Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1972

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

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Problems of Communism

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SEPT—OCT 1972 XXI

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Cover photo: First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, on May Day 1971 in Warsaw. Photo by James Blair, copyright 1972, National Geographic Society.

1 Poland Under Gierek

20 A New Political Style
by Adam Bromke

20 A New Economic Approach
by Michael Gamarnikow

31 Hungary's NEM on a Treadmill
by Barnabas Büky

40 The Communist Powers and the Middle East
Moscow's Purposes
by John C. Campbell

54 Peking's Revised Line
by W. A. C. Adie

69 Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Constitutional Reform
by Jerome M. Gilison

BOOKS

79 The Plight of the Minorities
by Roman Szporluk

84 Lysenkoism: The Un-Science
by Richard M. Mills

87 Shifting Soviet Assessments of Africa
by Helen Desfosses Cohn

90 The Agricultural Base of China's Political Economy
by Werner E. Klatt

95 Czechoslovakia: 1968 in Perspective
by Zvi Y. Gitelman

NOTES & VIEWS

96 Correspondence

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Poland Under Gierek

EDITORS' NOTE: In December 1970 Edward Gierek was catapulted to power in Poland by tumultuous riots in Gdansk and Szczecin. Just as it is commonly accepted—both within Poland and without—that the December events were r o mere "bread riots," so it is generally conceded that the accession of Gierek to the position of First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party has entailed more than just a changing of the Communist guard in Warsaw. Below we present two assessments of the first eighteen months of rule by the new Polish leadership. Mr. Bromke argues that Gierek's pragmatic and somewhat more open style has permitted the new party chief to consolidate political power and restore a measure of stability and purpose to Polish society. Mr. Gamarnikow restricts his analysis to the Polish economy, where he discerns the emergence of a pronounced consumerist orientation—a shift in priorities that he sees undercut by the party's delay in introducing comprehensive decentralization of economic decision-making.

A New Political Style

By Adam Bromke

When Edward Gierek came to power in Poland in December 1970, his position was extremely difficult. The uprisings that had broken out in the coastal cities and precipitated the fall of Wladyslaw Gomulka left the atmosphere in the country very tense, and spreading unrest among the workers manifested itself in new work stoppages at the shipyards in Szczecin and Gdansk toward the end of January and at the textile mills in Lodz in mid-February. There was a distinct danger that the strikes might result in renewed violence and bloodshed. Indeed, as one Polish commentator observed, the country was like a volcano that might erupt at any moment.[1]

Gierek's situation was complicated by several factors, not the least of which was the critical state of the economy resulting from fifteen years of inept management under Gomulka.[2] Sorely-needed reform of the economic system had been delayed so long

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[1] Karol Malcuzynski, *Kultura* (Warsaw), April 4, 1971. For the evaluation of the situation in Poland at the time of Gierek's takeover see Adam Bromke, "Beyond the Gomulka Era," *Foreign Affairs*, (New York), April 1971, pp. 480-92; Stanislaw Staron, "The Winds of Change in Poland," *East Europe*, (New York), April 1971, pp. 2-10; A. Ross Johnson, "Polish Perspectives, Past and Present," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1971, pp. 59-72; and V. C. Chrypinski, "Poland," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Eds., *The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1972, pp. 95-120.

[2] For analysis of Gomulka's economic policies in the 1960's, see Stefan Markowski, "Mr. Gomulka's Economic Legacy: The Roots of Dissent," *The World Today* (London), February 1971, pp. 56-67, and also Michael Gamarnikow's article, which follows in these pages.

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that by 1970 drastic measures had to be introduced, inflicting severe hardships on the population. The Poles, however, after over two decades of extensive industrialization and limited consumption, were in no mood to accept further deprivations and instead demanded to have their sacrifices tangibly rewarded by an improved standard of living. Against this background, it was hardly surprising that the Gomulka regime's ill-timed move to increase food prices sparked the December 1970 workers' riots. Gierek quickly reversed his predecessor's harsh action, but as for further economic relief to the population at large, he could do little more than promise better things sometime in the future.

Gierek also had to cope with the fact that the credibility of the Communist regime had been seriously undermined. The vast majority of Poles, who had supported Gomulka in 1956 only to become thoroughly disillusioned with him over the ensuing decade and a half, were not disposed to place much trust in the promises of his successor. "Gierek," wrote one of the readers of the weekly *Polityka*, "arouses considerable sympathy; yet it cannot be compared with the feelings which most of us had toward Gomulka in 1956. After such a letdown one has to watch the authorities." [3] The people, in short, demanded action rather than mere promises, and the new leadership could no longer count on their unlimited patience.

Even more important was the fact that Gierek lacked an effective political instrument with which to carry out any new policy. The ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) was torn by internal dissension. While Gomulka and his top lieutenants Zenon Kliszko, Ryszard Strzelecki, Boleslaw Jaszczuk, and Marian Spychalski had been removed from the Politburo in December 1970, many other former Gomulka supporters remained entrenched in key party posts. In addition, Gierek faced a potential challenge from the "Partisans," led by Mieczyslaw Moczar. This faction, which controlled the security forces, had helped Gierek remove Gomulka, but it was doubtful that Moczar's elevation to full membership in the Politburo in December 1970 was enough of a reward to satisfy his political aspirations. He clearly expected to share power with Gierek and could at any moment change from a collaborator into a rival. Thus, it was not without reason that in February 1971 the Warsaw daily *Zycie Warszawy* reported "an acute struggle . . . going on between the old and the new at many levels" in Poland.[4]

Last but not least, Gierek had to carry out his policies in Poland with one eye on Moscow. True, the Soviet Union had acted with unusual restraint during the December 1970 crisis, carefully avoiding any impression of overt interference in Polish affairs. The new Polish leaders were promptly endorsed by Moscow, and in February 1971 the Russians even extended credits to help Gierek cope with the country's most urgent economic problems. Yet, heightened Soviet sensitivity to political changes in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia was doubtless a factor that Gierek could not ignore. There was the danger that, if the situation in Poland were to get out of hand, the Russians might shed their restraint and intervene militarily. Some Polish Communist leaders clearly had this possibility in mind when, at the meeting of the Central Committee in February 1971, they spoke of the need to avoid "a catastrophe" and "a great tragedy." [5]

The combined effect of all these factors was to impose severe restrictions on Gierek's room for political maneuver. Whichever road he took, his course was fraught with grave perils. Yet, within little more than a year, he managed to bring the situation in the country pretty well under control.[6] He acted energetically and with great political skill, moving on a broad front to attack the most urgent problems first, while not ignoring the others. In this way he not only effectively defused existing tensions but also began —almost imperceptibly—to formulate and implement a long-range program of economic and social reform. At the same time he left no doubt that he remained in full charge of the reform process.

The first problem to which Gierek directed his attention was the consolidation and legitimation of his own power position. In a series of swift political moves, he disposed of his rivals one by one to

[3] Quoted in Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, "Perspektywa" (Perspective), *Polityka* (Warsaw) Feb. 13, 1972.

[4] Feb. 19, 1971.

[5] See comments by Jozef Cyrankiewicz and Mieczyslaw Moczar in *Nowe drogi* (Warsaw), Special number [undated], pp. 208, 215. Circulation of this issue of the PUWP's theoretical monthly was limited to a select circle of party officials, although several copies have made their way to the West.

[6] For early evaluation of Gierek's policies see Michael Costello, "Poland Today: Political Prospects," *Survey* (London), Summer 1971, pp. 53-73; Richard Davy, "Changing the Face of Polish Communism," *The Times* (London), May 25-26, 1971; Adam Bromke, "A Better Way of Life Comes to Poland," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), Dec. 1, 1971; and John J. Lenaghan, *The Limits to Freedom: Poland in World Affairs, 1964-1972*, Occasional Papers, School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, May 1972.

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emerge, toward the end of 1971, as undisputed leader in the ruling bodies of the PUWP. His authority was sanctioned by the Sixth PUWP Congress, convened in December 1971, a year ahead of the statutory date, and by the parliamentary elections which were held in March 1972, also a year ahead of schedule.

Consolidation of Power

The purge of Gomulka's former supporters progressed in piecemeal fashion throughout 1971. In February, the trade union boss, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, and one of Gomulka's younger aides, Stanislaw Kociolek, were removed from the Politburo; and in June, Artur Starewicz was released from the party Secretariat. At the Sixth Party Congress, former Premier and State Council Chairman Jozef Cyrankiewicz and Foreign Minister Stefan Jedrychowski also lost their Politburo seats, and after the March 1972 elections the former was dropped altogether from the government, while the latter was demoted to the lesser post of Finance Minister. At the same time two other younger Gomulka followers, while remaining members of the Politburo, were relieved of their positions in the Secretariat and transferred to the government: Jozef Tejchma as Deputy Premier and Stefan Olszowski as Foreign Minister.

Gierek had meanwhile begun moving against Moczar in the spring of 1971. Moczar was excluded from the PUWP delegation which attended the Soviet 24th Party Congress in April. When Gierek returned from Moscow, he quickly relieved Moczar of his Secretariat duties in charge of security affairs, transferring that responsibility to a close follower, Stanislaw Kania. In June, after being demoted to the politically insignificant post of Chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control, Moczar resigned altogether from the Party Secretariat, and at the same time Kania launched a wholesale purge of Moczar's supporters in the security apparatus. Deputy Minister of Interior General Ryszard Matejewski and several other high-ranking officials in the Ministry were arrested in June and charged with gross corruption (they were eventually tried in February 1972, Matejewski receiving a 12-year prison sentence and five other defendants getting lesser sentences). The purge continued, and by the fall of 1971 some 200 people had been summarily dismissed from the security apparatus.

The next move against Moczar came at the Sixth Party Congress, when he was ousted from the Politburo. (At the same time, one of his supporters, Warsaw Party Secretary Jozef Kempa, was retained as an alternate Politburo member but was denied promotion to full membership.) In May 1972, Moczar lost yet another of his power bases when he was removed from the presidency of the influential Association of World War Veterans. Although he remained a member of the Central Committee and a deputy in parliament, his political influence had virtually disappeared.

To replace the Gomulkaites and Moczarites, Gierek meanwhile moved in his own supporters, mostly younger men. By the conclusion of the Sixth Party Congress, only seven of the eighteen people who had been serving in the Politburo and Secretariat in December 1970 remained, and none of these had served in either body prior to 1968. The Sixth Congress also effected a drastic change in the composition of the Central Committee, with roughly half those elected—again mostly young men—entering the Committee for the first time. Of the 115 full members, only some 30 had reached this rank prior to 1968. The rejuvenation of these key party organizations also clearly establishes Gierek, who has been in the Politburo since 1959 and in the Central Committee since 1954, as a senior figure in the top echelon of the PUWP.

From the top, the purge gradually descended to the lower party ranks. By February 1972, twelve out of eighteen provincial secretaries had been replaced by new men. The party also began a massive screening of its general membership. In the first half of 1971, individual interviews were conducted with about 1,150,000 persons—*i.e.*, roughly half the PUWP membership—resulting in the removal of some 100,000 from the party rolls. Early in 1972, another round of screenings was undertaken, this time covering about one-third of the membership. Its stated objective was "to mobilize party activists to a still better execution of tasks arising from the resolutions of the Sixth PUWP Congress" [7]—in other words, to make the PUWP a more effective instrument for implementing Gierek's policies.

Perhaps the most significant result of these developments has been a radical change in the social profile of the Polish ruling elite. Gierek, himself, is symbolic of this change. His whole background differs strikingly from that of the predominantly intellectual-ideologue types who ran the party under

[7] *Zycie partii* (Warsaw), March 1972.

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GOMULKA'S LEGACY:

Problems of the Workers

Below are statements made by striking workers at the Adolf Warski Shipyard in Szczecin during a meeting with Polish party leader Edward Gierek on January 24, 1971. A tape of this session was published in Ewa Wacowska, Ed., Rewolta szczecinska i jej znaczenie *(The Szczecin Revolt and Its Significance), Paris, Institut Literacki, 1971.*

DELEGATE K-4: Work in our division is harmful to one's health. At present every second worker who works on the slips is blind, deaf, rheumatic, or afflicted with some form of lung disease, and all for so little money. . . . An assistant makes 1,800 to 2,000 zlotys [a month]. Let's look at his expenditures. In a family of five: for breakfast each has a roll with water—cost, 2 zlotys; for supper the same, a total of 4 zlotys; the least expensive lunch is 12 zlotys per person, *i.e.*, 60 zlotys. [This comes to an overall] total of 64 zlotys a day. In a month this amounts to 1,800-1,900 zlotys—for mere subsistence. . . .

DELEGATE W-6: In our division the average wage is 2,000 zlotys. . . . This is really very little. Very little! After paying rent, electricity, gas, etc., a worker is left with 1,600 zlotys. No family can survive on it. So, to make more money we work overtime. . . . I know many people who regularly do 150 or even 200 hours overtime a month. This means that they are virtually visitors in their own homes.

DELEGATE ZGW: . . . there have emerged men who live off the efforts of manual workers, but who sit behind their desks and decide our wages. Is this democracy? (Pounding his fist on the table.) No! (Applause.)

MEMBER OF THE STRIKE COMMITTEE: I do not know whether this is just gossip or a lie, but I have heard that *Director Skrobot makes 18,000 zlotys a month. If so, this* has to be changed. For some live in luxury while others have barely enough for bread. . . .

DELEGATE SOW!: Here we had a Comrade Skrzydlowski. During eleven months, it is said, he was paid over 170,000 zlotys. Not as basic salary, of course, but from all sorts of bonuses. But all the evil is not at the bottom! Our manager is like an estate overseer in the interwar period. . . . People frequently blame the party and the system for all of this. . . .

DELEGATE W-4: The average income in our division is 2,600 zlotys for eight hours a day . . . 2,600 or even 3,000 zlotys at the current prices amounts to very little, especially if one has three or four persons to support. . . . This should be taken into account by those comrades from the Central Committee who are here today. It is necessary to understand the position of the people who earn so little—for what can they do? We have a saying: "When a Pole is hungry, he is angry" —hence the present upheaval. (Strong applause.) It stems directly from our dissatisfaction. (Applause.)

DELEGATE K-2: Many young people were killed [in the December rioting]—they were shot in the back. There is evidence of that. So many people were killed, so many people. . . . People who were killed were put in nylon bags and buried like animals. This is true! Nothing can change this. . . .

DELEGATE K-1: We are not going to count bodies, for it is difficult to count exactly how many fell on the streets. We were given the figure of 17 for Szczecin. . . . Well, I am not going to contradict this, but I know there were more—for sure! For where bullets fly, people die. But it is sad that our hard-earned money paid for these very bullets which were used against us. . . . How is it possible for the working class [*i.e.*, the party] to turn against the working class?

DELEGATE W-2: I ask for a frank answer from the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP. Is it necessary to shed blood to change the Central Committee and the government? Is it not possible to consider a fixed term of office in order to avoid a repetition of 1956 and 1970?

DELEGATE MAMOR: . . . we demand that the guilty ones—both those who actually did the shooting and those who gave the orders to shoot the workers—be punished. (Applause.) Regardless of who they are or what positions they occupy. . . .

DELEGATE K-3: We must give Comrade Gierek a chance. . . . We must have confidence in him, as we had confidence in Gomulka. Except that the latter failed us. . . .

DELEGATE W-4: The situation in our division is that everybody wants to continue the strike. Comrade Gierek, Comrade *Jaroszewicz, your arguments did not convince the people* from our division. Yet, after long and stormy discussion, we have come to the conclusion that alone we cannot continue the strike. We are ending the strike not because we think we should but because all the others are doing it. That's all.

DELEGATE MKP: We have to give the government a chance for a year or two. . . . We must do it! If in a year or two there is no improvement, then we will say: Comrades, we were deceived.

CHAIRMAN OF THE STRIKE COMMITTEE: The strike is over! The strike is over! As of tomorrow the shipyard is back at work.

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: Sorry, I would like to say something about those who will not report for work tomorrow. I would like to ask everybody to pay a tribute to their memory by observing a minute of silence. . . . (37 seconds of silence.)

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TWO VANTAGE POINTS

Problems of the Party

Below are statements made by members of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party at its Eighth Plenum, held February 6-7, 1971. The transcript was published in a special, undated issue of Nowe drogi *(Warsaw) which was distributed to a select group of party activists but later leaked to outside sources.*

WINCENTY KRASKO (Head of the Central Committee's Cultural Department): The tragedy of the December days is behind us, but the drama is not yet over. It goes on in the form of intense discussions in each factory, each village, in each Polish family. These are discussions full of pain and bitterness not only because of the confidence that was abused but, above all, because of the missed opportunities for quicker development of our country, the losses which could have been avoided, and the moral damage which Poland has suffered.

The [December] events signaled that our country was threatened with a serious disease. The brain of the party suffered from serious disorders. . . .There was a sharp contradiction between the intellectual and educational achievements of the people, and the anachronistic (not to use a stronger expression) working style of the leaders. . . . Their work was characterized by subjectivity, dilettantism, lack of systematic information, and insufficient preparation before making decisions.

ANDRZEJ WERBLAN (Head of the Department of Science and Education, Central Committee): We were faced with a situation in the party where the top political leaders remained too long—ur. . .eir intellectual potentialities were totally exhausted, until they were totally unable to deal with new problems and were more and more inclined to make irrational decisions.

JAN OSSOWSKI (Member of the Central Planning Commission): The comrades from the former leadership cut themselves off from reality. They denied it. They did not understand the daily affairs of the working man. They did not know about his living conditions, the difficulties in getting to work, the lines at the shops, the shortages of goods, etc.

HENRYK SZAFRANSKI (Secretary of the Warsaw Provincial Committee): For a long time one could sense that there was something terribly wrong with the party. . . . Doubts were repressed by using the authority of the Politburo and especially that of Comrade Gomulka. . . . We got entangled in the mechanism of power which we ourselves had created. Authority became transformed into autocracy.

JOZEF CYRANKIEWICZ (Politburo Member, Chairman of the State Council, and former Premier): In the leadership of the party . . . there was almost complete decline of the principle of collectivity. . . . It was not possible to present one's views . . . at the meetings of the Politburo, for it only aroused the egotistic sensitivity of Comrade Gomulka and assailed his sense of authority. . . .

MIECZYSLAW MOCZAR (Politburo Member and Secretary of the Central Committee): Comrade Wieslaw [Gomulka] . . . was an autocrat. He could not stand independent people around him. . . . In such a situation, as usual, some "helpful" people emerged and they did "help" Wieslaw. . . . [They] presented him with all sorts of statistics and tables, arguing that these were truths which only his enemies would contradict.

PIOTR JAROSZEWICZ (Premier): It is generally known and well documented that the former Economic Secretary of the Central Committee [Boleslaw Jaszczuk—Ed.], by exploiting the authority of the First Secretary and by referring to opinions and decisions which had been influenced by himself, interfered in all the activities of the government. . . .

WIESLAW BEK (Head of the Central Committee's Press Department): Any critical remarks in the newspapers, even the most innocuous, if they contradicted the views of the people who had been responsible for the economic decisions, immediately aroused their nervousness. This was illustrated by the government decision, made in mid-October 1970, to stop supplying [the press with] essential information. This, in effect, reduced the task of the journalists to the mere reiteration of the ideas . . . of the former leaders.

WLADYSLAW KRUCZEK (Politburo Member and Chairman of the Central Council of the Trade Unions): With the complete abandonment of the principles of socialist democracy within the party and the state, the trade unions played little part in the decisions affecting vital problems of the working people.

WLADYSLAW KOZDRA (First Secretary of the Lublin Provincial Committee): Among the many problems . . . which the political crisis revealed to the party and the nation, one is foremost in our minds: How to avoid tragic upheavals in the future. How to achieve an effective way to formulate and implement the best methods of development; how to create the conditions in which the party and the society, in a natural, simple and obvious way, without pain, riots and upheavals, can select new leaders; how to ensure that the rights of the ruling class, the working class, are secure; and how to make certain that the constitutional rights of all citizens of People's Poland are observed. What sort of checks are needed to prevent the inherent tendencies of some individuals to restrict the process of collective decision-making and abuse democracy both within and without the party?

—Translated by Adam Bromke

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Gomulka. In the first place, he is of genuine proletarian origins: son of a Silesian miner who perished in a mine accident, he himself worked in the mines from the age of 13 until he was about 30 (only later, when he was already in his forties, did he earn a degree in mining engineering). Second, Gierek's career with the PUWP, which he joined in 1948, has been centered in Silesia. He served as secretary of the Katowice Provincial Committee in 1949-54 and as First Secretary of that body in 1957-70. It was his reputation there as a first-class administrator that led to his selection to succeed Gomulka in December 1970. Gierek's pragmatic Silesian background was intensified during his youth when he spent long periods in Western Europe—working as a miner and participating in trade union activity. Expelled from France in 1934 for participating in a miners' strike, he later went to Belgium and again worked in a coal mine, also becoming active in the Communist movement. He returned to Poland only in 1948, at the age of 35.

The New Elite

Not only is Gierek himself, at 59, eight years junior to Gomulka, but he has forged a leadership team that is conspicuous for its relative youth. Of 19 key individuals elected by the Sixth Party Congress to the Politburo and Secretariat, 15 were born after 1920, with the result that the average age of full Politburo members has been reduced from 57 years as of 1968 to 51 as of 1971, while the average age of Politburo alternates and Central Committee secretaries has dropped to only 45. This makes the present Polish ruling elite one of the youngest in age composition not only in the Communist orbit but also in Europe as a whole.

Many of these new additions to the top echelon have had relatively short experience in Communist ranks. Only two out of the 19 top PUWP leaders participated in the Communist movement prior to World War II,[8] while three others date their membership back to the war years. The rest joined the PUWP only after the war, several of them not until the early 1950's (although they had previously belonged to Communist youth organizations). The new elite's claim to rule is thus based not—as was that of the Gomulka group—on long participation in the revolutionary struggle, but rather on educational achievement and administrative experience.[9] The educational qualifications of the Gierek group are good, with five out of 19 top echelon officials holding doctorates and all the younger ones having university degrees or at least diplomas from party schools. They acquired their administrative experience by serving as provincial party secretaries, as heads of Central Committee departments, or as leaders of Communist youth organizations.[10]

At the pinnacle of the PUWP leadership is a group with close links to Upper Silesia. In addition to Gierek, five of the 19 members of the Politburo and Secretariat are Silesians from miners' families, and four hold degrees in mining engineering. One of them boasts a background strikingly similar to Gierek's, having entered the Communist movement in his youth while working as a miner in France and Belgium; and four served under Gierek in the Katowice party apparatus. Together with Gierek, these persons constitute the "inner circle" of the present Polish leadership. They occupy five out of nine posts in the Central Committee Secretariat, while four of them (Gierek, Edward Babiuch, Franciszek Szlachcic, and Jan Szydlak) are also full members of the Politburo. Significantly, the latter are the only members of the top leadership who combine these two key party posts.

The different background of the new ruling elite undoubtedly accounts for the fact that their social philosophy and political style also differ radically in many respects from those of the Gomulka group. The Gierek people are not professional revolutionaries but administrators; and as such they are less ideological and more pragmatic than their predecessors. This does not mean that they are not loyal Communists—in their youth (during the Stalinist period) they were exposed to intense political indoctrination, and they have since made their careers within the party.

[8] In fact only one, Wladyslaw Kruczek, belonged to the interwar Communist Party of Poland, whereas Gierek had been a member of the French and, then, Belgian Communist Party. In addition, Henryk Jablonski belonged to the prewar Polish Socialist Party.

[9] Ryszard Strzelecki highlighted the contrast between the two types of background in his speech of self-defense at the Central Committee meeting in February 1971: "I have devoted all my life to the country and the party. I have served faithfully at a time when one could not count on the promotion from one armchair into another, but when the only reward was . . . imprisonment, tortures or death." *Nowe drogi*, Special Number, pp. 145-46.

[10] Indeed, as such the new elite is the first since the 18th century to reach the top in Poland through regular channels. The interwar elite based its claim to rule the country on participation in the struggle for Poland's independence during World War I.

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Nonetheless, they are Communists of a new vintage, less concerned with a distant vision of proletarian paradise than with everyday practical issues. Products of an industrial society, they understand its functioning well; of proletarian background, they are genuinely concerned about bettering the workers' lot. Their exposure to Western influences—not only French and Belgian, but also German (which remains strong in Silesia)—has impressed upon them that the path to improved living standards is improved economic performance. Their first priorities, then, are to increase production and modernize the Polish economy.

In the realm of foreign policy, the new party leaders—not only as Communists but also as Poles—regard the maintenance of a close alliance between Poland and the Soviet Union as axiomatic. The members of the inner circle in particular, having their roots in western Poland, exhibit less anti-Russian bias than their compatriots from the eastern provinces; indeed, if anything, they look to the USSR as an effective counterforce to keep Germany in check. This pro-Soviet inclination may be further strengthened by close ties with the French Communist Party, which has a record of firm loyalty to Moscow—at times bordering on idolatry. Thus, in contrast to the Gomulka group, whose attitudes toward Moscow were often a complex mixture of *Hass und Liebe,* the Gierek team reveals no such ambivalence. They favor close bonds between Poland and the Soviet Union out of choice rather than compulsion, and in turn they expect the Russians to treat Poland not as a satellite but as an ally capable of playing an important role in European politics.

Economic and Social Objectives

The main thrust of Gierek's domestic policy has been directed toward improving the living conditions of the Polish population. This effort has evolved through a first stage of basically stopgap measures into a broader program of more fundamental social and economic changes. [The Gierek economic program will be discussed in greater detail in Mr. Gamarnikow's article which follows; what are presented here are those aspects of economic policy which have direct social and political relevance.—Ed.]

The immediate moves of the Gierek team to defuse the December 1970 crisis included scrapping the objectionable wage-incentive system (which had entailed a two-year wage freeze for most workers while expanding bonuses for a few) and—a short time later—the unpopular December increases in food prices; raising pensions and minimum wages; and accelerating housing construction. In agriculture, the government abandoned Gomulka's fruitless quest for self-sufficiency in grain (which had adversely affected meat and dairly production) and raised procurement prices for meat and milk.



MOTIVE POWER

—Uncaptioned cartoon from *Tygodnik powszechny* (Cracow), Sept. 12, 1971.

A comprehensive reform in agricultural policy announced in April 1971 went into effect in January 1972. The unpopular system of compulsory deliveries of animals, grain, and potatoes to the state was abolished; property laws were revised giving an individual farmer a greater sense of security; a fundamental change in land taxes was introduced; and finally health services were extended to farmers and their families, a total of 6.5 million persons.

These initial changes in the socio-economic sphere brought about a tangible improvement in the standard of living. In contrast to 1961-70, when individual income on the average increased 1.8 percent annually, the average increase in 1971 was over 5 percent. At the same time the supply of consumer goods increased substantially: the shortages of meat and butter were largely eliminated, and a greater variety of clothing, including imported goods, was made available. Yet, the government acknowledged that these gains by themselves were insufficient. The year 1971 was described as a period of convalescence after which many new efforts would be needed to attain full economic recovery.[11]

The shape of the next stage in Poland's economic development—through 1975—was worked out during 1971 by a commission of experts headed by Jan Szydlak and was adopted in December by the Sixth

[11] "Rekonwalescencja" (Convalescence), *Polityka*, Jan. 29, 1972.

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Party Congress.[12] The new program for 1971-75 stood in sharp contrast to that put forward by Gomulka in December 1970. The essence of the new approach was outlined in a pamphlet delineating Polish aims in the 1970's:

The new socio-economic policy is based on the assumption that it is already possible for the present generation to benefit from the economic progress of Poland. . . . The crux of the problem is, while not ignoring economic growth, to attain the maximum possible standard of living. In short, the objective is to promote parallel social and economic development of the country.[13]

In fact, the new PUWP leadership has accepted the unlikely (for a socialist state) concept that "increased consumption is an important and necessary factor in economic growth."[14]

The social goals for 1971-75 are very ambitious. Average income is to increase by 18 percent at the same time that working time is reduced. Full employment is to be maintained, requiring the creation of jobs for some 1.8 million young people scheduled to complete secondary or university education in the next four years. A committee of experts headed by the internationally famous sociologist, Professor Jan Szczepanski, is reviewing the entire school system in the interest of improving its functioning. The variety and quality of consumer goods is to be improved, in part through imports, and 600,000 inexpensive automobiles are to be produced and marketed. An estimated 1,080,000 apartments are to be built, and the construction industry is to be modernized in order to handle even larger housing programs in the latter half of the decade. New hospitals with a total of 16,000 beds are to be built, and 500 health centers are to be established in the countryside.

Success in achieving these ambitious goals, of course, depends on the performance of the economy, and the PUWP has targeted a 38-percent growth in Polish national income by 1975 (compared with 1970). The results for 1971 were encouraging but reflected a number of nonrecurring favorable phenomena—in particular, the utilization of existing reserves of credit within Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and an upturn in the prices of some Polish exports on world markets. In the long run, a more fundamental step is required: the drastic revision of the system of economic planning and management in order to increase efficiency and productivity. However, as noted by Mr. Garnikow, no comprehensive reforms have been forthcoming. In March 1972, a Warsaw daily highlighted the need for reform and indicated that the Polish government might soon begin to move with more determination on this front:

In the last fifteen months . . . the efforts of the government concentrated mainly on the reorientation of the development of the country, overcoming stagnation in the economy and adjusting it to fit the needs and aspirations of the society. . . . This is, however, only the beginning of the road. Progress in this sphere must be based on the reorganization of the entire system of planning and management. Premier Jaroszewicz has [in his speech of March 28] announced such changes. . . . More elastic planning and more effective distribution of income, better organization of foreign trade, strengthening the responsibility of managers, improvements in the financial system—these are the directions where basic changes are under way.[15]

Yet, so far, no concrete steps have followed. Only time will tell whether Gierek will, indeed, introduce the comprehensive, far-reaching reforms which the Polish economy requires.

The Credibility Gap

A highly important adjunct to the Gierek leadership's moves to resolve social and economic problems has been its effort to remedy the credibility gap separating the party and the general public—a legacy of the skepticism built up during the 14 years of Gomulka's ineffective rule. The new leadership has publicized its "new methods of political work"[16] designed to demonstrate its accessibility to the public and its genuine concern for popular wishes and

[12] "VI Zjazd Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej, Uchwala o dalszy socjalistyczny rozwoj Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej," (Sixth Congress of the Polish United Worker's Party, Resolution Concerning the Future Socialist Development of the Polish People's Republic), Warsaw, Trybuna ludu, December 1971. The 1971-75 plan was finally adopted in June 1972.

[13] Natalia Swidzinska, *Polska lat siedemdziesiatych* (Poland in the 1970's), Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1972, p. 8.

[14] See the speech of Jan Szydlak printed in *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Oct. 14, 1971.

[15] In *Zycie Warszawy*, March 30, 1972.

[16] "Procesy posytywne, nowy styl pracy, problemy do dyskusji" (Constructive Changes, New Styles of Work, Problems for Discussion), *Polityka*, Sept. 25, 1971.

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opinions. The practice of conducting direct discussions with workers to review their grievances, initiated by Gierek with his dramatic personal visits to the shipyards in Szczecin and Gdansk in January 1971, has been continued, if under less critical circumstances. Gierek and his top lieutenants frequently travel around the country to visit factories and villages and hold informal talks with local people. Some 160 major industrial enterprises have been singled out for special attention. Specific issues, such as the best methods of increasing the incomes of the lowest-paid categories of personnel, were submitted to the workers for discussion and recommendations.

Regular channels of information about the activities of party and government leaders have also been established. Short communiques are now issued after each Politburo meeting. A government spokesman was appointed in March 1971 to act as a regular liaison between the Council of Ministers and the press. A journalist from the Communist weekly *Polityka* was invited in the fall of 1971 to sit in on three Cabinet meetings with a view to stripping away the "unnecessary veil of secrecy and unapproachability." [17] In June 1971, a highly successful open-line television program called "The Citizens' Tribune" was launched. This format, in which the top party leaders answer questions from all over the country, has been repeated at regular intervals. Also, soon after Gierek came to power, an October 1970 law restricting the release of information to the press by local officials and enterprise managers was rescinded. As a result of all these measures, the tone of the press has changed considerably. Many sensitive issues are now being openly discussed, and highly unorthodox articles—not only critical of current government policies but posing fundamental questions about the nature of the political system itself—have appeared, especially in the Cracow Catholic weekly *Tygodnik powszechny* and in *Polityka.*

Nevertheless, information made available to the public is still carefully screened. The regime's promise to reveal all the facts about the brutal repression of the workers' demonstrations in December 1970 was not kept. A special issue of the party monthly *Nowe drogi* containing a record of the debate that took place on this subject in the Central Committee on February 6-7, 1971, was never put on sale and was circulated only to a very restricted number of party activists.[18] (Politburo member Szydlak was greatly embarrassed when he appeared on national television on June 2, 1971, and was repeatedly asked to explain this.) Press censorship, though perhaps less rigorous, continues, and foreign newspapers are no more easily available in Poland now than in Gomulka's days. Indeed, in at least one respect, Gierek has outdone Gomulka: jamming of Radio Free Europe, abolished in 1956, was resumed in March 1971.

Courting the Intellectuals

Although clearly most concerned about improving the PUWP's image among the workers, Gierek has also moved to mend the party's fences with the intellectuals. To be sure, he has never repudiated the repressive measures taken by Gomulka against students and writers in 1968, and at the Sixth Party Congress he explicitly condemned "revisionist tendencies" among these groups.[19] Nevertheless, during 1971 he made a number of conciliatory gestures aimed at achieving a *modus vivendi* between the government and the intellectuals. The youth leaders who had been jailed for opposing Gomulka's policies were released; writers who had been barred from publishing under Gomulka—notably Antoni Slonimski and Stefan Kisielewski—once again appeared in print; a new historical book by the late Pawel Jasienica was published, and émigré playwright Slawomir Mrozek was invited to return to Poland from the West. Late in the summer, Gierek personally met with Igor Newerly, Chairman of the rebellious Warsaw Branch of the Polish Writers' Union, and soon thereafter the new Minister of Culture, Stanislaw Wronski, met with several well-known writers.

In February 1972, on the eve of the Congress of the Polish Writers' Union, Slonimski published an article which praised "the change in the style of

[17] Daniel Passent, "Jak pracuje rzad? Piatek, od dziesiatej do piatej" (How the Cabinet Works? Friday, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.), *ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1972.

[18] In this respect Gierek proved to be even more secretive than Gomulka, for the deliberations of the Central Committee of October 19-21, 1956, reviewing the political crisis in the country of that year, had been published in the regular issue of the party monthly. See "VIII Plenum Komitetu Centralnego PZPR, 19-21, X, 1956 r." (The 8th Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee, Oct. 19-21, 1956), *Nowe drogi*, October 1956.

[19] *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 7, 1971. For a comprehensive account of the intellectual ferment in 1968 see two volumes of documents: *Wydarzenia marcowe, 1968* (The March 1968 Events) and *Polskie przedwiosnie* (The Polish Early Spring), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1969; also: A. Ross Johnson, "Poland: The End of the Post-October Era," *Survey*, July 1968 (pp. 87-98); and Adam Bromke, "Poland's Political Crisis," *The World Today*, March 1969, pp. 117-26.

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Upper left—Polish villagers present Edward Gierek, PUWP First Secretary, with a traditional welcome of "bread and salt": photo from Poland *magazine (Warsaw), June 1972, p. 6. Center left—Gierek visits with Warsaw steelworkers: Eastfoto. Lower left—The party chief visits a state farm in Poznan Province: Eastfoto. Upper right—Gierek discusses operations with plant engineers:* Poland, *June 1972, p. 7. Lower right—Polish mining students chat with a veteran of the Silesian pits:* Samo Zycie *(From Life Itself), Warsaw Wydawnictwa Artystyczne i Filmowe, 1971, plate 19, via Eastfoto.*

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relations between the authorities and the public" and noted the possibility of "an agreement between the authorities and creative circles." He argued, "It would be irresponsible to pretend that there are no conflicts, but it would be equally irresponsible to pretend that no compromise is possible."[20] Indeed, some sort of compromise did seem to emerge at the Congress, which subsequently took place in Lodz. While voicing his preference for ideologically-committed works, Minister of Culture Wronski emphasized that, barring fundamental political objections, "we do not and will not restrict the freedom of creative cultural activity,"[21] and as an evidence of good will he promised improved working facilities and higher remuneration for writers. Several speakers voiced continued apprehension about the government's cultural policies, but on the whole their criticism was quite restrained. The elections to the new board of the Writers' Union also reflected the effort to achieve a *modus vivendi.* While the key posts remained in the hands of people loyal to the party, several figures who had taken a hard-line stance in 1968 lost their seats on the board and were replaced with well-known liberals. Soon after the Congress, a new weekly, *Literatura,* was launched in Warsaw. Its chief editor is a party stalwart, Jerzy Putrament, but the editorial board includes several people known for their liberal views, notably Gustaw Gottesman, the former editor of *Przeglad kulturalny,* an outspoken weekly shut down by Gomulka in 1963.

On the other hand, it has been made plain that the regime, while willing to tolerate somewhat greater freedom of expression, fully intends to keep a firm grip on the reins. Though the first edition of Jasienica's new book quickly sold out, the authorities have yet to authorize a second edition. Publication of a biography of the national democratic leader, Roman Dmowski, written by the Catholic writer Andrzej Micewski, has been considerably delayed. The scholars who were involved in the disturbances of March 1968 have not yet been allowed to resume university teaching. And the members of an underground youth group called "Ruch," who were brought to trial in 1971, were given prison sentences even harsher than those handed down in the Gomulka period,[22] evoking a joint protest by seventeen noted Polish intellectuals. In sum, the truce between the regime and the intellectuals remains extremely fragile.

Toward a Broader Base

Besides trying to better the regime's relations with the intellectuals, Gierek has also sought to broaden his base of popular support by taking actions specifically designed to win mass support outside the party rank and file. One such action, calculated to appeal to Polish nationalist sentiment, was the decision to rebuild the Warsaw Royal Castle, which had been demolished during the war and which Gomulka saw no need to restore in the capital of People's Poland. A public committee, which included the Bishop of Warsaw and several well-known intellectuals, was established in January 1971 to solicit support and funds for the project from Poles both at home and abroad. The reconstruction work was soon started and is to be completed by mid-1974.

The regime has also promised to promote greater participation in the government by people from outside the ranks of the PUWP. In February 1971, an independent deputy, Mrs. Halina Skibniewska, was elected a Deputy Speaker of the Sejm (Poland's parliament), and at the same time Jozef Tejchma declared the strengthening of all representative bodies, particularly the Sejm to be a major party goal.[23] In June of the same year, the Presidium of the National Unity Front—an umbrella organization through which the PUWP supervises the political participation of two residual parties, the United Peasants' Party and the Democratic Party, as well as of other less structured groups—was reorganized to provide for stronger representation of non-party people. Breaking with the tradition that a Communist should hold the post, the Front elected unaffiliated Professor Janusz Groszkowski to be Chairman of the Presidium and two other non-party figures, Professor Jan Szczepanski and Konstanty Lubienski, a noted Catholic intellectual and vice-chairman of the Church-sponsored "Znak" circle of Sejm deputies, to be deputy chairmen.

Notwithstanding these friendly gestures, however, the Gierek leadership has made few changes that enlarge concretely the political opportunities af-

[20] "Kompromis" (Compromise), *Tygodnik powszechny* (Cracow), Feb. 6, 1972.

[21] *Trybuna ludu,* Feb. 6, 1972.

[22] For a systematic review of political trials in 1971, see "Nowe procesy polityczne" (New Political Trials), *Kultura* (Paris), December 1971.

[23] See the report of Tejchma to a plenary session of the Sejm, *Zycie Warszawy,* Feb. 14, 1971.

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

Polish workers begin the reconstruction of the Royal Castle in Warsaw, destroyed in World War II and left in ruins by Polish Communist leaders until Gierek.

—Polish Central Photo Agency.

forded non-party people. The parliamentary elections of March 1972 were particularly revealing in this regard. Although the make-up of the Sejm was altered (and rejuvenated) by the election of more workers and scientists, the voters were not given any greater leeway for expressing their preferences, and the party's screening of candidates was as tight as in the Gomulka days. In fact, the new Sejm compared unfavorably with that of 1957—elected in the early liberal phase of Gomulka's rule. Among the 460 deputies elected in 1972, only 49 were unaffiliated (the same number as had served since 1961) compared with 62 in the Sejm elected in 1957. Likewise, representation of Catholics remained at 10 seats—five each for the "Pax" group (fostered by the PUWP) and the Church-supported "Znak" group—which was less than the 12 seats (divided three and nine, respectively) which the Catholics held in 1957. Nor is there any convincing evidence of concrete steps to effect the promised increase in the powers of the Sejm.

There has also been little visible progress toward increasing the opportunities for non-party persons to function in lower-level administrative positions, despite considerable public discusson of the problem and official pledges to improve the situation. In a July 1971 article which drew heavy reader support, Mieczysław Rakowski, editor-in-chief of *Polityka,* noted the absurdity of trying to require that every director of a small factory, every schoolmaster, or every manager of a local savings bank be a PUWP member. Rakowski wrote:

Among the millions of non-party people there are many individuals superior in intelligence and performance to many party members. . . . A wise cadre policy must strictly observe the principle of equal opportunity for party and non-party people.[24]

Two months later, possibly in response to Rakowski's criticism, Edward Babiuch, Politburo member in charge of cadre policy, pledged to "emphasize even more strongly the need for placing highly qualified non-party specialists in executive positions." [25] Little seems to have been accomplished, however, apparently because local party authorities, jealously guarding their influence, have continued to discriminate against non-party specialists. As the leader of the "Znak" group of Catholic Sejm deputies, Stanislaw Stomma, complained in the spring of 1972,

. . . efforts to release social energy at the bottom are still unsatisfactory. This restricts social activity and adversely affects progress in the country.[26]

A *Modus Vivendi* with the Church

A particularly important aspect of the Gierek leadership's drive to gain broad popular acceptance has been its effort to improve relations with the Church, the institutional focus of Poland's millions of Catholics. In his very first speech to the Sejm after taking office in December 1970, Premier Jaroszewicz announced the government's readiness to normalize relations.[27] Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski responded cautiously but positively the next day in his Christmas

[24] "Dobry fachowiec ale bezpartyjny" (A Good Specialist, but a Non-Party One), *Polityka,* July 3, 1971.
[25] *Nowe drogi,* September 1971.
[26] *Tygodnik powszechny,* April 14, 1972.
[27] *Trybuna ludu,* Dec. 24, 1970.

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Eve sermon in Warsaw's St. John's Cathedral. On March 4, the two men met in the first state-Church encounter at this level since 1963. Although little was revealed of the substance of the three-hour negotiations, they presumably paved the way for several government concessions to the Church that followed. In June, ecclesiastical property in the former German territories was formally returned to the Church, and in February 1972 the regulations requiring the Church to keep a complete inventory of all its property, including that used for purely liturgical purposes, were abolished. The government also began to grant permission for the construction of new churches; some 30 permits had been granted by mid-1972. In another open gesture of accommodation, the Polish authorities helped airlift some 1,500 Polish Catholics to Rome for the ceremonies beatifying the Polish martyr of Auschwitz, Father Maksymilian Kolbe.

The concessions to the Polish Church were linked to negotiations looking toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. In April 1971 and again in November, Aleksander Skarzynski, Polish Deputy Minister in charge of religious affairs, conferred with Archbishop Agostino Casaroli, Secretary of the Vatican's Council for Public Affairs, but nothing concrete emerged from the discussions. The major obstacle was apparently Warsaw's insistence that the Vatican officially recognize Poland's western boundary—the Oder-Neisse line, established by the 1945 Potsdam Agreement. The Holy See was unwilling to take this step before ratification of the Polish-West German treaty terminating the territorial dispute between the two countries. The FRG's ratification of the treaty facilitated a breakthrough in these negotiations. On June 28, 1972, the Vatican appointed Polish bishops to six western dioceses of Poland, thereby acknowledging the ecclesiastical control of the Polish Church over these areas and implicitly recognizing the territories as part of Poland. The most significant appointment was that of Boleslaw Kominek as Archbishop of Wroclaw, an area which was still listed in the 1972 Vatican yearbook as "Breslavia" (the Latin version of its former German name, "Breslau").[28]

These developments do not indicate, however, that all issues in Church-state relations in Poland have been resolved. The Episcopate still complains that the situation in regard to the issuance of permits to erect churches—especially in newly-built workers' districts of the cities—has been far from satisfactory, and that, even when such permits have been granted, actual construction has been held up in some places by local PUWP officials. As if delays in the construction of new churches were not enough, on March 22, 1972, a provisional chapel in the village of Zbroza Duza, south of Warsaw, was demolished by the militia—an incident strongly condemned by Cardinal Wyszynski in his Lenten sermon in the Warsaw Cathedral.

The PUWP's clumsy efforts to manipulate and control the token Catholic representation in the Sejm have also antagonized the Church. In the selection of candidates for this year's election, the party successfully had Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a member of the Church-approved Znak group in the previous Sejm, dropped from the lists. He was replaced by the Secretary of the Warsaw Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia, Ludwik Aulajtner. But after his predictable election to the Sejm, Aulajtner was removed as Secretary of the Warsaw Club—a clear rebuke to

Warsaw's Royal Castle as it appeared in 1924.

—From *Stare Miasto i Zamek Krolewski w Warszawie* (The Old Town and Royal Castle in Warsaw), Warsaw, Arkady, 1971, p. 71.

[28] *The Washington Post*, June 29, 1972.

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the PUWP and its meddling. A further affront to independent Catholic opinion was the election by the Sejm of Boleslaw Piasecki, leader of the PUWP-sponsored Pax group among Catholic deputies, to membership in the State Council. Despite these symptoms of continuing tension, however, Premier Jaroszewicz, in his first address to the Sejm, repeated his call for normalization of relations for an agreement based on mutual concessions by the state and the Church.[29]

Polish-Soviet Relations

Although they have been heavily involved in domestic affairs, the new Polish leaders have not neglected foreign relations. Immediately after coming to power, Gierek was quick to stress the continuity of Polish foreign policy, particularly with respect to close friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union. In his message to the nation on December 20, 1970, Gierek stressed "fraternal and cordial cooperation" with the USSR and promised to consolidate it even further in the future.[30] He has reiterated this theme in virtually all his major pronouncements and in terms no less exuberant than those used by Gomulka. At the same time, however, there have been evidences of a new and more self-confident approach to Polish-Soviet relations. Commenting on Gierek's visit to Moscow in January 1971, a writer in *Polityka* rebuked those who, in looking at Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union, "stubbornly cling to yesterday's patterns while ignoring the passage of time and the changes which come with it."[31] Similarly, a well-known Warsaw commentator on international affairs, Ryszard Wojna, stressed the importance of Poland's role as a member of the Warsaw Pact. "Our contribution to the Warsaw Treaty is by no means unimportant," he wrote. "Taking into account our demographic, economic and military potential, we are, next to the Soviet Union, the second strongest power in the socialist bloc."[32]

The new Polish leaders may, in fact, be in a better position than their predecessors to put relations with the Soviet Union on a more equal footing. Gierek's team appears to be more attuned to the present Soviet leadership than the Gomulka group ever was. While Gomulka had good rapport with Khrushchev, Gierek—even though he speaks Russian poorly—probably finds it easier than Gomulka did to get through to Brezhnev. Despite the difference in their ages, both Gierek and Brezhnev belong to the same first post-revolutionary Communist generation, and they both talk the language of practical administrators rather than of doctrinaire ideologists.[33] Indeed, their partnership seems to work well. In February 1971, the USSR extended badly-needed credits to Poland; in the spring of the same year, Moscow threw its support behind Gierek in his power struggle against Moczar; and in December, Brezhnev made a personal appearance at the Sixth Polish Party Congress to signify his approval of Gierek's course.

Poland has also cultivated good relations with the other East European countries. Immediately after his takeover, Gierek dispatched leading members of his team to various East European capitals to establish contact with the local Communist leaders. Polish-East German relations, which had been seriously strained under Gomulka and Ulbricht over the shift in Polish policy toward reconciliation with the FRG, have visibly improved since the present East German leadership's decision to fall into line with Moscow

[29] *Trybuna ludu*, March 31, 1972.
[30] *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1970.
[31] S. K., "Zawsze blizej" (Ever Closer), *Polityka*, Jan. 16, 1971.
[32] "Nasze funkcje europejskie" (Our European Functions), *Zycie Warszawy*, Jan. 17, 1971.

[33] It is widely believed in Warsaw that Brezhnev's dislike of Gomulka, who at the international Communist meetings had bored the Soviet comrades with lectures on ideology, was probably one of the reasons for Moscow's signal lack of interest in the fate of the Polish leader in December 1970.

Poland's new leaders visit the Kremlin in January 1971. From left, CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, PUWP First Secretary Edward Gierek, USSR Premier Aleksei Kosygin, and Polish Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

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and the rest of the bloc on the issue of European détente. Indeed, the new atmosphere of friendliness in Polish-East German relations was underlined in January 1972 by the opening of the boundary between the two countries to tourist traffic for the first time. (A similar opening of the Polish-Czechoslovak border was contemplated but apparently has run into difficulties.) Poland's relations with Romania and with Yugoslavia, whose President Tito was accorded a warm welcome when he visited Warsaw in June 1972, have also undergone marked improvement. On the other hand, Poland's relations with China have remained cool. In evident solidarity with the Soviet position, the Polish leaders, including Gierek himself, have harshly denounced the Chinese for splitting the international Communist movement.

While preserving or cultivating good relations with Poland's Communist neighbors, the Gierek leadership has stressed from the very outset its intention to pursue the course initiated by Gomulka in 1969, looking toward a rapprochement with West Germany and détente in Europe. In the present international situation, it maintains that Poland's continued alliance with the USSR and a policy of improving relations with the Western powers are not only compatible but indeed complementary. "The effectiveness of our policy in the West," wrote foreign affairs commentator Ignacy Krasicki, "depends upon our position in the socialist system. . . . In the present constellation of forces in Europe, our country is the first ally of the strongest European power —one of the two world superpowers—the Soviet Union."[34] The Catholic writer, Andrzej Micewski, was even more explicit:

We are faced with a completely new situation in which Poland's pro-Russian course is no longer incompatible with other international associations. At present the Polish-Soviet alliance is helpful to us in expanding relations with other countries. . . . Our participation in the eastern bloc provides us with an opportunity to reach a Polish-German reconciliation and to revive ties with our traditional friends in the West.[35]

Polish advocacy of European détente is clearly more, however, than a dutiful seconding of Moscow's current policy. Rapprochement and détente promise not only to give Poland access to important Western markets and technology, but also to restore traditionally close cultural ties with Western Europe. Even more important perhaps, the Poles no doubt hope—even if they do not say so publicly—that the emergence of an all-European system will serve to strengthen Warsaw's position vis-à-vis Moscow within the framework of the Polish-Soviet alliance.

Warsaw and the West

A key part of the Gierek leadership's effort to promote a general European détente has, of course, been its persistent endeavor to bring the rapprochement with West Germany to fruition. During 1971 the new leadership continued active contacts with West German representatives, welcoming to Warsaw not only supporters of Chancellor Brandt but also several ranking members of the opposition Christian Democratic Union, including the party's head, Rainer Barzel. The regime meanwhile continued to permit Germans living within Poland's boundaries to emigrate to West Germany if they desired to do so, and bilateral talks were held on mutual steps to correct inaccuracies in history and geography textbooks of the two countries. During the bitter debate in Bonn over ratification of the West German treaties of 1970 with Poland and the USSR, the Polish leadership reacted with moderation and restraint, although the press did not conceal its apprehension. When, in mid-May 1972, the treaties were finally ratified by the West German parliament, Warsaw was quick to follow suit, ratifying the Polish-FRG treaty on May 26.[36] On June 5, Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Czyrek went to Bonn to exchange the ratification documents with his West German counterpart, and it was announced that formal diplomatic relations would be inaugurated in the near future with an exchange of ambassadors. *Trybuna Ludu,* commenting on the event, hailed it as "opening new perspectives,

[34] "Nasze miejsce w sojuszu" (Our Place in the Alliance), *Zycie Warszawy,* Jan. 26, 1971.

[35] "Historyczne warianty i teranzniejszosc polityki polskiej" (Historical Models and Contemporary Polish Politics), *ibid.,* Dec. 27, 1970.

[36] It is interesting to note a significant difference between the Polish and Soviet interpretations of Bonn's obligations under the treaties. While the USSR implicitly accepted the *Bundestag* resolution which held that the treaties do not prejudice the ultimate settlement of German boundaries at a peace conference, Poland made it clear that it regards the territorial settlement as final. Indeed, at the joint session of the Foreign Affairs and Legislative Committees of the Sejm, Foreign Minister Olszowski explicity stated that "all of the reservations of the unilateral resolution of the *Bundestag* have no validity in international law." Krajowa Agencja Informacyjna (Warsaw), May 31, 1972.

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and even a new chapter, in the postwar history of Europe."[37]

The Gierek regime has also continued to develop broad contacts with several other West European countries with the dual objective of expanding bilateral relations—especially economic—and paving the way for a conference on European security and cooperation. Poland's relations with France, which had chilled appreciably since President de Gaulle's 1967 visit, have begun to warm, and Gierek has received an invitation to pay an official visit to France in the fall of 1972. In October 1971, Poland signed an agreement with Italy providing for the mass production of small Fiat cars in Poland, and in November a protocol guaranteed long-term Italian credits for the project. In late 1971, a Polish-British venture in the coproduction of machine tools was agreed on, and in mid-1972 a contract was negotiated with the British Petroleum Company for the joint construction of an oil refinery at Gdansk. The Swedes, in turn, are to build a luxury hotel in Warsaw.

Particular attention has been paid to Finland, which has been in close consultation with the Poles on preparations for the proposed conference on European security and cooperation. Early in 1972, Warsaw appointed a senior diplomat, Adam Willman, as Ambassador to Helsinki, obviously with an eye to the possibility of having the conference convened in the Finnish capital. The idea of a European conference has also been promoted by numerous informal contacts; by discussions with foreign diplomats, scholars, and journalists at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; and by the airing of Western views on European problems in the Polish press.[38]

Not the least important part of the Gierek leadership's foreign policy program has been an effort to bring about a thaw in the frigid climate that prevailed in US-Polish relations during the last years of Gomulka's rule. This effort centered first in the economic sphere. Warsaw's interest in developing commercial and technical cooperation with the United States was emphasized by the appointment early in 1971 of one of Poland's leading economists, Witold Trampczynski, as Ambassador to Washington. This was followed in the spring by the dispatch of two high-level Polish missions to the US, one headed by the Minister of Chemical Industry and the other by the Chairman of the government's Committee on Science and Technology. In June, Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz, paying a personal visit to the American pavilion at the Poznan trade fair, chatted with US Ambassador Walter Stoessel and expressed their interest in increasing trade with the US and gaining access to American technological know-how. Washington's response to Warsaw's overtures was both positive and swift. In August 1971, reversing a decision which had been made shortly before Gomulka's ouster, the US government agreed to grant an export license allowing Poland to purchase an American catalytic cracking plant; in October, a small credit was extended for the purchase of American agricultural produce; in November, US Secretary of Transportation John Volpe visited Warsaw to sign an agreement for cooperation in research on transportation problems; and in December, US Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans also went to Warsaw to explore further the prospects for expanding trade between the two countries. During his visit, Stans hinted at the possibility of easing current US restrictions on the provision of long-term credits to Poland.

By early 1972, the road was clear for even more dramatic steps. In an address to the Sejm on March 28, Premier Jaroszewicz welcomed "the interest of the United States in expanding economic, scientific and technical relations with Poland."[39] President Nixon reciprocated with a congratulatory message to the newly-elected Chairman of the Polish State Council, Henryk Jablonski, in which he voiced satisfaction over the improvement in relations between the two countries during 1971 and voiced the hope that this trend would continue in the future.[40] On April 17, at a meeting described as "elaborate and warm," Polish Ambassador Trampczynski extended to the US President an invitation to visit Poland,[41] which resulted in Mr. Nixon's brief stopover in Warsaw on May 31 and June 1 on his way back from Moscow.

The official reception accorded to the President during his visit was entirely proper but not demonstrative, although he did receive a tumultous welcome from the crowds that gathered to see him lay a wreath at the tomb of Poland's Unknown Soldier in Victory Square. The President then had two meetings with the Polish leaders, an official communique describing the talks as "frank, business-like and con-

[37] Karol Malcuzynski, "Sukces i egzamin dojrzalosci" (Success and the Test of Maturity), *Trybuna ludu*, May 21, 1972.

[38] See, for example, articles by the editor of *The Economist*, Alastair Burnet, in *Polityka*, June 19, 1971, and by the present author in *Tygodnik powszechny*, Dec. 12, 1971.

[39] *Trybuna ludu*, March 29, 1972.

[40] Krajowa Agencja Informacyjna, April 12, 1972.

[41] *The New York Times*, April 20, 1972.

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Warsaw hosts the American chief executive, May 31-June 1, 1972. From left, Polish Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, Edward Gierek, the interpreter, President Richard M. Nixon, and Henry Kissinger.

—Polish Central Photo Agency from Eastfoto.

structive."[42] The communique acknowledged differences, especially over the war in Vietnam, but also recorded agreement on various matters of common interest, notably the holding of regular bilateral consultations to develop trade and expand scientific cooperation, increased personal contacts, and steps to establish air and sea connections between the two countries. A consular agreement clarifying the status of the Polish-Americans was also signed, and Mr. Nixon extended an invitation to the Polish leaders to visit the United States. In the area of broader international issues, President Nixon placed the US on record as welcoming the treaty between Poland and West Germany (including its border provisions) and as endorsing the Polish view that multilateral consultations should soon be started to prepare for a conference on European security and cooperation. Speaking at a state dinner in the Radziwil Palace, the President stressed his expectation that Poland would play an important role in coming negotiations on Europe.[43]

The Poles had good reason to be pleased with the results of Mr. Nixon's visit, which no doubt enhanced the prestige of the Gierek leadership both at home and abroad. The visit was hailed by one Polish commentator as the beginning of "a new chapter in relations between Poland and the United States," although he hastened to add that the way had been "paved by the historic results of the Moscow accord."[44] Another well-known writer on international affairs, Janusz Stefanowicz, saw a broader significance in the visit, which he said demonstrated that "the role of the middle powers . . . increases proportionately to the progress of détente in East-West relations."[45]

The Regime and Public Opinion

By and large, then, the policies of the Gierek leadership appear to have achieved a substantial degree of success to date. The emergency, stopgap measures taken to surmount the immediate domestic crisis worked. The regime's subsequent moves toward instituting longer-range reforms have gone far toward overcoming the apathy and stagnation of the last Gomulka years and instilling a new sense of direction in the population.

Yet there is no doubt that Gierek's credit with the people is not unlimited and that his ultimate success will depend on whether or not he demonstrates the will and ability to carry out an effective long-range program of reform. On this question, Polish public opinion appears to be divided into three camps. The first—and perhaps largest—segment of the population believes that Gierek will take effective steps to assure continued improvement of the situation. A second group also has trust in Gierek's leadership but feels that he is unlikely to succeed in view of the seriousness of the obstacles in his path. A third group simply has no confidence in Gierek and believes that, once he has consolidated his power, he will revert to the conservatism and inertia of the later Gomulka period.[46]

These divergent trends of public opinion harbor elements that are at once conducive and inimical to change in Poland. On the one hand, the existence of widespread enthusiasm generated by expectations

[42] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1972.

[43] Krajowa Agencja Informacyjna, June 7, 1972.

[44] Ryszard Wojna, "W kierunku wytyczonym porozunieniem moskiewskim" (Toward Implementation of the Moscow Accord), *Zycie Warszawy*, June 3, 1972.

[45] Janusz Stefanowicz, "Wizyta wazna i owocna" (An Important and Fruitful Visit), *Slowo powszechne* (Warsaw), June 3, 1972

[46] A survey conducted by Radio Free Europe in late 1971 indicated that the division among the three groups was as follows: 39 per cent supporting the first view; 25 per cent the second; and 34 per cent the third. It is significant that a considerable difference was revealed in the attitudes of the different age groups, with the younger people displaying considerably more confidence in Gierek than the older ones. Radio Free Europe, Audience and Public Opinion Research Department, *Polish Confidence in Gierek*, Munich, December 1971.

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of real progress is a positive force that not only pushes the leadership to fulfill its pledges of reform but also contributes materially to the effectiveness of the reforms themselves. On the other hand, the fact that the expectations of many Poles exceed the capabilities of the regime to fulfill them creates a dangerous situation. The Poles, still disillusioned by Gomulka's betrayal of their aspirations for reform in the late 1950's, may adopt a *déja vu* attitude which interprets any slackening of Gierek's course as an abandonment of the promise of reform. Such skepticism could lead in turn to a shirking of effort that could jeopardize the very reforms the majority of the nation desires to see come about. For without massive popular support and effort Gierek's chances of successfully implementing the reforms must necessarily be greatly reduced. Indeed, in an article published in June 1971, the popular Polish writer Wieslaw Gornicki already warned of the emergence of the latter syndrome in these terms:

The truth about the past six months is as follows: productivity has not increased, while absenteeism, work stoppages, and unfulfilled plans have mounted. Tragic and unrealistic demands, the realization of which would mean economic suicide, have arisen.

Gornicki went on to blame these shortcomings on "the buddy in the beer shack" who wants more money but refuses to work, and who will soon say, "See now what has come of all the promises made by Gierek? Are we once more to toil for a measly 2,000 zlotys a month and keep waiting for Godot?"[47]

Gornicki's article evoked a strong reaction. The well-known Catholic columnist Stefan Kisielewski ridiculed paying so much attention to "the buddy in the beer shack" and called the presence of such people "merely a symptom and not the cause of the disease." Instead, he urged concentrating all efforts on reform of the economic system.[48] Professor Szczepanski, too, has made the same point, coupling it with an appeal for stronger leadership. Observing that there are in Poland "many strong hands and able minds which for a long time have been waiting to be used effectively and creatively," he added:

It is not the lack of opportunities, but the inability of the leaders to exploit them which has been responsible for the stagnation of our economy. . . . For it is the quality of political leadership which determines also the moral climate prevailing in the country.[49]

Gierek's Prospects

There thus appears to be broad recognition that the key to the success of Gierek's course lies in effective reform of Poland's economic system. This, in turn, is closely linked to two crucial ancillary problems: placing the most competent people, whether or not they carry a party card, in responsible positions in the economy; and overcoming the strong resistance in the middle echelons of officialdom to the adoption of such criteria. Mieczyslaw Rakowski may well have put his finger on the main threat to Gierek's internal policies when he pointed to the existence of powerful vested interests in the administrative bureaucracy:

On various levels in the government, and especially at the intermediate level, there exist indolence and inertia, organizational paralysis, inability or unwillingness of men in the positions of responsibility to abandon routine, disregard of human needs, and infringement upon the rights of the citizens. [There are still] those who are saying to themselves: "Never fear, we shall also outlast this reform."[50]

Resolution of Poland's key domestic problem of economic reform also hinges to a considerable extent on what degree of systemic change Moscow will tolerate. Soviet criticism of even the economic phases of the 1968 Czechoslovak experiment in liberalization, and more recently of the Hungarian economic reforms, must make the Poles wary of proceeding with a major overhaul of the economic system—especially one that would involve a major purge of the economic bureaucracy so as to entrust greater responsibility and authority to non-party people. This might well antagonize the Soviet leadership, which still regards preservation of the leading role of the Communist Party as the *sine qua non* of a true socialist system. Gierek must, therefore, tread carefully with his internal reforms.

The recent changes on the international scene, however, seem to have enlarged Warsaw's scope of maneuver *vis-à-vis* Moscow. In the new climate of

[47] "Chocholy" (The Straw Man), *Zycie Warszawy*, June 13, 1971.
[48] "Kwasno" (Sour Grapes), *Tygodnik powszechny*, Aug. 29, 1971.
[49] *Rozwazania o Rzeczypospolitej* (Thoughts on the Republic), Warsaw, Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1971, pp. 98-99.
[50] "Gory i doly" (The Top and the Bottom), *Polityka*, May 29, 1971.

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European détente that is beginning to prevail, Moscow will probably be more reluctant to risk a rift with its immediate neighbor and ally to the west. The Kremlin leaders, moreover, must be aware that given the situation existing in Poland, Gierek really has no choice but to proceed with substantial internal changes. Therefore, provided the Poles do not move too far or too fast, there is a fair chance that the Russians—in order to maintain tranquillity on their western flank—may overlook minor ideological deviations by their Polish comrades.

This brings us to the more fundamental question of whether or not the Gierek team will be disposed to exploit this situation in order to expand the perimeters of political freedom within Poland. Certain factors that may inhibit them from doing so come immediately to mind. In the first place, although the present Polish leaders differ radically from the Gomulka group, they represent only the second post-revolutionary generation, while—as Professor Szczepanski has sagely observed—it requires at least three generations for any ruling elite to develop a political culture of its own.[51] Consequently, there may still be a strong tendency for the Gierek leadership to revert to the ingrained habits of its predecessors. After all it is not easy for anyone to divorce himself from a system in which he has been indoctrinated from youth and to which he owes most of his own personal advancement, no matter how completely that system may be compromised.

Secondly, the very success initially achieved by the new leadership may—again paradoxically—strengthen rather than restrain the inherited autocratic tendencies of the new Polish leaders. A certain degree of intoxication is already evident. After the Sixth Party Congress, *Zycie Warszawy* made a comment about Gierek that sounded like an ominous echo of the Gomulka era:

One would like to add a word about the First Secretary, about his modesty, simplicity, and straightforwardness in dealing with the people, and at the same time about his sense of responsibility . . . responsibility before history for the fate of the Poles and People's Poland. But these are unnecessary words. . . .[52]

Even if Gierek should personally disapprove of such exaggerated hero worship, there is the danger that it may lead him to become isolated from the people in the same way Gomulka did. Nor should it be forgotten that there are as yet no institutional checks that would stand in the way of such a tendency on the part of Gierek and the new ruling elite. The Communist Party remains the sole guarantor that the party will not abuse its rule.

Finally, it must be remembered, that the pressure which Polish public opinion can be expected to exert to push the regime along the path of genuine reform, also has its limits. It is not only that the masses are handicapped when faced with a tight and determined group of rulers; even more important is the fact that the legacy of history inhibits the Poles from exerting their full pressure. As this writer has observed elsewhere, today's Poles are in the grip of an intense political realism.[53] The memories of their defeats and sufferings during World War II are still quite strong among the present generation, and they do not want to be exposed again to the same bitter experience. As the restraint of even the rebelling workers in December 1970 clearly demonstrated, the Poles today are clearly not prepared to push the regime so far that it may feel compelled to invite Soviet military intervention. When the next generation comes to the fore, however, the situation could change. The attitudes of Polish youth differ markedly from those of their parents because of their different life experiences.[54] Their impact on Polish political life, however, will not be fully felt before the 1980's.

Thus, with regard to the possibility of political as well as economic liberalization, it seems probable that the present Polish leaders will continue to give priority to socio-economic over political reform and that they will make concessions in the political sphere only insofar as they deem it necessary in order not to impede progress in the socio-economic sphere. Even so, the Gierek leadership can make an important contribution. If it succeeds only in rationalizing and modernizing the country's economy, it may yet carve out for itself an honored place in Poland's history. At least it will have a just claim to having handed over to the next generation of Poles a better and healthier country than it inherited.

[51] Jan Szczepanski, *Polish Society*, New York, Random House, 1970, p. 75.

[52] Dec. 12, 1971.

[53] *Poland's Politics, Idealism vs. Realism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967.

[54] Such a possibility was explicitly pointed out in a letter by a young listener from Poland to Radio Free Europe. Polish youth, he reports, "is rebelling against the order established by the PUWP. . . . Despite indoctrination in the schools, youth is looking for other ideals. . . . One can expect that in the next decade, when the influence of the present young generation increases, there will be serious upheavals in Poland," *Na antenie* (London), May 1972, p. 2.

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A New Economic Approach

By Michael Gamarnikow

Edward Gierek took over the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) at the eleventh hour of the gravest political crisis in the postwar history of Poland, when the country—by Gierek's own admission—stood "at the brink of civil war." [1] Although the workers' demonstrations and strikes which toppled Gomulka were triggered by the ill-considered and ill-timed decision to increase the prices of food and other staples some 15 to 20 percent on December 13, 1970 (*i.e.*, during the pre-Christmas buying season), these events were clearly no mere "bread riots." As the PUWP Politburo subsequently acknowledged in a report to the Central Committee in February 1971, the protests

. . . *took such violent form as a result of* social discontent which had been accumulating for a long time; *it was caused by many factors, and particularly by* the worsening economic situation *of the country, serious neglect in social policy, the stagnation of real wages, shortages of supplies, and the rising cost of living. . . . The December events have shown that* any disruption of the bond between the party and the working class . . . can cause a serious political upheaval in our country.[2]

From the December 1970 events, the PUWP drew the conclusion that the party

. . . *must always in the future aim at preventing any conflicts with the working class. This requires . . . that* we should pursue an economic policy which is fully consistent with the objective social needs *of the working people . . . and which stems from the Marxist-Leninist ideology of our party.*[3]

As a result of this insight, the PUWP under Gierek has devised a set of economic policies which in essence constitutes a new growth model for the Polish economy. However, this model—in placing greater emphasis on the satisfaction of consumer demand than past models—has given rise to some serious economic problems, as will be seen. Furthermore, Gierek's failure to fulfill his promise to institute a comprehensive program of reforms in economic planning and management has resulted in a marked incongruity between the new growth model and the structure of the economic system, an inconsistency which undermines the effectiveness of the regime's concrete economic policies.

Gomulka's Economic Legacy

Before looking at these policies in some detail, it is first necessary—since the current PUWP economic program represents a reaction to the economic situation and policies inherited from Gomulka—to catalogue, however briefly, the grave errors of economic policy which were committed by the former party leader in the final stages of his 14-year rule. Some were the results of ineptitude and mismanagement, but more fundamental misconceptions were also involved.

Since mid-1968, the Polish economic situatio

[1] See text of Gierek's speech to a meeting of editors-in-chief of all major newspapers and periodicals, published only in *Prasa Polska* (Warsaw), November 1971. On Friday, December 18, 1970, workers downed their tools at many large factories in Warsaw, and a general strike was proclaimed for the following Monday. Gomulka was forced to resign on December 19, and Gierek was elected First Secretary at a Plenum hastily convened the next day.

[2] "Documentary Material for the Eighth Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee," *Nowe drogi* (Warsaw), no date, pp. 45, 48 (emphasis added). This special issue of the PUWP organ has remained, despite repeated promises of wider publicity, available only to a limited number of higher party functionaries, although a few copies have reached the West.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48. (Emphasis added.)

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had steadily deteriorated. Disorganized by sporadic reforms and conflicting directives, industry was unable to adapt its output to changing patterns of industrial and consumer demand. Much of Poland's substantially expanding output ended up as unwanted inventory gathering dust in the nation's warehouses. Throughout 1970, inventories increased at twice the rate of retail sales growth and by year's end reached an astronomical total value of 500 billion zlotys, or roughly half the estimated 1970 gross national product of Poland.[4]

Moreover, as the earlier-mentioned Politburo report pointed out, the Gomulka economic policy had "tended to earmark too great a portion of national income for capital accumulation purposes" and had also failed consistently to use these resources in the most effective manner. While "giving high priority to a number of low-yield investment projects," the government had deprived "many essential branches of industry of badly needed capital." In addition, the planners had willfully neglected the housing needs of the population, thereby "depriving hundreds of thousands of people of an opportunity to move into an apartment of their own." [5]

Still further, grave errors in agrarian policy and two consecutive years of bad harvests had combined to produce a major food crisis. This was quite a reversal, for Gomulka's initial policies of dissolving the cooperative farms, drastically reducing compulsory deliveries of meat and produce, and increasing material incentives for farmers had proved basically sound, turning Poland into the only major food exporter among the socialist states of Eastern Europe. Although two billion tons of fodder had to be imported annually as a result of a grain deficit, this expenditure was offset by a huge trade surplus generated largely by exports of meat, butter, bacon, and eggs. In 1968, sales of agricultural products accounted for a third of Poland's total exports and more than 60 percent of her hard-currency earnings.[6]

Unfortunately, however, Gomulka failed to leave well enough alone. Spurred by an ideologically-motivated aversion in some party circles to the growing prosperity of the country's essentially private peasantry and by the dogmatic goal of achieving Polish self-sufficiency in grain, the regime began to increase the prices charged to the peasants for fodder while holding meat procurement prices steady. By thus eliminating or reducing the profit margin, this policy clearly decreased incentives among those peasants engaged in animal husbandry.[7] Bad weather in 1969 and 1970 put a further crimp in this rural industry by reducing domestic grain and fodder supplies, and Poland was suddenly faced with severe shortages of meat and dairy products. Particularly hard hit was the pig-breeding industry: between June 1969 and June 1970 the number of hogs on the hoof dropped by 900,000.[8]

As if food shortages were not enough to stir up the Polish workers, the country also seemed faced with the specter of mass unemployment. A Politiburo decree of early 1970 ordered industry to lay off 200,000 surplus workers and specified how many each enterprise was to dismiss.[9] Since no alternative employment was provided, the number of jobless began to rise. Worse still, the original version of the 1971-75 economic plan worked out by Boleslaw Jaczczuk, Gomulka's chief planner, projected *official* unemployment of half a million (roughly five percent of the nonagricultural labor force) by 1975.[10]

Finally, there was the matter of wage policy. The February 1971 Politburo report told the story:

It must be stated quite clearly, that during the years 1966-70, Poland had the lowest rate of increase in real wages of all the countries of Comecon [the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance]. . . . There were some groups of workers which actually suffered a decline in their real wages.[11]

Although in May 1970 the PUWP CC had approved a new system of material incentives based on the principle that workers' earnings should reflect the economic performance of individual enterprises, Gomulka had postponed any wage increases until mid-1972 because of the unexpected food shortages and the perennial shortage of other consumer

[4] See *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), Oct. 4, 1970, and M. Kowalewski, "Excessive Stocks, a Real and Not a Marginal Problem," *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), May 13, 1971.

[5] *Loc. cit. supra*, pp. 65-66.

[6] E. Harasim, "The British Market for Agricultural Produce and the Problems of Polish Exports to This Market," *Zagadnienia ekonomiki rolnej* (Warsaw), No. 6, 1971, pp. 51-52.

[7] A. Krasnica, "How Much for One Kilogram of Pork," *Dziennik ludowy* (Warsaw), Aug. 8, 1970.

[8] *Zycie gospodarcze*, Sept. 6, 1970.

[9] *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 12, 1970, and H. Krall, "To Dismiss or Not to Dismiss," *Polityka* (Warsaw), Feb. 22, 1970.

[10] Dr. H. Krol, "Intensive Development Versus Employment," *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 15, 1971.

[11] *Loc. cit. supra*, pp. 66-67.

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goods.[12] To the workers, the new system seemed tantamount to a two-year wage freeze.[13]

When this explosive mixture of popular discontent over food shortages, creeping unemployment, and frozen wages was ignited by the December 1970 price increases, Gomulka chose to look on the revolt as a counterrevolution which should be suppressed by force. However, a coalition of certain members of Gomulka's own Politburo, a portion of the party apparatus, and the army hierarchy opposed this response and acted to remove Gomulka from office and to reverse his repressive policies.[14] Overnight the "counterrevolution" became a justified protest movement of the working class. The new party leadership had to placate the rebellious workers with immediate material concessions and the promise of far-reaching changes in the economic and social policies pursued by its predecessors. Thus, to a great extent, the economic policies of Gierek were determined by the circumstances of his accession to power.

Putting Out Fires

The first step taken by the new government was to freeze all retail prices for two years, to "suspend" the controversial wage freeze, and to lift all employment restrictions.[15] A week later the Council of Ministers and the Central Trade Union Council announced a combination of measures designed to compensate low-paid workers and low-income families for the December increase in the cost of living. The statutory minimum wage was increased from 850 zlotys to 1,000 zlotys a month. Workers earning less than 2,000 zlotys were to receive raises ranging from 30 to 80 zlotys a month, retroactive to December 1, 1970. Family allowances were raised for families having two or more children and a net per capita income not exceeding 1,000 zlotys a month. Minimum pensions and disability payments were raised 60 zlotys a month. According to the official announcement, the wage and pension increases would affect 5.2 million people, and the increased family allowances would benefit 4.7 million children. The total program was expected to cost 7.4 billion zlotys.[16]

The essential defect of these initial measures was that they offered nothing to skilled industrial workers who already had a job and earned more than 2,000 zlotys a month.[17] Although the price freeze and possible wage increases might ultimately benefit them, there was no immediate relief from the December 1970 increase in their cost of living. Therefore, the industrial workers continued to press for either adequate wage increases or rescission of the December price increases, and a new wave of protest strikes swept across Poland. A three-day general strike was held in Szczecin on January 22-24, 1971, and on February 12 a general strike was launched in Lodz, a major textile center. The government responded with pleas for restraint and cooperation in maintaining "market equilibrium" and with promises to improve the working people's standard of living "within the limits of those means which we possess and create, mobilizing all our economic reserves for this purpose." [18] A confrontation between four members of the PUWP Politburo and the Lodz workers through the night of February 14-15 failed to budge the workers from their demands, and the regime was forced to yield. On the evening of February 15, Radio Warsaw broadcast the capitulation of the Gierek leadership in the form of an across-the-board nullification of the December 1970 price increases. The announcement stated:

Thanks to the credit obtained during the last few days *from the Soviet Union, and also taking into consideration a possible increase in our own meat production in the second part of the current year and in the coming year, it was decided . . . to lower the*

[12] B. Fick, "The System of Incentives," *Zycie gospodarcze*, Feb. 7, 1971.

[13] B. Krajewski, "Wage Systems in 1971," *Praca i zabezpieczenie spoleczne* (Warsaw), April 1971.

[14] The February 1971 Politburo report, *loc. cit. supra*, pp. 44-45.

[15] See Gierek's speech to the Polish Sejm (parliament) on December 23, 1971, in *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 24, 1970. The freeze—originally intended to apply only to the post-December 13 retail prices—was maintained after the February 1971 cutback of these prices.

[16] See the joint announcement of the Council of Ministers and the Central Council of Trade Unions, *Trybuna ludu*, Jan. 1, 1971. The cost estimate for these measures was soon raised to 8.6 billion zlotys (see Gierek's speech to the February 1971 CC Plenum, *ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1971).

[17] At the outset of 1971, the average monthly wage of an industrial worker in Poland was 2,537 zlotys [*Biuletyn statystyczny* (Warsaw), February 1971, p. 10]. The shipyard workers who spearheaded the December riots earned between 2,800 and 3,400 zlotys.

[18] See the speech of Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz to the Polish Sejm on Feb. 13, 1971 (*Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 14, 1971). The stress on maintaining a market equilibrium was also evident in Gierek's nine-hour discussion with the striking workers of Szczecin in January. Tapes of this historic confrontation have reached the West and have been published as *Rewolta Szczecinska i jej znaczenie* (The Szczecin Revolt and Its Meaning), ed. Ewa Wacowska, Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1971.

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Grocery clerks in Warsaw post new prices on foodstuffs on February 27, 1971, as the Polish government rolls back the price increases of December 1970 that occasioned bloody street riots, toppling the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka.

—Wide World Photos.

prices of food, including meat and meat products, to their former levels [which existed] prior to December 13, 1970. (Emphasis added.)

The simultaneous announcement of the price rollback and of the Soviet credit which had made it possible occurred while the Lodz general strike was still in full swing,[19] and there are reasons for believing that the firm stand of the Lodz workers may have had a decisive influence on the decisions reached in both Warsaw and Moscow. Lodz has occupied a special place in the fighting tradition of the working-class movement not only in Poland but in Russia (to which Lodz belonged until 1918). A general strike in Lodz (bloodily suppressed by Tsarist troops) was a highlight of the 1905 Russian revolution. Furthermore, unlike the first-generation workers of the Gdansk and Szczecin shipyards, the textile workers of Lodz were genuine, hard-core proletarians with an inborn ability to organize a strike and carry it to the bitter end. In short, a mass strike in "red" Lodz was bound to have a very great psychological and ideological impact in Warsaw and Moscow.

Whatever the reason, the Kremlin, just as during the December rioting,[20] advocated a course of moderation in response to the workers' rebellion in Poland. While one cannot determine the full extent of Soviet aid, it has been officially confirmed that the USSR provided a loan of 100 million dollars in convertible currencies and arranged for Warsaw to make special use of Poland's credit balances at the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (the bank for mutual settlements among members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance).[21] The main purpose of these measures was to enable the Polish leadership to import large quantities of food and consumer goods from both capitalist and socialist countries.[22]

The need for such heavy imports becomes apparent when one tallies up the effect of Gierek's concessions to the Polish workers. Sundry wage increases were to increase consumer purchasing power by some 8.6 billion zlotys in 1971 alone; social benefits would add another 4.5 billion [23]; and revocation of the December price hikes would add 11 billion zlotys more.[24] Adding, on top of all this, the probable effect of increased employment, one could reasonably predict a surge of 25 to 30 billion zlotys in purchasing power. In fact, a simultaneous sharp jump in rural earnings as a result of substantial increases in procurement prices paid for milk, lard, and carcass meat meant that total purchasing power actually increased by 59 billion zlotys during 1971, or roughly 10 percent, of which only 18 billion zlotys was absorbed by increased savings.[25] Unless the govern-

[19] *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw) on February 16 reported "work stoppages" in Lodz. It was only on February 17 that Radio Warsaw reported that normal work had resumed in Lodz.

[20] In his speech to the Szczecin strikers, Gierek stated that a letter from the Soviet Politburo had tried to impress on the Gomulka leadership that the December strikes were a genuine working class protest. He also reported that "Comrade Brezhnev phoned several times to Comrade Gomulka and urged him not to use force, but to rely on political persuasion." See *Rewolta Szczecinska . . .*, p. 37. The Soviet Union also agreed, on December 29, 1970, to ship some two million tons of grain to ease the Polish food shortages (see *Trybuna ludu,* Dec. 30, 1970).

[21] See the speech of Premier Jaroszewicz to the PUWP provincial conference in Szczecin, *Zycie Warszawy,* April 16, 1971.

[22] Specifics of imports from the socialist countries remain a closely guarded secret. Imports from hard-currency countries consisted of consumer goods (knitwear, rubber shoes, clothing, furniture, and household articles) and food. Judging by the increase of 3.4 kilograms in per capita meat consumption during 1971 (see A. Rolow, "Eight Billion Dollars," *Rynki zagraniczne* [Warsaw], Feb. 3, 1971), some 100,000 tons of meat and meat products were imported by Poland during 1971—mainly from Denmark and countries of the European Economic Community.

[23] Premier Jaroszewicz' speech to the Sejm on Feb. 13, *loc. cit.*

[24] Unsigned editorial in *Trybuna ludu,* Feb. 17, 1971.

[25] See the communique of the Main Statistical Office on 1971 plan fulfillment, *Trybuna ludu,* Feb. 2, 1972. The 18-billion-zloty increase in savings represented a 15.8-percent increase in the total volume of savings from the 1970 level. Thus savings grew more rapidly than incomes, in effect a case of repressed inflation.

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ment provided an increased supply of consumer goods and agricultural products to absorb this expanded purchasing power, it faced the unhappy prospect of sharp inflation and further popular discontent.

A Major Reorientation

One might be tempted to stress the *ad hoc*, emergency nature of the initial Gierek policies and to dismiss them as expedient steps to disarm the forces of popular discontent. However, it would appear that these initial concessions were symptomatic of a very fundamental realignment of economic policy by the new leadership. Instead of returning to Gomulka's "ill-conceived economic concepts" and his orthodox pursuit of rapid economic growth at the expense of the consumer, the new leadership seized on the opportunity created by the total breakdown of the former ruler's policies to work out an entirely new pattern of social and economic development with a qualitatively different order of priorities based on a qualitatively different socio-economic philosophy.

The new philosophy has been stated most clearly by Edward Babiuch, member of the PUWP Politburo and a Central Committee Secretary:

Our policy is based on the fundamental idea that the highest goal of socialism lies in the constant satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the people on the basis of dynamic economic development.[26]

Thus, the PUWP leadership accepted the revolutionary concept that economic growth and rapid development of productive potential have no real value unless they result in a steady increase in the living standards of the population. Fulfillment of quantitative economic targets thus would cease to be the *end* of party policy and instead would become merely a *means* toward the goal of increasing real wages and satisfying the needs of the population.[27]

As party spokesmen attempted to explain and justify this reordering of priorities, it became clear that a new Polish growth model was being developed. Terming the Gierek economic approach "a dialectical generalization" of long-standing party policy in light of "recent experience" and "unsolved social and economic problems," Jan Szydlak defined the essence of the evolving model in these terms:

. . . increased consumption is an important and necessary factor in the process of economic growth, a factor which stimulates production and technological progress, improves organization, and results in greater labor productivity.[28]

Here, in a nutshell, was the whole rationale behind the new economic policy. Hard work properly rewarded was to be the mainspring of economic progress.

This pragmatic, consumer-oriented approach bears the distinct personal imprint of the new PUWP First Secretary. Gierek's genuine concern for the material well-being of the working masses was ingrained during 20 years of work as a miner and in active pursuit of better pay and working conditions as a member of the trade union movement in France and Belgium during his formative years (see the preceding article). His policies while serving as party first secretary in the Silesian province of Katowice (from 1957 to 1970) demonstrated his conviction that workers will work harder if they receive higher rewards for their efforts. By a stroke of fate, the specific circumstances which catapulted Gierek into leadership of the PUWP in December 1970 made this economic policy, which for him had been an article of faith, the most politically acceptable alternative in the eyes of the Polish ruling elite and of Moscow.

The Gierek team had an immediate opportunity to give concrete expression to its new growth strategy through the vehicle of the 1971-75 state economic plan. One of its first major policy decisions had been to scrap the version of the plan already worked out under Gomulka. By June 1971, a new draft was ready for presentation to a plenary session of the PUWP Central Committee. The new document was the complete antithesis of the original draft and reversed the economic priorities which had been regarded as inviolable in economic planning during the 14 years of Gomulka's rule. Whereas the former leader had sought to modernize select branches of Polish industry even at the cost of stagnant living standards and substantial unemployment, Premier Jaroszewicz told the June 1971 plenum:

The principal aim of this [new] plan is a substantial acceleration of the rate of increase in living stand-

[26] See the interview with Babiuch in the East German weekly *Horizont* (East Berlin), No. 45, November 1971.

[27] See Jan Szydlak's speech in Katowice, *Trybuna ludu*, Oct. 14, 1971.

[28] *Ibid.*

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ards. . . . At the same time, we should ensure full and rational employment. The determination of these basic objectives was the starting point of our work on the draft of this plan.[29]

The new economic priorities were reflected in the key target figures set for 1975. Thus, individual and social consumption was to increase by 38 percent, as against some 27 percent achieved in 1966-70. Real wages were scheduled to rise by some 17-18 percent, *i.e.*, at an average annual rate of 3.4 percent, nearly twice the average growth rate registered during the period 1961-70. The housing construction target was increased by 25 percent over that of the previous five-year plan. Finally, an additional 1.8 million work places were to be developed to assure full employment.[30]

New Priority for the Consumer Sector

This dramatic reorientation of priorities necessarily entailed a considerable reallocation of investment resources in order to increase capacities for the production of consumer goods, to build new housing, and to finance the creation of supplementary job opportunites.[31] Within the framework of the new plan and for the first time since the Communist takeover in Poland, food-processing and consumer-goods industries, as well as housing construction, were granted a priority in the allocation of raw materials and investment funds over such sacred cows of Marxist-Leninist economics as heavy industry.[32] This reordering of priorites in favor of the consumer public meant in effect—as a *Zycie gospodarcze* editorial of July 4, 1971, pointed out—a drastic change in "*the entire logic of economic planning.*" In the past, the editorial noted, the standard procedure has been to prepare a balance sheet of all available resources, to allocate them according to established priorities, and then to estimate the potential increase in the global output of the economy. At this point, a decision would be made at the highest level on how much of this additional production could be spared (or sacrificed) to provide for popular consumption. On this basis, the central planners then determined what increases in real wages and consumption could be incorporated into the plan. In devising the new plan for 1971-75, however, the Gierek team started with targets for increases in real wages, consumption, and employment, which then served as the *primary data base* for calculating all other indices of the plan, *e.g.*, production targets and estimated investment outlays.

The June version of the 1971-75 plan was submitted for public discussion at all levels in preparation for the December 1971 congress of the PUWP, but in fact, only marginal matters (such as adjusting the mix of apartment construction to provide more small units, or effecting reductions in the retirement age) were given any broad public scrutiny. Therefore, the socio-economic program for 1971-75 that was adopted at the Sixth PUWP Congress differed only insignificantly from the June draft.[33]

It is far too early to draw any comprehensive judgments on the adequacy of the new Polish growth strategy or on the consistency and skill with which the party has pursued its new economic goals. However, in one area—food production—the Gierek regime appears to have made considerable progress. Results in this sector constitute a particularly vital test of the party's will and ability to satisfy the working population, inasmuch as it was the issue of food shortages and food price increases that precipitated the December 1970 riots.

In tackling the task of increasing food output, the party paid particular attention to meat production, which is of special importance to the Polish economy for several reasons. It determines in large measure the overall profitability of farming and the incomes of the rural population; it has an important bearing on Polish foreign trade results; it affects the morale of urban consumers; and it can serve as a powerful instrument to siphon off excess urban purchasing power.[34] Anticipating an increase in purchasing

[29] *Ibid.*, June 25, 1971.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] For example a Special Fund of half a billion zlotys was created in August to provide additional work places for women on an emergency basis. See *Slowo powszechne* (Warsaw), Aug. 20, 1971.

[32] The full extent of the shift in investment priorities was disclosed by Premier Jaroszewicz in his speech to the June 1971 CC Plenum, *loc. cit. supra.*

[33] O dalszy socjalistyczny rozwoj Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej—uchwala VI zjazdu PZPR (On the Further Socialist Development of the Polish People's Republic—Resolution of the 6th PUWP Congress), *Nowe drogi*, January 1972, pp. 138-85. The revised Five-Year Plan for 1971-75 was adopted by the Sejm on June 8, 1972 (see PAP broadcast of that date).

[34] Experience has shown a high income elasticity in the Polish consumer's demand for such high quality food items, *i.e.*, worker raises tend to be translated immediately into increased demand for meat products. In the last years of Gomulka's rule, this consumption pattern was used as an argument against wage increases—on the grounds that there was little prospect of increasing meat output to meet the increased demand. See for example *Zycie Warszawy*, Dec. 6, 1969, and *Zycie gospodarcze*, Jan. 18, 1970.

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power of 25-30 billion zlotys in 1971 alone, the Polish leaders considered it imperative to assure adequate supplies of meat. As already noted, the Soviet hard-currency loan provided temporary relief by permitting sizable meat imports, but the regime ultimately would have to induce Poland's 3.5 million independent farmers to produce more meat, milk, butter, and other products for the market.

Gierek's Agricultural Policies

Accordingly, in March 1971, the government increased the supply of concentrated fodder and raised the procurement prices for meat, lard, bacon, and milk.[35] However, the Gierek team soon went much further, offering the Polish peasants a comprehensive package of far-reaching social and economic concessions which amounted to a qualitatively different agrarian policy. The new deal for Poland's private farmers was announced in mid-April, in the form of an eight-point agricultural program worked out jointly by the Polish United Workers' Party and the United Peasant Party.[36] The main features of this new agrarian policy included: abolition, as of January 1972, of all compulsory deliveries; improved procedures and increased prices for the purchase of agricultural products to the state; the grant of property titles to "more than a million private farmers" [37]; changes in existing land taxes to compensate the state for the end of compulsory deliveries, but also to facilitate expansion of private holdings by purchase of state land; and introduction of a comprehensive free health service for private farmers and their families.

From the purely economic point of view, the most important feature of Gierek's agrarian policy was the abolition of compulsory deliveries, which had been the principal economic demand of the Polish peasants since 1945. After the Polish October of 1956, Gomulka had partially acceded to this demand by considerably reducing the share of output subject to compulsory delivery and had even promised to dispense with such payments "as soon as practicable," [38] but this promise was never fulfilled. Although after 1958 the bulk of agricultural production was bought from the peasants by the state on a free-contract basis, a portion continued to be compulsorily delivered to the state at prices roughly half the contract price.[39] The party claimed that the price difference was a form of levy needed to finance agricultural investment, but the peasants viewed this self-evident loss as exploitation. Perceptive agricultural economists also opposed the compulsory-delivery system on the grounds that it forced each peasant smallholder to grow everything from pigs to potatoes and thereby impeded rational specialization of agricultural production, an argument which evidently figured in the decision of the pragmatic Gierek leadership to abolish compulsory deliveries.[40]

In making this major concession, the current Polish leadership did institute a special cash levy, assessed on the acreage of individual homesteads, which was to be part of a reformed system of land taxation. However, the levy was a fixed sum which could be calculated into production costs, and the government promised a substantive reform of the land-tax system to "reduce excessive progression in land-tax assessment." [41] The tax reform would benefit the larger (and more productive) private farms, which previously had been forced to pay disproportionately large taxes on their landholdings.

Success in the Short Term

Gierek's new agrarian policies gave the individual peasants a sense of security, economic respectability, and social usefulness that had not existed under Gomulka. In addressing the concrete issue of increasing the output of food, the new leadership had in effect further consolidated private ownership in the countryside,[42] and thus had exhibited a willingness to subordinate ideological to pragmatic considerations.

[35] *Trybuna ludu*, March 20, 1971.

[36] See the joint recommendation of the PUWP Politburo and the UPP Presidium, *ibid.*, April 18, 1971. The United Peasant Party is one of two licensed (*i.e.*, satellite) political parties in Poland (the other being the Democratic Party).

[37] This figure was reported in a speech by Stanislaw Gucwa, Chairman of the UPP Presidium at a plenary session of that party's Executive Committee, *Zielony sztandar* (Warsaw), April 24, 1971.

[38] See Gomulka's speech at the 1958 Harvest Festival, *Trybuna ludu*, Sept. 8, 1958.

[39] In 1970, the respective compulsory-delivery and free-contract prices for pork meat were 9.78 and 20.13 zlotys per kilogram; for wheat, 235 and 396 zlotys per hundredweight; and for potatoes, 54 and 102 zlotys per hundredweight (*Rocznik statystyczny 1970* [1970 Statistical Yearbook], Warsaw, GUS, 1971, p. 404).

[40] See E. Gorzelak, "The Key Problems of Agrarian Economic Policy," *Wies wspolczesna* (Warsaw), November 1968, and the unsigned editorial in *Trybuna ludu*, April 18, 1971.

[41] *Trybuna ludu*, April 18, 1971.

[42] In Poland, some 84 percent of all agricultural land is cultivated by private farmers.

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Gierek's Silesia—a farmer and his son plow their fields under the shadow of the giant Katowice coking plant.

—Photograph by James Blair, copyright 1972, National Geographic Society.

The results of these policies have been particularly dramatic in the sector of animal husbandry and meat production. Freed from onerous compulsory deliveries, Polish farmers began to produce and market meat. Thanks to the relatively short breeding cycle for pigs, pork supply was the first to show improvement. After oscillating between 65,000 and 80,000 tons a month for the first nine months of Gierek's rule, pork marketings jumped to 120,000 tons in October 1971. In December, 129,000 tons of pork were marketed, representing an increase of better than 60 percent over December 1970 marketings.[43] In the first quarter of 1972, pork procurement continued to run 60 percent ahead of year-earlier figures. Although beef purchases rose only 13.7 percent (owing to the longer breeding cycle), the overall volume of meat supply in the first quarter of 1972 was 42 percent higher than in the first quarter of 1971.[44] Should this favorable trend continue—and there is every indication that it will—Poland could soon dispense with costly meat imports and perhaps even resume its export of meat and meat products.

These favorable results in the agricultural sector played an important role in the overall achievements of the Polish economy during Gierek's first year of rule. Having inherited a near-stagnant economy devoid of any reserves which could be employed to raise living standards or provide additional job opportunities, the new First Secretary and his economic experts reportedly were able to increase real wages in 1971 by 5.3 percent and boost total employment by nearly 3 percent. Despite the unprecedented 10-percent increase in purchasing power, the government was able to keep inflationary pressures in check by producing 7 percent more consumer goods than in 1970. There were no persistent shortages of goods in 1971, although the government did admit that "some of the more sophisticated consumer products were still difficult to get." [45]

While laudable in themselves, these short-term achievements do not mean that Gierek's economic experts have found the magic formula for combining a substantial improvement in living standards and satisfaction of the social and economic needs of the population with relatively rapid economic growth—along standard Communist lines. Economic stability

[43] *Biuletyn statystyczny*, No. 2, February 1972, p. 27. Cf. *ibid.*, No. 2, February 1971, p. 29.

[44] Official Polish Press Agency (PAP) release, March 8, 1972.

[45] See the Main Statistical Office's communique on 1971 plan fulfillment, *loc. cit. supra.*

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has been purchased at the price of increased foreign indebtedness, not only in the form of loan borrowing from the Soviet Union but also, and more important, in the form of a substantial increase in Poland's balance-of-trade deficit. A 36.7-percent increase in food imports and a 16-percent increase in imports of consumer goods contributed to a record trade deficit of 162.3 million dollars in 1971.[46] Red ink in foreign trade accounts is not a new phenomenon, but Gomulka had always tried to close the gap by ruthlessly slashing all "nonessential" imports. Gierek's overriding concern with providing consumer goods and food has ruled out this solution as politically unfeasible.

Poland's economic stability remains very fragile indeed. In 1972, the economy faces an estimated 50-billion-zloty increase in individual incomes over the already-inflated 1971 level.[47] Although there are many indications that this official estimate may prove too conservative, the targeted increase in domestic output of food and consumer goods in the National Economic Plan for 1972 barely matches the estimated surge in purchasing power, and then only on the quite unrealistic assumption that everything produced for the market will be purchased. Thus the government faces the possibility of being again forced to spend more on imports than anticipated.

The official response to this threat has been the launching of a massive propaganda and organizational effort to get industry to produce 20 billion zlotys of goods over and above the output targets contained in the 1972 plan.[48] But such improvised efforts to increase overall output regardless of cost can at best serve as a temporary palliative for the more fundamental inflationary pressures in the Polish economy. The regime will probably attempt to channel some of the inflationary demand into durable consumer goods such as mass-produced and relatively inexpensive family automobiles,[49] or into private and cooperative housing.[50] However, the motorcars will not roll off the assembly lines before 1975, and building-material shortages will hamper home construction until at least 1976. Hence the battle with inflation promises to be difficult and protracted, notwithstanding Gierek's forceful and effective first steps.

Economic Reform—The Missing Link

It must also be noted that the boldness of Gierek's reordering of economic priorities stands in sharp contrast to the caution and hesitancy he has displayed in dealing with the more fundamental problem of reforming the system of economic planning and management. It is true that the new leader has shown a keen awareness of the crucial linkage between the introduction of greater initiative and flexibility in economic decision-making, on the one hand, and acceleration of economic growth and improved satisfaction of consumer demand, on the other hand. At the February 1971 Plenum of the Central Committee he stated:

. . . the whole system of economic management . . . must be completely overhauled and adapted to the new strategy of social and economic development."[51]

The Politburo report to the same session criticized Gomulka's piecemeal, inexpert implementation of economic reform and called for a comprehensive program of economic reform which would be introduced all at once, in its entirety. The Politburo assigned responsibility for designing such a program to a special commission chaired by Gierek's principal economic advisor, Jan Szydlak, and composed of leading party and government figures as well as a large number of nonofficial experts.[52]

Despite this promising beginning, however, evidence soon began to accumulate that the party was not ready to accept really radical changes in the

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] Z. Szeliga, "Reconvalescence," *Polityka*, Jan. 29, 1972.

[48] D. Zuk, "20 Billions," *Nowe drogi*, March 1972.

[49] According to an agreement with the Italian Fiat firm, production of a Fiat 500 model is to be tooled up at new factories in Tychy and Bielsko-Biala, with an initial total output of 150,000 cars a year. *Trybuna ludu*, Oct. 30, 1971.

[50] In Poland, no family above a specified income bracket is entitled to subsidized state or municipal housing. Such families must either join a housing cooperative and contribute some 20 percent of apartment construction costs, or build or buy a private home. To soak up purchasing power, the Polish state plans to sell from its holdings by the end of 1975 some 25,000 one-family houses and some 30,000 small dwellings to private owners. It will also provide credits of up to 100,000 zlotys or 75-80 percent of construction costs to those building their own one-family homes. See A. Stasiak, "One-Family Housing," *Polityka*, Nov. 27, 1971.

[51] *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 8, 1971.

[52] See PAP release of Feb. 23, 1971. It was later disclosed that some 230 "eminent specialists, scientists, and men with practical experience" had been drafted to serve on 10 working teams of this commission. Each group was to propose "concrete system solutions" (E. Kow, "Modernizing the Functioning of the National Economy," *Trybuna ludu*, May 29, 1971).

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existing economic system. An unsigned editorial which appeared in *Trybuna ludu* on April 28, 1971, declared:

The main characteristic of our reform should be a constructive attempt to reconcile the principle of central planning with that of [providing] a greater scope for initiative and independence at a lower level of economic management.

A month later, while urging the special commission to accelerate its work in order to be able to present "the general lines of the reform proposal" to the December gathering of the Sixth PUWP Congress, First Secretary Gierek warned the members of the commission to "take into account both the existing realities and the present state of the national economy." [53]

Although at the PUWP Central Committee meeting in September the party promised to work out and present "the basic principles of the reform of the system of economic management" to the Sixth Party Congress for its approval," [54] the party leaders failed to report on the reform at the Congress and instead informed the delegates that the commission was considering several alternative solutions. In the Resolution of the Congress the exceedingly modest section devoted to proposed changes in the system of planning and economic management dealt in vague generalities and made no reference to the need for greater decentralization or debureaucratization of the economic system.[55]

Further evidence of party indecision concerning the direction of economic reform emerged in the somewhat sketchy reports on a meeting of the Congress working committee assigned to examine reforms of planning and management. The very brief *Trybuna ludu* account of December 12 contained the admission:

It has been generally agreed . . . that all day-to-day operational decisions should be made at the lowest possible level. But at what level? No one could answer this question in an unequivocal manner.

A more comprehensive interview with the working committee's co-chairmen, Professor J. Pajestka and J. Pinkowski, revealed the difficulties which the experts were having in reconciling the principle of central planning with the need to decentralize decision-making and increase the play of market forces. It was stated that certain "partial solutions" would be introduced in 1972 and 1973, with other measures postponed until the mid-1970's.[56] Clearly, the Gierek team had reneged on its pledge to introduce a comprehensive reform program in one fell swoop.

From the continuing dialogue concerning the reforms there emerges the possibility that the dilemma of reconciling central planning with local initiative might be solved by *redefining* the role of central planning. One commentator suggests that the central planners should retain overall responsibility for the "purposeful guidance of the national economy" through determination of the basic proportions for future macro-economic development, correlation of the objectives of the party's socio-economic policy with the basic targets of national economic plans, and determination of the long-term needs of the economy and the means for satisfying them. However, the planners would not be allowed to interfere with operational decisions of individual enterprises and industrial associations.[57]

The Resolution of the Sixth Party Congress did, in fact, promise the enterprise managers increased freedom of action in planning output and in establishing wage rates and employment quotas for their own plants.[58] But it remains to be seen what the relationship will be between the enterprises and the industrial associations to which they belong. This is the pivotal issue in the proposed new management system, since it will determine to what extent the middle-level bureaucratic superstructure will be permitted to interfere in the operational decisions of the managers of individual enterprises. There are indications that the current leadership will opt for a differentiated organizational structure, geared to the

[53] Quoted in *ibid.*

[54] See "For the Further Socialist Development of the Polish People's Republic," guidelines for pre-Congress discussion adopted by the PUWP CC Plenum of September 4, 1971, *Trybuna ludu*, Special issue, Sept. 4, 1971.

[55] See Section 5 of the *Resolution of the 6th PUWP Congress, loc. cit. supra.* Only two of the 32 pages of the resolution dealt with the issue of economic reforms.

[56] Interview by S. Chelstowski, *Zycie gospodarcze*, Jan. 2, 1972. This article noted the unprecedented participation of some 29 "non-party" experts together with 80 congress delegates in the "heated discussion" of this committee. In the interview Professor Pajestka continued to argue, as he had in the article "A Discussion on Modernizing the System of Economic Management (*Nowe drogi*, December 1971), that central planning and increased enterprise initiative were "noncontradictory objectives of the economic reform."

[57] J. Beksiak, "The Central Plan as an Instrument of Economic Policy," *Nowe drogi*, October 1971.

[58] *Resolution of the Sixth PUWP Congress, loc. cit. supra*, p. 7. On this matter, the text of the Resolution is far less specific than that of the pre-Congress guidelines.

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specific conditions of each branch of industry.[59] If so, the greatest scope for entrepreneurial initiative is likely to be granted to managers in those plants which produce directly for the market.

A Painful Dilemma

Although the failure to draw up and enact a cohesive program of economic reform consistent with the newly-proclaimed socio-economic goals is a potential source of political embarrassment to a Gierek team which took office with a denunciation of Gomulka's failings in this sphere, it is quite conceivable that the cautious approach to reform is the result of a deliberate policy decision. Indeed, while meaningful reform measures might be expected to help the party achieve its socio-economic objectives over the long run, in the shorter term there is the very real danger that any market-oriented economic reforms could intensify inflationary pressures and further complicate an already complex economic situation. Having occasioned an inflationary expansion of the supply of money in circulation by his early, *ad hoc* concessions to the Polish population, Gierek must try to preserve a semblance of economic stability. This necessity could well figure in the party's insistence on preserving—at least for the time being—full administrative control over the use of scarce economic resources, especially investment means and imported raw materials.

It remains moot, however, whether the Polish economy can wait for qualitative reform of the existing economic system until Gierek and his advisers have dealt with the problem of excessive money supply and have achieved a genuine equilibrium of the economic forces of supply and demand. For spokesmen of the new party leadership have made the issue of economic reforms the touchstone of Gierek's economic policy—"a historic necessity." [60] The half-measures announced so far are nothing but ineffective palliatives. What is needed is a thorough overhaul of the whole system of planning and economic management, based on a genuinely comprehensive reform blueprint. As the veteran Polish economic reformer Professor Edward Lipinski has said, ". . . . only a radical reform can do away with the disastrous heritage of the mistaken policies of the past." [61] Without such reforms, Gierek's master plan for putting the Polish economy back onto an even keel and his much-advertised socio-economic objectives will remain on paper, while the "new economic policy" will be transformed into a patchwork of *ad hoc* emergency measures, isolated positive reforms and partial solutions, administered by a paternalistic and consumption-conscious, but still arbitrary, leadership relying primarily on a mixture of material incentives and instruments of the old-fashioned command economy.

Former First Secretary Gomulka was indicted by the current PUWP leaders for "mishandling" the economic reforms. But Gomulka failed to implement the new economic model not because he was hostile to it or because he was indolent. The real reason was that he was forced to give in to the pressures of the party apparatus. The new leadership has made economic reforms an integral part of its economic recovery program. It has publicly stated that it will not be deflected from its chosen course by the opposition of dogmatic elements within the party apparatus and the state and economic bureaucracy. As Jan Szydlak has declared, "We have embarked on this policy with full conviction and with full awareness of our responsibility: we shall not become tired of it. . . . Anyone who thinks that he can wait out the present period and continue to indulge . . . in the old shallow methods is mistaken." [62] In view of such firm commitments, the issue of economic reforms must be regarded not only as the touchstone of Gierek's economic policy but also as a test of his political integrity.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[60] See for example J. Pajestka, "A Discussion on Modernizing the System of Economic Management," *loc. cit. supra.* Professor Pajestka is a full member of the Central Committee and deputy chairman of the special commission preparing the economic reforms.

[61] See J. Radominska's interview with Professor Lipinski in *Kulisy* (Warsaw), Oct. 3, 1971. Professor Lipinski, together with Professors Oscar Lange and M. Kalecki, designed the Polish Economic Model of 1956-57.

[62] *Loc. cit. supra.*

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Hungary's NEM on a Treadmill

By Barnabas Büky

Approximately four and a half years after the inauguration of Hungary's "New Economic Mechanism" (NEM) in January 1968, the nation's economy presents a somewhat contradictory and enigmatic picture.

On the one hand, there are many outward signs of apparent progress and achievement. The economy is constantly expanding; production is accelerating rapidly; some enterprises have been making fat profits; an investment boom is going on; many incomes have risen considerably in the last four years; there is little or no apparent unemployment; and the rate of inflation appears comparatively modest.

On the other hand, if one looks beneath these surface appearances of success, it becomes evident that they are highly deceptive. If production is accelerating, waste is accelerating even faster. Though there are labor shortages, there is also hidden unemployment. Inflation is being artificially kept from surfacing through the use of state subsidies to hold down consumer and export prices and to offset actual losses at many inefficient enterprises. Even the most successful enterprises are finding their profits eaten away by rising costs, by growing stocks of unsalable goods, by unprofitable or uncompleted capital investments, and by having to pay increased taxes to finance the subsidies the state uses to cover up the general waste. Behind the facade of an expanding foreign trade, there is a mad race between imports and exports in which the latter are falling increasingly behind. Individual incomes are extremely uneven, with only a minority of the population rising to a level of relative affluence in recent years while the vast majority remain not much better off than before.

Many of these anomalies are nothing new; indeed, they date back to the days of the old Soviet-style "command" economy whose deficiencies the NEM was intended to correct. Hence their persistence four years after the birth of the NEM—and one year past the date when it was scheduled to reach full maturity—inevitably poses the question of whether or not the whole Hungarian economic reform program embodied in the NEM must now be written off as a total failure. It is the central purpose of this article to explore to what extent, in what ways, and why the NEM has failed, and to assess the current direction of Hungarian economic policy. It is essential, however, to do this against the backdrop of the original goals and limitations of the 1968 reforms.

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From Command Economy to NEM

The primary objective of Hungary's NEM was to decentralize economic decision-making in order to achieve a higher level of economic efficiency and a more economical use of available resources. By increasing productivity, *i.e.*, the ratio of output to input, the party hoped to modernize industry and improve the performance of Hungarian exports in world markets. This in turn would contribute to a more rapid increase in the Hungarian standard of living.[1] The economy was to pass through a preparatory stage, lasting through the end of 1970, in

[1] For a good discussion of the original thinking of the Hungarian reformers, see Harry G. Shaffer, "Progress in Hungary," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1970, pp. 48-59.

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which various "brakes" and "exceptions" would permit central authorities to intervene in the economy in order to stave off economic and political upheavals. Beginning in 1971, the brakes were to be released, the exceptions eliminated, and the "mechanism" given full swing to reap the anticipated economic benefits.[2]

It is important at this juncture to note, however, that Hungary's "new economic mechanism" was never intended to be a radical transformation of the economy. As its official label aptly suggested, it was to be an innovation, and as Edmund Burke once remarked, "to innovate is not to reform." [3] In working out the program of "reforms", Hungary's Communist leaders knew exactly what they wanted to achieve and what they wished to avoid. They intended to introduce a new "mechanism" which would make better use of the economic base *without* disturbing the political superstructure, a goal which not only violated the fundamental Marxist tenet of the linkage between economics and politics (something that did not seem to disturb them) but also ultimately doomed the reform.

The system which the NEM was designed to improve upon was a typical Stalinist command economy based on the ideological assumption that the only repository of human rationality is the party. Accordingly, the independent actions of individuals, groups, or institutions—which could only hinder the effective pursuit of rational goals—had been replaced by the absolutist exercise of power by the party-state.

In economic life this "absolute rationality" was embodied in the state plan, which prescribed *practically all actions* for each economic unit in the form of a state law to be carried out to the last detail. The same rigid relationship existed between the center and the unit, between the state and the individual, in all walks of human life, particularly in politics, where it was seen as the only guarantee that the center could control the economy. It clearly followed that a genuine market, being essentially a medium of individual decisions, could not and should not play any real role in this system. The market had only a formal existence, the categories of money, price, and interest serving mainly accounting purposes and being openly manipulated by the state. In short, the Hungarian system was of the "Soviet type," in which, as Prof. P. J. D. Wiles has observed, money is first of all a unit of account with its only active role to persuade "the worker to work where he is wanted and the consumer to consume what has been produced. . . . The initiative resides with the planner, not with the enterprise. The latter does what it is told, and the bank checks that it has done so." [4]

In this system, the fundamental economic signal was the central directive establishing compulsory production quotas expressed in natural units. The hallmark of the system was *extensive* economic growth—the quest for expansion of gross output regardless of criteria of efficiency in the use of human and natural resources.[5]

Limits, Flaws and Miscalculations

Upon close examination, one discovers that Hungary's "new" mechanism—the 1968 reforms—actually left the main principles of the old system intact. The state remained the sole repository of rationality; although the rigid relationship between the state and individual was to be relaxed in the economic realm, the alteration was hardly fundamental. The state would continue to make *all major* macro-economic decisions concerning economic development, overall investment and consumption, living standards, and the orientation of foreign trade. In the field of micro-economics, where the major changes were to take place, individual managers were expected to work more effectively and profitably (still toward realization of the central plan), and enterprises were therefore to be invested with the formal authority to manage their own affairs. Yet, even this independence was largely illusory. To ensure enterprise compliance with basic central policies, the state created—in place of the former compulsory quotas—a series of *indirect regulators*. These were complex formulas which determined how enterprises were to divide profits among various taxes and funds for profit-sharing, investment, reserves, and social purposes. Each aspect of enterprise activity—wages, total manpower, profit, invest-

[2] This timetable was explicitly laid out by numerous Hungarians, in particular, by Rezso Nyers, Hungarian Politburo member, in his book *Gazdasagpolitikank es a gazdasagi mechanizmus reformja* (Our Economic Policy and Reform of the Economic Mechanism), Budapest, Kossuth, 1968, pp. 370-71.

[3] Edmund Burke, *Letter to a Noble Lord*, London, 1796.

[4] P. J. D. Wiles, *Communist International Economics*, New York, Praeger, 1969, pp. 32, 47.

[5] For a comprehensive analysis of the command economy in Hungary, see Ivan T. Berend, *Gazdasagpolitika az elso oteves terv megindulasakor* (Economic Policy and the First Five-Year Plan), Budapest, Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 1964.

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ment, etc.—was linked by these formulas to the size of the profit-sharing fund, from which managers would receive bonuses. Therefore, by manipulating the formulas (and thereby, the managers' bonuses), the planners could regulate the flow of investment, the wage level, or the size of the labor force.[6]

On the surface, the basic reform design seemed sound enough. First, it satisfied the ideological claim that no "return to capitalism" was involved. Not only did "state ownership of the means of production" remain intact, but the state retained the initiative in the economy—regulating the planned market by new, indirect methods. Second, the NEM purported to enlist individual initiative—through the profit-sharing fund—as a powerful new instrument of economic development.

The reform, however, suffered from two fundamental flaws. First, although it was supposedly based on the idea that the national interest would be served by permitting people to make independent economic decisions on the basis of personal material interest, the authorities were not really prepared to grant this independence. Individuals soon discovered that the "indirect" regulators severely curtailed their independence, and that the market—which was supposed to be the arena and testing ground of their decisions—was hardly a genuine market, but merely a manipulated framework. They were forced to adapt economic decisions to the constraints of this framework, although they certainly tried to manipulate it in their own interests—this being the only kind of "independent" action left open to them.

The second and more crucial flaw was not something in the NEM itself, but rather the fact that there was no accompanying program of political reform. In the realm of politics, there was to be no extension of individual autonomy, no expansion of human rights—in short, no real change in the individual's subjugation to the state. Decentralization of economic decision-making, if it is to be effective, requires a parallel extension of democratic political rights in order to convince people that they have a real and responsible role in society. However, to accept this would have meant to renounce absolute political power, and this the Hungarian regime was not prepared to do. This basic moral flaw haunted the "new economic mechanism," distorting the rules of the new system and corrupting the people involved in it. This was apparent in a series of glaring mistakes in the preparations for and staging of the economic reforms, as well as in their implementation.

The first miscalculation was an error in timing. The NEM was launched in 1968, the third year of the 1966–70 Hungarian Five-Year Plan. This plan, which had been conceived and prepared during 1964 and 1965 (when economic reform was only in its embryonic stage), reflected the attitudes and priorities of the traditional command economy. Hence, it conformed to the old economic policy of extensive rather than intensive development of the economy and thus clashed with the reform's emphasis on efficiency and increases in productivity.[7]

Furthermore, the state—anxious to ensure that the replacement of directives by indirect regulators would not loosen its control over individual enterprises—had effected a series of mergers in 1967 which drastically reduced the number of enterprises. The result was the highest degree of industrial concentration in any East European country.[8] This placed the majority of Hungarian enterprises in a monopolistic position and virtually eliminated the possibility

[6] The functioning of the regulators is described in detail by Endre Megyeri in his book, *Jovedelmezoseg es vallalati erdekeltseg az uj mechanizmusban* (Profitability and Enterprise Interests in the New Economic Mechanism), Budapest, Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 1969.

[7] Bela Csikos-Nagy admits this mistake in his book, *Magyar gazdasagpolitika* (Hungarian Economic Policy), Budapest, Kossuth, 1971, pp. 364-65.

[8] In 1967, Hungarian industrial enterprises had the following distribution by size of work force: 9.7 percent of the enterprises employed less than 500 workers each; 55.8 percent employed from 500 to 5,000; and 34.5 percent employed more than 5,000 workers. See *Kosponti statisztikai idoszaki kozlemenyek* (Budapest), No. 3, 1967.



The Szekesfehervar light metals plant, reportedly the largest of its kind in Central Europe—an example of Hungarian industrial concentration.

—From *Soviet Union* (Moscow), November 1971, inside cover.

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that competition might exercise a disciplinary influence on enterprise decisions.

The party leadership was also concerned that introduction of the NEM might generate mass unemployment in Hungary and hence lead to political instability. It therefore carefully built various "brakes" into the system (*e.g.*, special new subsidies were granted to unprofitable industrial branches, and the so-called "wage-level system" of 1968 encouraged managers to retain their labor force) to prevent radical shifts in the utilization of manpower. This had the unfortunate result of blocking the necessary structural reorganization of industry—*i.e.*, the expansion of modern, profitable branches and the contraction of inefficient branches. Ironically, the fears of unemployment resulted from serious miscalculations. First, the fact that the economy continued its pursuit of extensive development under the 1966–70 plan generated a great demand for labor. More important, a careful study of Hungarian demographic trends, particularly the impact of the liberalized abortion law of 1956, would have indicated that the annual supply of new labor would rise very slowly after 1968 and drop sharply in the 1970's.

A "Phony Market"

The party's concern with maintaining central control over the economy was also evident in the role accorded prices and profits in the NEM. Instead of creating a genuine market where the decisions of sellers and buyers would be regulated by prices based on costs and the relation between supply and demand, the reforms created what amounted to a "phony market." Due to the continuation of the policy of extensive development and the practical absence of competition, this became a seller's market, allowing the consumer little chance to register his preference. The dual price system continued to operate—with a separate price scale for producers and consumers, the state bridging the gap by its turnover tax or by price subsidies.[9] In each case, prices bore little relation to costs. In the consumer sector, a three-tier system was introduced, comprising fixed prices, "limit" prices (allowed to fluctuate within centrally prescribed upper and lower limits), and free prices. However, the number of items in the last category was quite small, and the promised gradual expansion of the list failed to materialize.

The major innovation in the field of pricing was the decision to permit enterprises to fix the prices they charged other producing firms (with the exception of the prices for most raw materials—which were set by the state). This, however, led to new distortions as monopolistic sellers increased prices at will. These prices were passed on—where possible—by the purchasing firms, generating a strong inflationary trend throughout industry. All enterprises able to raise prices reaped windfall profits; other enterprises, whose prices were fixed by the state or which enjoyed a lesser degree of monopoly, suffered losses. In order to eliminate this discrepancy and to prevent bankruptcies, the state taxed the profitable firms and subsidized the unprofitable ones. On top of this, the state had to subsidize consumer industries in order to prevent the inflationary prices from being passed on to the general populace. "Profitable" enterprises paid bonuses to management and workers from the profits which remained after taxes, whereas "unprofitable" enterprises paid bonuses out of fictitious "profits" created by the state subsidies. Since no distinction was drawn between the bonuses paid in the two types of firms, the bonus system failed to perform its designated function of rewarding economic efficiency and entrepreneurship.

In order to confine the impact of inflation to the enterprises and the state budget, the planners adjusted their indirect regulators in such a way as to prevent wage increases and thereby curb inflationary consumer demand. (The subservient trade unions contributed to this effort by dutifully abstaining from making demands for higher wages—a posture which demonstrated the failure of a half-hearted reform of the unions.[10]) The result was that a paradoxical situation developed: despite an imbalance between the dwindling supply of manpower and the steadily growing demand for labor, wages remained low. In the absence of rising labor costs, enterprise managers were not forced to make efficient, labor-

[9] If the producer's price was considered too low, the turnover tax was added to make the item more expensive to the consumer. If the price was too high, the government subsidized the producer in order to keep down the price paid by the consumer.

[10] To match the increased scope of authority of the enterprise managers, the government invested the trade unions with new rights to defend the workers' interests. The unions were to be consulted on every decision concerning working time, wages, and work conditions, with the right to exercise a veto in special cases. In practice, this veto has hardly been used in the last four years. See *A munka torvenykonyve es vegrehejtasa* (The Labor Decree and Its Execution), Budapest, Tancsics Kiado, 1971, pp. 335-41.

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saving investments; instead, each tried to expand his own enterprise's supply of cheap labor at the expense of other enterprises. This aggravated labor shortages as workers shifted from job to job.[11] The state reacted characteristically with a campaign to stop "erratic" labor migration and the "irresponsible actions" of the so-called "migratory birds," but when this did not prove effective, it finally had to partially reinstate controls on the movement of labor from enterprise to enterprise.[12]

The history of wage policy under the NEM is also illustrative of another trend in the reform—the steady modification and proliferation of indirect regulators. These guidelines soon came to be viewed by the central planners as a substitute for the former binding directives; and the managers also clearly treated them as obligatory because bonuses were based upon complying with the terms set by the regulators. This, however, did not deter the managers from contriving ways of bending or getting around the regulators, and the resulting actions often had undesired side-effects which had to be dealt with by a new set of regulators. For instance, the 1968–69 "wage-level system" set limits on the average wage level at enterprises,[13] but the managers contrived to pay their enterprises' skilled manpower higher wages and still maintain a low average wage, by hiring large numbers of unskilled workers. The result was hidden unemployment and decreased productivity, which the planners attacked with a new regulator—wages paid newly hired workers were deducted from the profit-sharing fund.[14] When new difficulties arose, still further revision was required.[15] It was also found necessary to make exceptions for various industrial branches or even individual enterprises. Thus, ever more complicated, more detailed, and more circumscribing regulators were created—with the final denouement likely to be the establishment of a special set of regulators for each enterprise, tantamount to reestablishment of the command economy.

The hope that the NEM might generate a flow of available investment funds into the most modern and productive industries also proved illusory. It has already been noted that the retention of an unrealistic pricing system and the continued payment of subsidies blurred the differences between dynamic and unprofitable enterprises. Modernization of industry was also hindered by the credit monopoly of the central bank, and by refusal to allow foreign investment capital to enter in any significant quantity. Although enterprises were to be allowed to plow a growing share of their profits into capital investment (thereby gradually reducing the investment role of the state), this process was also distorted by the system of prices and subsidies. The inflation in industrial prices led to a tremendous increase in investment costs, and the artificially low cost of labor encouraged managers to build new plants using more manpower and existing technology rather than to modernize production processes or develop new products. Expansion of plant capacity seemed to promise a larger scale of production and a bigger volume of profits. Thus, there was a tendency to start too many capital projects at the same time, a trend also fostered by the not unfounded expectation that the state would come to the rescue with new subsidies if financial difficulties arose. The volume of unfinished capital projects increased year by year, and reconstruction was neglected.

Foreign Trade Problems

In the vital area of foreign trade (on which 40 percent of Hungary's national income depends), the anticipated exposure of the economy to the salutary effects of genuine market forces was thwarted by two factors: first, the domestic structure and level of prices bore no relation whatsoever to prices abroad; and second, Hungary had to adapt the very structure and mechanism of its foreign trade to the rigid rules of Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance).

In trying to bridge the gap between domestic and world prices, the state introduced in 1968 a foreign-exchange multiplier (60 forints to the dollar, compared with an official exchange rate of 27 forints to

[11] In the two-year period 1969-70, labor turnover was equivalent to 80 percent of industrial workers changing their jobs. Karoly Hlogyik, "A munkaugyi helyzetrol" (On the Manpower Situation), *Munkaugyi szemle* (Budapest), March 1971, p. 53.

[12] Compulsory labor-exchange was gradually reintroduced in different counties in the course of 1970 and, finally, in Budapest on October 24, 1970. *Magyar hirlap* (Budapest), Oct. 24, 1970.

[13] The Government Decree No. 11/1967 (on taxation and enterprise funds), *Az uj gazdasagi mechanizmus jogszabalgainak gyujtemenye. I.* (Laws and Decrees of the New Economic Mechanism. Vol. I), Budapest, Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 1967. For details on the wage-level system, see pp. 511-14.

[14] *Nepszava* (Budapest), Dec. 7, 1969. The regulators took effect January 1, 1970.

[15] On January 1, 1971, the system was modified again. The profit-sharing fund was cut back by increased taxes on profits and a new levy on wage increases. Enterprises with low profit-margins were hit hardest, but the expected shift of labor to more profitable enterprises was hindered by the reintroduction of compulsory labor-exchange. *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), Nov. 18, 1970.

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Hungarian Premier Jeno Fock (right) arrives at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport on March 27, 1972, for talks with USSR Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin (left) concerning Soviet-Hungarian economic, scientific and technological cooperation and Budapest's obligations under the Comecon integration program.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

the dollar) for trading firms.[16] This would have been useful if the domestic price structure had not been so unrealistic and lopsided. Since the dollar-forint rate varied with practically every commodity group (not to mention the complications caused by price fluctuations abroad, which domestic prices were unable to follow), the idea of a general multiplier proved futile, and the rate had to be varied for different branches of industry and even for different enterprises within a branch. In most cases, the state had to heavily subsidize the dollar rates because of disappointing export returns.[17] Under these conditions, the government tended to export anything that could be sold for hard currency in order to be able to satisfy import requirements, even if this practice was done at the expense of domestic consumers.

Forced adherence to the written and unwritten rules of Comecon has created additional foreign-trade difficulties for Hungary. A principal factor here is the so-called "dependence-ratio," which has required Hungary to conduct some 70 percent of its annual trade with Comecon partners—36 to 40 percent with the USSR alone.[18] (Other Comecon members also adhere to a fairly high and constant "dependence-ratio"—with the notable exception of Rumania, which indicates that the ratio is maintained mainly for political reasons.) The great bulk of this trade is regulated by bilateral governmental agreements negotiated without enterprise participation. Prices are much less important here than the relative barter values of certain commodities in the Comecon area. The only reliable rate of exchange is "commodity *versus* commodity," and prices are adapted to this principle.

As long as Hungary remains so deeply involved in the Comecon system, its trade with the rest of the world remains restricted, and useful and profitable participation in the international division of labor is hardly possible. Hungary might attempt to remedy this situation in two ways: by reducing its involvement or by trying to change the system. The first possibility is excluded for political reasons. The second was attempted, with no success, in early 1969, when the Hungarian regime tabled its reform-model for Comecon.[19] In the so-called "integration dispute" that followed, the Russians succeeded in putting the Hungarian proposals on ice, and the Comecon integration program adopted in July 1971 may well have increased Hungary's dependence on the organization.[20]

Hungarian discontent with the implications of this dependence flared in March 1972. Upon his return from economic consultations in Moscow, Hungarian Premier Jeno Fock made a statement at Budapest airport in which he openly indicated that the USSR had proved reluctant to commit itself to the delivery —on a long-term basis—of the raw materials and

[16] Under this system, a firm exporting goods at a price of $1 million would be credited with 60 million forints instead of the 27 million forints it would have received at normal exchange rates.

[17] For a discussion of the problems in applying the foreign-exchange multiplier, see Dr. Imre Vincze, "Penzugyi tamogatasok a termelo agazatokban" (Financial Intervention in the Production Branches), *Penzugyi szemle* (Budapest), June 1970, pp. 452-64.

[18] Jeno Fock, speech delivered at meeting of Parliament with the economic managers, *Magyar hirlap*, Oct. 23, 1971.

[19] Rezso Nyers, "A szocialista integracio elmeleti es gyakorlati kerdesei" (Socialist Integration: Questions of Principle and Practice), speech at the Political Academy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Jan. 22, 1969, in *Nepszabadsag*, Jan. 23, 1969. The "Nyers Model" offered a two-pronged approach toward integration: the gradual introduction of convertibility, Comecon price reform, and direct enterprise-to-enterprise deals, on the one hand; coordination of planning and establishment of supranational bodies, on the other. Nyers made it clear that Hungary gave priority to the first approach.

[20] Communique of Comecon's Bucharest session, *Nepszabadsag*, July 30, 1971. A somewhat fuller version was issued by Agerpres (t' Romanian press agency) on July 29, 1971.

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fuels needed by Hungarian industry.[21] Any Soviet cut in these absolutely essential supplies would cause Hungary's long-range economic plans to collapse like a house of cards. A more likely development may be that Hungary will get the required deliveries—but at a price. Not only could the Soviet Union raise the barter value of its raw materials, but it has already insisted that Hungary "fulfill its role in the integration program," *i.e.*, commit its limited capital resources to the construction of a huge steel plant near Kursk and the development of the West Siberian oilfields.[22]

Crisis and Retreat

The cumulative effects of the inherent weaknesses of the economic reform and the adverse foreign trade situation of Hungary forced the government to resort to increasingly centralistic policies during 1971. Thus, far from letting up on the economic "brakes" (as prescribed in the NEM's original timetable), the party had to increase state intervention—modifying the regulators to curb excessive enterprise investments, placing a credit ban on new investments in June, and limiting the mobility of labor.[23] However, these expedients failed to stave off a serious economic crisis. At the end of October, a special conference—attended by managers, economists, party leaders, and members of the government—was held in Budapest, at which Premier Fock gave an unusually frank and gloomy account of the economic situation and called for "fundamental decisions" in the realm of economic policy.[24]

Actually, Fock only called attention to the tips of the iceberg, but his revelations and subsequent statements by others provide adequate testimony to the general inefficiency and disequilibrium afflicting the Hungarian economy under the NEM. Despite restrictive state policies, investment spending in 1971 raced out of control, far exceeding the state plan and available resources. A total of 106 billion forints was expended, of which more than 80 percent was tied up in unfinished projects.[25] Many enterprises went into bankruptcy because of this overspending, imposing a heavy burden on the state budget.[26] As the supply of labor decreased, the manpower situation grew chaotic. The result was an erratic and extensive mobility of labor and a gradual decline of worker morale and discipline. At the same time there was considerable hidden unemployment. The reform's objective of closing unprofitable enterprises was not met, and state subsidies amounted to 53 billion forints in 1971, compared to 35 billion forints in 1968.[27]

In foreign trade, Hungary ended 1971 with a deficit of 6.5 billion forints, another all-time record. Even if one discounts the 3.4 billion-forint deficit in the trade with Comecon (where such an imbalance is Hungary's only way of recovering its former trade surplus from its Communist partners), there remains a critical 3.1-billion-forint deficit in trade with hard-currency areas. This exceeds the total deficit of 2.8 billion registered for all of 1964–67 (*i.e.*, the last four years before the NEM was introduced.)[28] Imports from the developed countries grew rapidly (partly because of Hungarian overinvestment), while Budapest's exports to those countries fell by eight percent.

None of these phenomena was a unique product of 1971. Overinvestment was typical not only of 1971 but of 1970 and some years before. Manpower shortages have been a chronic problem for Hungary. Trade with the West has closed with a deficit not only in 1971 but, with the exception of 1969, in every other year since 1958. The extravagance of state subsidies has been a feature of Hungarian economic life ever since the command economy was established in 1949. Clearly, the crisis of 1971 was

[21] *Nepszabadsag*, March 30, 1972 (broadcast in a fuller version by Radio Budapest on March 29, 1972).

[22] *Izvestia* (Moscow), March 30, 1972. Reference to participation in the Kursk deal was made as early as August 31, 1970, by Jozsef Kocsis, Hungarian Deputy Minister of Metallurgy and Machine Building (Radio Budapest). See also *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 7, 1971. On Hungarian participation in exploitation of Siberian oil, see *Vneshniaia torgovlia* (Moscow), No. 1, 1971.

[23] See *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 19, 1971, and interview with Imre Pardi, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, *Tarsadalmi szemle* (Budapest), January 1972.

[24] *Loc. cit. supra.* See also *Nepszabadsag* for Oct. 23 and 24, 1971.

[25] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1971.

[26] In 1971, some 106 industrial enterprises had to be rehabilitated by the state at a total cost of 3.3 billion forints. Geza Prohaszka, "A vallalati eladosodas okai" (Why They Are Running into Debts), *Penzugyi szemle*, August-September 1971.

[27] *Magyar hirlap*, Sept. 28 and 29, 1971.

[28] *Statisztikai havi kozlemenyek* (Warsaw), January 1972, pp. 88-89. Hungary's deteriorating terms of trade with non-socialist countries are shown in the following data drawn from the above source and the annual volumes of *Statisztikai evkonyv* (Statistical Yearbook), Budapest, for 1964-70:

	Exports (mil. forints)	*Deficit (mil. forints)*	*Deficit as % of exports*
1964-67	22,515	2,801	12.4
1968-71	29,734	4,473	15.0

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only a particularly glaring manifestation of anomalies which date back to the "old mechanism" of the centralized command system. Because it was an attempt to modify rather than do away with these old conditions, the NEM was doomed to failure.

The Hungarian government responded to this latest crisis with new restrictive measures which took effect on January 1, 1972. These steps not only froze the program of economic reform but involved a partial reintroduction of central controls. Investment expenditures for 1972 were to be held at 1971 levels, and the share of investment financed by the enterprises was to be cut back. A new state bank was set up for the purpose of handling the increased government share of investment. The ban on credit for additional enterprise capital outlays was also extended. To stem the spiraling trade deficit, the government proposed to cut the import of Western consumer goods by some 25 percent in 1972.[29] As a result of the shortage of manpower, the 1971 restrictions on labor mobility were extended through 1972, and a concerted drive was launched to strengthen work discipline and to revive "socialist emulation" in the factories.[30]

The regime also felt compelled finally to pass on some of the burden of inflation in industrial prices to the consuming public. Prices on building materials were allowed to rise 30 percent, and prices on all imported consumer goods except "basic necessities" were also raised.[31] To make these increases somewhat more palatable, the government moved to close the widening income gap between a prosperous minority and the great majority of Hungarians by imposing a new income tax which claims practically all income in excess of 10,000 forints (or roughly 370 dollars) a month.[32]

Available data for 1972 indicate that this restrictive program has not been very effective. State subsidies and investment outlays in the first quarter were higher than in the comparable period of 1971; the trade deficit with the West during the first half of 1972 was down from 1971 but remained higher than in the first half of 1970.[33] Thus, even the recent restrictive measures may prove insufficient to restore at least a temporary balance in the Hungarian economy.

The sorry pass to which the NEM has come is perhaps highlighted by a relatively minor government decision—its ban on the industrial activities of consumer cooperatives. These auxiliary production operations, run as semi-private units, had proven capable of earning surprisingly large profits (and of successfully attracting labor with the offer of high wages) because of their ability to satisfy consumer demand and to operate efficiently. In justifying its ban, the government explained that "state industry should be protected from this unfair competition."[34] It is truly ironic that the cooperatives' industrial operations should be accused of competing unfairly merely because they have prospered by being responsive to the forces of the marketplace, thus demonstrating the promising potential of genuine economic reform.

The Present Outlook

As one attempts to assess the future course of the NEM, it is necessary not only to recall the fundamental political limitations which the Hungarian regime placed on the reform from the outset, but also to consider the current state of the Hungarian economy and the changed environment in Eastern Europe. Three major stumbling blocks can be discerned, which, in combination or separately, could force the abandonment of the whole experiment.

The first obstacle is the major difficulty Hungary faces in attempting to achieve a rapid and continuing economic growth. With investments and imports curbed, with the supply of labor expected to decline, and with the inflow of foreign capital more or less excluded (in fact, Hungary may have to export capital to the USSR), future growth is indeed very problematic. Should it fail to produce the promised growth performance, the NEM may be put aside in favor of more coercive measures.

[29] Speech by Istvan Szurdi, Minister of Internal Trade at Budapest conference on internal trade of November 29, 1971. *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 30, 1971, and Radio Budapest on the same date.

[30] See *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 5, 1971, and *Nepszava*, Jan. 12, 1972.

[31] *Nepszabadsag*, Jan. 1, 1972. The increases took effect on January 1 and February 1, 1972, respectively.

[32] Anticipating this policy, the police in the second half of 1971 began to interview people who had bought a new apartment or automobile—for the purpose of determining the source of their finances.

[33] For the data on subsidies and investments, see Rezso Nyers, "Gazdasagi helyzetunk es fejlodesunk" (Our Economic Situation and Development), *Nepszabadsag*, April 30, 1972. Foreign trade statistics for the first half of 1972 were revealed by Jozsef Biro, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Trade, at a July 19th press conference (*Vilaggazdasag* [Budapest] July 20, 1972).

[34] Speech by Lajos Feher, member of the HSWP Political Committee at the Parliament session of September 22, 1971. *Nepszabadsag*, Sept. 23, 1971.

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The second danger is inherent in the new mechanism itself. As it becomes obvious that neither liberalization nor genuine decentralization is in sight, and as the state gradually reintroduces controls and restrictions on economic activity, a final corruption and degeneration of the reform is likely to set in.

Finally, changing conditions and relationships within Eastern Europe will doubtless have their impact on the Hungarian reforms. When the NEM was launched in 1968, the international outlook seemed favorable for such an undertaking. The Russians—themselves toying with reformist ideas—seemed relatively tolerant; Czechoslovakia had already introduced its "new economic model"; and the Sino-Soviet rift had not yet posed any serious challenge to Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. The picture is quite different today. "Integration" has replaced "reform" as the catchword in Eastern Europe, and the Hungarians have had to shelve their hopes for reforms within Comecon. The Czechoslovak reform has been ruthlessly rooted out by military intervention, which serves as a warning to Budapest to avoid far-reaching experimentation. Finally, the Chinese have challenged Soviet control in the Balkans—which has led the Kremlin to establish even stricter rules of conformity among its allies.

The Hungarian regime was able to muddle ahead with its imperfect reforms in the first years of the NEM, when the innovations generated sufficient economic growth to stave off political instability, division within the ruling party, and intervention from outside. However, this guarantee no longer exists with the economy in serious trouble. Since truly radical reforms are precluded by current political realities in Eastern Europe, there seems to be no choice for Hungary but to revert to more authoritarian, centralistic policies, even though they hold little promise for significantly improving economic performance in the foreseeable future.

Selected Data on the Hungarian Economy

(in percent, except where noted)

	Prior to Reform (1964-67)	Under the NEM (1968-71)
Growth of national income	22.2	24.7
Rise in productivity	21.9	14.0
Total investment (bil. forints)	219.7	349.6
Increase in investment over preceding four-year total	22.9	59.1
Increase in investment per one-percent increase in national income	1.03	2.39
Increase in investment per one-percent increase in productivity	1.05	4.33

SOURCE: *Statisztikai evkonyv* (Statistical Yearbook), Budapest, for the years 1964 through 1970, and the report on the 1971 budget delivered to the National Assembly on December 20 (broadcast by MTI, Budapest, the same day).

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The Communist Powers and the Middle East

EDITORS' NOTE: The last few years have witnessed a major increase in the involvement of the Communist powers in Middle Eastern affairs. Each of the following articles explores a pertinent aspect of that evolving situation. Mr. Campbell analyzes various threads of Soviet policy to determine whether Moscow has a "grand design" in the area. Mr. Adie examines China's approach to the Middle East since the Cultural Revolution, viewing present-day policies in broad historical perspective.

Moscow's Purposes

By John C. Campbell

The growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean has produced in the West a variety of explanations and reactions. The latter range from alarm to vague concern to complacency. The former may flow from a general view of Soviet policy in the Brezhnev era (and before) or from a specific preoccupation with interests that are obviously affected—Western defense, concern for Israel or for the Arabs or for a settlement between them, access to Middle East oil, or whatever.

If a Soviet grand strategy exists, then we must assume that the separate pieces of Soviet policy here and there in the Middle East are logically related to it. It is unrewarding to proceed from theory —from the sacred texts of Leninism on the inevitable triumph of communism or the pronouncements of party congresses and leaders about national liberation movements and progress on the road to socialism in the Third World, or even from some mechanical concept of the balance of power. One has to look at specific developments in the Middle East itself to see where this "presence" is, of what it consists, and against whom it is directed; what the commitments and the means to back them up are; what risks are being taken, and where their limits are. Finally, one has to try to measure the importance of the region, in Soviet eyes, in relation to other Soviet interests, foreign and domestic.

In contrast to Europe, where the Soviet leaders have chosen a policy of stabilization and détente, the Middle East has presented a shifting political scene in which the USSR is engaged in an active political and military competition with the United States which both sides frankly admit is dangerous to world peace. In contrast to Southeast Asia, where the Soviet leaders, although virtually compelled to support North Vietnam and oppose the United States for reasons of solidarity with a Communist state and of competition with China, have limited their involvement, the Middle East has witnessed such a heavy concentration of Soviet effort and such deep Soviet involvement as to suggest that the leaders in

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Moscow see vital interests at stake. In contrast to their game in South Asia, where they chose to back India—the stronger party—and made notable gains at small risk, in the Middle East they have sided with Arab states of proven weakness and instability.

The inevitable question is: Why? Before attempting to deal with it, we should have before us a brief (if necessarily oversimplified) description of the position that the Soviet Union has attained in the Middle East. What has it gained in military positions, political influence, and general prestige? How solid is the foundation on which these gains rest?

The recent action of Egypt, in requesting the withdrawal of most of the Soviet military advisers and experts, appears to have posed that last question in stark form. This dramatic move and the circumstances surrounding it are not yet sufficiently clear to enable us to reach firm conclusions on their meaning. As an expression of nationalism, it can hardly be overestimated. Some call it a historic turning point, a basic shift in the balance of power, indicating that the Soviet position in the Middle East has passed its apogee and can only decline henceforward. Others pass it off as a temporary setback, or even as a sly game of collusion. Probably neither interpretation is correct. Rather than attempt rash prediction, it seems wise to look at these recent events in the context of the whole pattern of Soviet relations with the Middle East.

The Military Picture

The Soviet military presence has consisted mainly of ships on the high seas, naval and air facilities, bases, advisory missions, military supply programs, and, until recently, limited combat forces in Egypt. (Thus far, we do not know whether all those forces are being permanently withdrawn, along with other "advisers," at Egypt's request; if so, the Soviet presence is diminished, though by no means ended.)

The growth of Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean from practically nothing in the early 1960's to a permanent squadron which at times has numbered more than 60 ships has been the most spectacular advance.[1] This squadron has the use of facilities for repair in certain Egyptian and Syrian ports and has perfected techniques of refueling and replenishment at sea. However, the effect of the increase of the Soviet naval force on the military balance has not been decisive, for the Soviet squadron is inferior to the US Sixth Fleet in striking power and could not last long in a direct test of strength, though such a test is neither sought nor likely to take place. Nonetheless, the Soviet squadron has compelled American and NATO naval forces to take account of it. Soviet and Western writers have argued that its mere presence may rule out unilateral moves by US forces such as the landings in Lebanon in 1958.[2] Above all, it proclaims to all nations that the Mediterranean is not an American lake, that another great power is there. The effects have been evident not only on Arab states but on the political calculations and policies of NATO countries, of Yugoslavia and Albania, and especially of states like Cyprus and Malta, former strongpoints of the Western defense system.[3]

In the Indian Ocean, the trend has been similar, although there the wide expanses of water and the near-absence of naval power exercised by anybody make for a less concentrated rivalry and a more attenuated connection between warships and political influence. This is not to say that American authorities have not been concerned about Soviet naval visits to the Persian Gulf or East Africa, and especially about possible Soviet bases in India following Moscow's strong support of India against Pakistan and the bilateral security treaty of August 1971, or that Soviet authorities have not been concerned about US submarines in the Indian Ocean capable of launching nuclear missiles into Soviet territory.[4]

[1] Michael Salomon, *Méditerranée rouge*, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1970, pp. 87-95; Lawrence L. Whetten, "The Military Consequences of Mediterranean Super Power Parity," *New Middle East* (London), November 1971, pp. 14-25; J. C. Hurewitz, "Changing Military Perspectives in the Middle East," in Paul Y. Hammond and Sidney S. Alexander, Eds., *Political Dynamics in the Middle East*, New York, Elsevier, 1972, pp. 72-85.

[2] See A. K. Kislov, "SShA v Sredizemnomore: novye realnosti," *SShA* (Moscow), April 1972, pp. 35-36; Bernard Lewis, "The Great Powers, the Arabs and Israelis," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), July 1969, p. 644; J. C. Hurewitz, *loc. cit.*, pp. 79-80. However, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, US Chief of Naval Operations, believes that the Sixth Fleet could still act as it did in 1958 [*US News and World Report* (Washington, DC), Sept. 13, 1971, pp. 72-77], and much has been made of its influence on the outcome of the Syria-Jordan crisis of 1970.

[3] On the balance of forces and its consequences, see E. Novoseltsev and David Prygov, "SShA i Sredizemnomore," in Yu. P. Davydov and V. S. Rudnev, Eds., *SShA: Regionalnye problemy vneshnei politiki*, Moscow, Nauka, 1971, pp. 56-59.

[4] Geoffrey Jukes, "The Soviet Union and the Indian Ocean," *Survival* (London), November 1971, p. 371; Oles Smolansky, "Soviet Entry into the Indian Ocean: An Analysis," unpublished paper presented at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, March 18-19, 1971, pp. 6 and 8; Yurii Tomikin, "Indiiski Okean v aggressivnykh planakh imperializma," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia* (Moscow), August 1971, pp. 20-22, 27.

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

A Kola-class destroyer leads the way as three Soviet warships pass through the Bosphorus on their way to the Mediterranean in June 1967.

—Wide World Photos.

The new Soviet naval strategy, of course, is not chopped into geographical segments. The forces in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean serve the general aim, pursued since the early 1960's, of making the Soviet Union a global naval power capable of flexing its muscles on all the world's seas. In that context, too, it is worth mentioning some physical barriers. The Mediterranean is a highway to the oceans; however, it is an inland sea with narrow openings. Between it and Soviet home ports in the Black Sea lie the Turkish Straits, long coveted by Russian governments but now firmly in the physical possession of the Turks. At the moment, both the Soviet Union and Turkey are observing the Montreux Convention. But the Soviets cannot be sure of Turkey's cooperation in all circumstances; thus, the Soviet naval position depends uniquely on Soviet relations with Turkey.

At the eastern end of the Mediterranean, the exit to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean has been closed since 1967; the Suez Canal serves not as an international waterway but as an antitank ditch between two armies. The Soviet Union undoubtedly would like to see the canal reopened. However, it has not pursued an active policy to that end for the simple reason that it could not bring about Israel's withdrawal except on terms unacceptable to its Egyptian ally. The US proposal for an "interim solution" to the Arab-Israeli conflict—whereby Israel would move back from the Canal to another defensive line in the Sinai and allow the Canal to reopen for all ships, including its own—would suit Soviet maritime and strategic interests, but this proposal is now festooned with all the intractable issues which have made a permanent settlement impossible and on which neither great power chooses to push its local ally to accept a compromise. So the Soviets are denied the direct route that they would like to have in moving ships between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

The western end of the Mediterranean has a wider gate than the eastern end. However, Western positions at Gibraltar and Rota afford the means of surveillance, and Western air and naval capabilities provide the means of control.

One can foresee possible additional gains in the Soviet military position: more surface ships and submarines in the Mediterranean, more naval and air facilities along the North African littoral, the neutralization of Cyprus and Malta as bases available to Western forces, perhaps a reopening of the Suez Canal, the use of bases along the Red Sea, and stronger forces in the Indian Ocean. But it is hard to see such gains upsetting the military balance in those regions or permitting Soviet forces safely to engage in military interventions, unless the United States deliberately chose a policy of withdrawal or unless there were a total change in the political balance on which American interests so largely depend. We must presume that the Soviet political leaders know these things, despite the loud talk of their admirals about fighting the imperialists on all the seas.

Political Strategy

It is for these reasons that the essence of the Soviet Union's policy, and of the gains it has made, is primarily political. Political success in the Arab world in the period of Nikita Khrushchev opened the way for the development of military positions by his successors, and those positions, besides being useful for further political gains, continue to require an adequate political foundation for their very existence.

Soviet political strategy in Stalin's last years was extraordinarily passive in the wake of his failure to break into Iran, Turkey, Greece and the Mediter-

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ranean during the period at the close of World War II; after his death, it emerged along two main lines. The first was to reduce Western commitments and influence in the countries on the Soviet Union's southern borders, Turkey and Iran. This policy had its periods of threat and subversion, as well as of détente, and sometimes it combined all three; but by the mid-1960's the watchwords were normalization and cooperation. The second line was to support Arab nationalism and radical Arab regimes in their conflicts with the Western powers and with Israel. Here the successes were more spectacular, and the gains made at Western expense were more serious.

These were not separate policies. Moscow is often given great credit for having "leapfrogged" the Western-allied "northern tier" to establish Soviet influence in the Arab world where the West was vulnerable. Yet the Soviet leaders were not so taken with their successes in Cairo and Damascus that they failed to keep in their vision the Middle East region as a whole. Where there were differences within the Soviet leadership about how far to go in commitments to Arab states—and there were such differences, certainly during Khrushchev's last year in power and probably on subsequent occasions[5]—the state of relations with Turkey and Iran was not an irrelevant consideration. Brezhnev and his colleagues, in scaling down Khrushchev's far-flung adventurism in the Third World to concentrate particular attention on the Middle East, have shown their awareness of that fact, as will be demonstrated in the following discussion of Moscow's bilateral relations with Iran, Turkey, and the Arab states.

Turkey. What political gains have they made in Turkey? Under the banner of normalization, they have drawn the Turks away from rigid conformity with American policies and strategies. In many ways, they were knocking at an open door, for the Turks not only were already questioning the need for policies of cold-war firmness at a time when their allies in Western Europe were preaching and practicing détente, but were looking askance at American policies which included withdrawal of missiles from Turkey, decreasing levels of military and economic aid, and an unwillingness to support Turkey's position in the dispute over Cyprus. Even so, the Soviets were quick to move.

On the diplomatic front, the two countries have exchanged numerous high-level visits since 1964. The Soviet Union has repeatedly proclaimed its respect for Turkish independence and its agreement with the principle that no settlement of the Cyprus question should ignore the rights of the Turkish community there (a principle that Moscow has not found inconsistent with continued support of Cyprus' President Makarios). The two countries have concluded several economic agreements, including some which provide for Soviet supply of plants and equipment on liberal terms of credit.[6] In 1970, the Turkish government agreed to allow the Soviets to move arms over Turkish roads to Syria and Iraq, an extraordinary concession that would not have been dreamt of a few years before.

Nevertheless, there is no Soviet military aid program, no military cooperation. Moscow has gained no influence over the basic foreign policy of Turkey, which continues its solidarity with NATO. And Turkey's internal troubles have not proved easy to turn to Soviet advantage.

Since the overthrow of the Menderes government in 1960, Turkey has been unable to stabilize its political system. The interim military regime handed the running of affairs back to the politicians under a democratic constitution, but feuds and factionalism deprived successive governments of stability. Meanwhile, the vociferous Turkish Labor Party, helped by many leftist intellectuals, had some success in discrediting the government and turning discontent against the United States and its military presence, *i.e.*, its installations and personnel stationed on Turkish territory and its ships and sailors visiting Turkish ports. The growing trend toward violence—especially by terrorists of the extreme Left, who provoked counterviolence from the extreme Right—finally induced the senior military officers to step in and, without abrogating the constitution, rule through governments basically responsible to them alone. The generals worry about possible subversion by Communists, Maoists, Palestinian-trained terrorists, Kurdish nationalists, or anybody else, and they see a link between terrorism at home and plotting abroad.

No one has produced evidence to connect Moscow with these activities, but good relations do not flour-

[5] Nadav Safran, "How Long Will Sadat Last? Moscow's Not-So-Secret Wish," *New Middle East*, March/April 1972, p. 7.

[6] George Lenczowski, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971, p. 52. Through 1969, Soviet economic aid to Turkey totaled $376 million. US Department of State, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1970*, Sept. 22, 1971, p. 4.

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ish in such an atmosphere. It should be, and probably is, evident to the Soviet leaders that, while prudence might dictate that they always be ready to capitalize on a breakdown of authority in Turkey, their public line has been the right one—that the Soviet interest for the foreseeable future is in an independent Turkey which will in due course assert its full independence of NATO and of Washington. A Turkey moving toward neutralism might be much more subject to Soviet pressures and blandishments—in a situation where Moscow would also enjoy a broader scope for maneuver in the Middle East as a whole.

Iran. In Iran, Soviet policy has been similar to that vis-à-vis Turkey, though the pattern and the circumstances have differed. Ever since his victory over Muhammad Musaddiq in 1953, the Shah has been the real ruler of the country. His frankly pro-Western policies and Soviet tactics of threat and subversion for many years fed upon each other. Yet there were occasional signs, even in the 1950's, of Soviet awareness of an alternative course.

In 1958, after the Baghdad Pact had lost one of its original members (Iraq) and had been reconstituted as the Central Treaty Organization, the United States decided to conclude bilateral security agreements with each of the remaining Middle Eastern members. For Turkey and Pakistan, already in the Western alliance system through NATO and SEATO respectively, this was not so important a step. For Iran, it was, for it marked Teheran's initial acceptance of a formal treaty link with the United States that resembled an alliance, though the obligations were loosely defined. Moscow took this occasion to try to move Iran back from its Western alignment toward a more neutral position and offered to sign a nonaggression pact. The Shah seriously considered the offer, somewhat to the embarrassment of his American friends; however, he ultimately decided to sign the agreement with the United States.[7] The circumstances of the time, especially the rising Soviet influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world, were such as to emphasize Iran's need for continued American support. But the episode was instructive. It showed both Moscow's capacity for flexibility in dealing with Iran and the Shah's awakening confidence in his ability to maneuver between the great powers.

By the mid-1960's, Iran had established a remarkable record of political stability and economic advance, thanks largely to oil revenues and to the Shah's political skills. In 1967, the American technical and economic aid program came to an end by mutual agreement that it was no longer necessary. The United States, however, continued to supply a large part of Iran's modern military equipment (on a credit rather than grant basis), and American-Iranian relations remained good. The Shah was nevertheless ready for the initiatives which began to come from the post-Khrushchev regime in Russia. As in the case of Turkey, these initiatives included high-level visits, warm expressions of friendship, and specific economic proposals. The most important of the agreements reached covered Soviet aid for construction of a steel plant at Isfahan and of the northern part of a gas pipeline from the main Iranian oilfields to the Soviet border (the southern part was to be built with Western help), and the eventual delivery of large quantities of natural gas through this pipeline to the Soviet Union. In addition, Iran purchased about $100 million worth of Soviet military equip-

Moscow and the Northern Tier: top, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny and Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, attend the opening in late 1970 of the Trans-Iranian gas pipeline, laid with Soviet technical and economic assistance; bottom, Podgorny pays a 1972 visit to an oil refinery at Allaga, Turkey, built with the technical assistance of the USSR.

—From *Soviet Union* (Moscow), January 1971, p. 2, and June 1972, p. 2.

[7] Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964, pp. 239-42.

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ment (mostly vehicles, as aircraft and tanks continued to come mainly from the United States and Great Britain).

Was all this a great success for Soviet policy? The answer, of course, depends on what Moscow was seeking to achieve. Normalization of relations modified Iran's image of the USSR as an enemy constantly threatening attack and carrying on subversion, and Soviet diplomacy could now have more direct influence in Teheran. Yet the gain resulting from the loosening of Iran's close ties with the United States was bought at the price of strengthening Iran's independent stance against pressure from all outside powers, including the USSR. The Shah was confirmed in his conviction that Iran must play the leading role in its own area, that of the Persian Gulf, and he has vigorously asserted Iran's right to do so against outside powers and against Arab states, especially those radical states like Iraq with close ties to Moscow. Thus, the Soviet diplomatic game in Teheran did not open up an avenue to the Gulf either through Iran or around it.

Egypt. In the Arab world Soviet advances have been striking in some countries, modest or barely visible in others. To speak generally of Arab attitudes toward the USSR, or Soviet policies toward the Arabs, tends to distort rather than to clarify.

Egypt has been, and remains, the centerpiece of the Soviet position in the Middle East. The country's size, geographic location, and influence on other Arab states were as apparent to Moscow as to Western capitals. That the breakthrough came there, with the famous "Czech" arms deal of 1955, is a matter partly of historical circumstance, partly of design. The state of Egypt's relations with the Western world had brought that country's leaders to the decision to turn to the USSR for support at a time when the latter was looking for just such an opportunity. Since that time, Moscow—despite Egypt's loss of two wars against Israel—has steadily continued its military deliveries, provided economic aid, and increased its political commitment.

The process has been marked by a number of crucial decisions. There is no doubt that the Soviets encouraged Gamal Abdel Nasser to provoke the crisis of 1967 with Israel.[8] When the result was a disastrous war instead of an easy political victory, they scarcely hesitated in making the same choice as in 1956—to replace Egypt's lost military equipment and build up its armed forces again. Backing a loser, and one which might lose again if the war were renewed, had its compensations: increased Egyptian dependence on Moscow as Cairo's only supplier of advanced weapons, availability of military facilities in Egypt, and a public role as defender of the Arab cause that brought advantages throughout the Arab world. A further step forward came in the spring of 1970 when, in response to Nasser's desperate appeal for protection against the Israeli air force, which dominated Egyptian skies, the Soviets made the unprecedented and daring move of stationing their own missile ground crews and air-combat pilots in Egypt. It was a sign of how badly Nasser needed the Soviets, and of how essential they deemed him—and Egypt—to their position in the Middle East.

While the Soviet leaders left no doubt of their desire to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States, they must have known that a clash between their armed forces and those of Israel would carry that risk. Nevertheless, they calculated —correctly, as it turned out—that the risk was one that they could safely take despite strong words from the White House. Similarly, they did not hesitate to join Egypt in violating the terms of the cease-fire of August 1970 by moving missiles into the Suez Canal area; for again they judged that the United States and Israel would not respond with military force.

But the Soviet leaders did not abandon their caution. Having established a military position which helped stabilize the cease-fire, they worked to consolidate their influence in Egypt. They knew how to restrain themselves and saw the need of restraining the Egyptians from renewing the war.

The potential weakness of the Soviet position in Egypt, of course, lay mainly in the unpredictability of that country's conduct in a situation of status quo with Israel which the Egyptians found unacceptable but were powerless to change. Though the Soviet Union was "big brother," it could suffer the disadvantages of that role if it had to couple fraternal help with frequent attempts to restrain and control Egyptian policy. Soviet leaders have made plain, by the nature of the weapons that they have and have not provided, the attitudes of their military advisers, and

[8] The entire question of Soviet intentions and actions in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war still lacks a definitive interpretation. On this point, see Charles W. Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War: How it Began," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1968, pp. 306-11; Walter Laqueur, *The Road to Jerusalem: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967*, New York, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 178-83; Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967*, New York, Pegasus, 1969, pp. 274-85.

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the counsel of their diplomats, that they look first to their own interests. As a consequence, an element of tension has run through the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. For example, both Cairo's push toward war and its angling for peace through talks with the United States have disturbed Moscow, just as direct Soviet talks with the Americans on the Middle East caused distrust in Cairo. A further complication has been the personal friction between Russians and Egyptians that inevitably accompanied the ever-growing presence of the former in the latter's country.

Perhaps the least predictable of all elements is whether or not Cairo will continue indefinitely to have a regime which will follow the Soviet lead in foreign politics. With Nasser, the Soviets had a good working relationship, based not only on his usefulness to them but also on his solid position at home. However, they always confronted the dilemma of how much to depend on personalities and how much to encourage the development of political and social institutions which would provide continuity. In trying to cope with this problem, they displayed a relative lack of interest in the local Communists, who were politically impotent, and a desire to see the Arab Socialist Union become a solid party organization, a political engine which could both run the state and organize mass support for consistent long-term policies—first and foremost, cooperation with the Soviet Union. Their entrenchment in the Egyptian economy provided another means to that end.

Nasser's death shocked Moscow, for it replaced the known with the unknown. Anwar el-Sadat was no carbon copy of Gamal Abdel Nasser. He did not qualify as an inspirational leader of the Arab world; he did not have unquestioned control in Egypt; and he was not "Moscow's man," groomed to succeed Nasser. Indeed, he soon made those who better fitted that definition, notably Ali Sabry, his victims in an internal power struggle. Moreover, events quickly proved that the Arab Socialist Union, despite all the effort that had gone into building it, did not constitute an element of strength for either the regime or its enemies. Sadat has no guaranteed hold on power, and he continues to be under popular pressure for action against Israel and for improvement at home. More than Soviet leaders like to contemplate, the USSR's position in Egypt can be at the mercy of Egyptian politics.

Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny and UAR President Anwar Sadat attend the inauguration ceremony of the Aswan Dam on January 15, 1971.

—Wide World Photos.

It was probably internal political pressure, along with frustration at not getting the weapons he wanted, that brought Sadat to demand the withdrawal of the Soviet military personnel in July 1972. The Russians are not fully informed on internal struggles in Egypt. Certainly, they cannot control them. All they can do is hope that any individual or group which holds power, or comes to power, will see the national interest served by continuance of the Soviet connection.

Syria. Soviet handling of Syria has followed the pattern for Egypt fairly closely, but with differences flowing from the dissimilarities in their strategic importance and political situations. Shortly after the USSR's 1955 decision to send arms to Egypt, Moscow undertook a similar but smaller program for Syria, which also had a radical nationalist regime, disputes with the West, and a militant policy toward Israel. Syria had in addition a more effervescent politics, which gave the local Communists greater opportunities for maneuver. Indeed, it was partly the threat of the Syrian Communists, acting for the Soviet Union or at least exploiting the rise of Soviet influence, that motivated the Ba'ath and military leaders to offer up Syrian independence to Nasser to form the United Arab Republic in 1958. For three years, Syria proved a source of irritation in Moscow-Cairo relations, as Nasser showed a firm intention not to tolerate Communist activities in his "northern province" any more than in Egypt itself. Syria's breakaway in 1961 was therefore welcome to the Kremlin—even though the coup returned "bourgeois" politicians to power—for it brought Syria back to its traditionally unstable politics and again

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gave both Moscow and the local Communists freedom of maneuver.[9]

Palace revolutions put Syria under the control of the Ba'ath's "international command" in 1963, of its more radical "regional command" in 1966, and of a somewhat more moderate leadership in 1970, as successive groups of leaders took the road to exile. Throughout these changes and the underlying instability they reflected, the Soviet Union showed a notable steadiness of policy. Stressing the theme of solidarity against the "Western imperialists" and "Zionist aggressors," the Soviets have maintained their role as protector of Syria's independence and provider of arms and aid for development. Preaching the doctrine of union of all "progressive" and "democratic" elements, they have steered clear of too close identification with particular military and political factions, so as not to compromise their ability to work with whoever comes to power.

At certain points in time, Moscow's special concern for Syria has seemed even greater than that for Egypt. In 1957, the USSR threatened dire consequences to Turkey and the Western powers if they should tamper with Syria. In the period 1958–61, it showed that it was willing to risk spoiling relations with Egypt for the sake of pursuing operations of its own in Syria. In 1966, it pressed Egypt to give Syria greater protection against Israel, and in the following year, it helped provoke the June crisis by magnifying Israeli threats of action against Syria.[10] In the closing moments of the six-day war, it warned that it would act to prevent a further Israeli advance toward Damascus. After the war, it chose to overlook Syria's deviation from the Soviet line in rejecting United Nations Resolution 242, which laid down the principles for a political settlement including Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and the right of all states in the area to live in peace within "secure and recognized boundaries." In 1970, when King Hussein's army was liquidating the forces of the militant Palestinian organizations in Jordan, Moscow apparently called a halt to Syria's intervention, which threatened to provoke action by Israel.

This extraordinary sensitivity about Syria is easier to describe than to explain. Despite Syria's military and political weakness, perhaps because of it, Moscow seems determined to take all the risks of maintaining a position of preeminence there. That position helps to put the squeeze on Turkey; it checks Israel; it keeps the Soviet Union associated with Arab nationalism, in which Syria historically has had a special role. If nothing else, it shows Soviet determination to stay the course in the Middle East.

Iraq. Iraq since 1958 has been just about as unstable as Syria, a prey to the ambitions of would-be leaders among the shifting cliques of officers and politicians. It has been less consistently friendly to the Soviet Union than Syria, for the local Communists have at times been a political factor of importance. Some Iraqi regimes (Kassem's in 1959 and that of the Ba'ath in 1963, for example) have dealt with them by execution and massacre. Even though the course of Soviet-Iraqi relations was bound to feel the impact of these events, Moscow did not propose to leave any openings for the return of Western influence. While the moderate Bazzaz government of 1965–66 might have created an opening or two, it proved too weak and too brief to get started in that direction. In any event, the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe established themselves as Iraq's main partners in trade and aid shortly after the revolution of 1958, and so they have remained.

The Kurdish question increasingly posed a problem for the Soviet Union, as it always had for Iraq. As long as Iraq had a pro-Western regime, the Soviets found it useful to encourage Kurdish nationalism against the regime, and they offered Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the principal but not unchallenged Kurdish leader, a haven in the USSR. When the monarchy was overthrown in 1958, Barzani returned to Iraq as a putative partner in the new nationalist and pro-Soviet regime. However, he proved to be neither a Soviet agent nor a passive junior partner of Kassem, but a Kurdish nationalist. He engaged in a decade of fighting against the Iraqi army under a succession of Baghdad regimes and was never conquered.

Moscow did not denounce Barzani, but it continued to furnish arms which the Iraqi army used to fight him. While the Soviet line varied with the changing circumstances in Soviet-Iraqi relations, in general the USSR's support of self-determination for the Kurds took second place to maintenance of cooperation with Baghdad.[11] Consequently, the Russians

[9] Walter Laqueur, *The Struggle for the Middle East*, New York, Macmillan, 1969, pp. 84-94.

[10] In diplomatic exchanges with Israel after the Syrian-Israeli armed clash of April 7, 1967, Soviet diplomats took a sharp and threatening stance which revealed both a concern for Syria and a desire to teach Israel a lesson on the dangers of playing with fire "in an area near to the borders of the Soviet Union." See Avigdor Dagan, *Moscow and Jerusalem*, London, Abelard-Schuman, 1970, pp. 202-08.

[11] Walter Laqueur, *The Struggle for the Middle East*, pp. 98-101.

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greeted with relief the conclusion of an agreement between the Ba'ath government and Barzani in 1970 which ended the fighting and accepted the principles of autonomy for the Kurdish areas and Kurdish participation in the central government.[12] Yet recent reports indicate the unraveling of this agreement and the unwillingness of Barzani, despite Soviet urging, to have his Kurdish Democratic Party join a united front with the Ba'ath and the Communists.

The Kurdish question is by no means a side issue, especially after the Iraqi government's nationalization of the Kirkuk oilfield of the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company and its turn to the Soviet Union for help in working the field, which lies in the Kurdish area. Moscow has found that it does not maintain its position simply by providing arms and making declarations denouncing Israel. It is inevitably involved, as the partner of successive regimes whose actions it does not control, in all the complexities of Iraqi politics.

Similarly, in the realm of international politics, Iraq may serve as a conduit for the extension of Soviet influence into the area of the Persian Gulf, but can this happy outcome take place without Soviet involvement in Iraq's disputes with Iran, with which the Kremlin has labored hard to repair relations? Or can it take place without commitment to the cause of radical revolution in the sheikhdoms on the Arab side of the Gulf, which would antagonize Iran and a number of Arab states as well?

Other Arab States. A decade ago, the prevailing Western view was that the Arab states were roughly divisible into two categories, radical and conservative. In the former camp were those discussed above, which had governments born of revolution or *coup d'état,* vaguely socialist in their internal policies, and anti-Western and pro-Soviet in their foreign policies. In the latter were states ranging all the way from traditional monarchies and sheikhdoms in the Gulf area to more modern types such as Morocco and Jordan, which had governments generally evolutionary in their approaches to domestic change and oriented toward the West in international affairs. The cold war between members of these groups appeared as real as the cold war between the big powers, and often the two interlocked.

Because revolutions continued to take place and because they often added members to the radical at the expense of the conservative group, it seemed that the tide of history was with the former and that it was only a matter of time before the entire Arab world would be composed of states professing socialism in one form or another and living in close cooperation with the USSR. Soviet leaders appeared to think so. At least, they said so often enough, and so did their experts in ideology and in international affairs. The radical Arab regimes certainly thought so. They fed on success, and the triumph of the FLN in Algeria in 1962, the republican revolution of 1962 in Yemen, the radical takeover of 1969 in Aden, the seizure of power by Jaafar Nimeri and his group in the Sudan in 1969, and the republican revolution of the Young Officers in Libya in 1969 seemed to prove the case beyond a doubt.

However, the past ten years have provided some salutary lessons, especially for those whose interpretation of events is governed by supposed laws of history or of revolutionary change. Some of the conservative regimes showed unexpected strength and a capacity to adapt to new conditions. Some of the radical ones proved unable to turn theory into practice. Some governments like those of Lebanon and Tunisia fell in between the radical and conservative camps and stayed there. National interests and the personal ambitions and rivalries of individuals made a mockery of supposedly uniform patterns of political and social development. Nor was there any automatic correspondence between progress of "the revolution" in the Arab world and the degree of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Libya had the most radical revolutionaries of all, and they held Moscow at arm's length. Though American influence generally declined after the six-day war in 1967, it remained strong in Jordan and Saudi Arabia and did not disappear elsewhere.

The Middle East Seen from Moscow

We have made the point that the facts of Soviet conduct toward individual Middle East states are more significant than any general theory or approach to the region as a whole. Of course, modes of thinking about the role of colonial and former colonial peoples in the struggle against imperialism—going back to Lenin and the early years of the Comintern—infuse Soviet thinking about policy toward the Middle East, as toward other areas of the Third World. One can take any arbitrary starting date—say 1960, to keep the discussion in the recent era—and

[12] A. Y. Yodfat, "Iraq—Russia's Other Middle Eastern Pasture," *New Middle East,* November 1971, pp. 28-29.

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trace the evolution of doctrinal pronouncements from the Statement of the Moscow Conference of 81 Parties down to the most recent speeches of Leonid Brezhnev, elaborated at each stage by authoritative writers in the journals of the party and of the academic institutes.

Several concepts have had their innings: the "national democratic" state, "revolutionary democracy," the "popular union of progressive forces," "taking the non-capitalist path," and so on.[13] Each has been trotted out to describe a historical process and to provide a rationale for Soviet strategy. These formulations are directed primarily to a Soviet audience, then to Communist parties and radical movements throughout the world, and finally to the leaders and peoples of the Third World. At home, the Soviet system lives on ideological justification and cannot dispense with it. In its external extension, those Communist parties which it largely controls, it must furnish a combination of guidance and encouragement (especially when it is short on real support). To the aspiring nationalists of the Third World, in this case mainly the Arabs, the Soviets feel the need to press home the argument that nationalism and socialism are allies in a common struggle.

Moscow's rather consistent sacrifice of local Communists for the sake of good relations with national regimes has often been cited as proof of its cynicism, or its realism.[14] The most flagrant case of all was Soviet acceptance, with relatively little fuss, of the Nimeri regime's execution of Communist leaders and destruction of the influential and well-organized party in the Sudan. Yet it has been no easy matter to handle these situations. Nikita Khrushchev, one of the greatest realists of them all, chafed under the waves of nationalist rhetoric and burst out publicly, on the occasion of his visit to the Aswan Dam in 1964, to stress the primacy of class over national solidarity.[15] It was never comforting to the Soviet leadership either to witness the impotence of the local Communist cadres or to look away when they were persecuted. And, despite sad experience, the Soviets continued to try to use them: as independent parties sharing power with others and exercising a beneficial influence in local radical regimes (Syria and Iraq); as individuals allowed to move into official front organizations (Egypt and Algeria); or in the old familiar role of subversive agents in countries where they had to operate underground.[16]

George Lenczowski has pointed out that analysts of Soviet policy have no need to expend much time and thought wrestling with the familiar question whether great-power interests or ideological drives underlie Soviet policies, since the contradictions tend to be temporary and are more apparent than real. "Ultimately, a dynamic Soviet state interest to expand and dominate is complemented by Communist ideology and vice versa." [17] Applied to the long run, the proposition is unexceptional. The more immediate question concerns the temporary period of difficult choices, which has gone on for many years and may last for many more. During the process of making their advances into the Arab world, the Soviets have made many decisions which throw light on their motives and their strategy. Perhaps one can judge that record by looking at how they have handled a number of important questions: Arab nationalism and unity, the conflict with Israel, and oil.

Arab Nationalism

Arab nationalism, in the forms it took in the early years after World War II, held no attractions for the Soviet Union. Those national leaders who were governing newly-independent states formerly under British or French control were seen as tame nationalists still bound to the West by a network of military and political ties. Moscow supported the Jewish drive for an independent state in the late 1940's as a means of getting the British out of Palestine, yet it did not simultaneously cultivate Arab nationalism in order to achieve the broader goal of getting the British out of other Arab states. It continued to be well-disposed toward Israel for the next few years, and although that relationship began to go sour by late 1950 (largely because of Israeli policies which, in Moscow's view, bent Israel's declared neutrality

[13] Charles B. McLane, "Russia and the Third World," *Studies on the Soviet Union* (Munich), Vol. VI, No. 3, 1967, pp. 73-90; Jaan Pennar, "The Arabs, Marxism and Moscow: A Historical Survey," *The Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Autumn 1968, pp. 438-47.

[14] Walter Laqueur, *The Struggle for The Middle East*, pp. 173-80. For specific instances involving the Communists in several countries, see John C. Campbell, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East: 'In the General Direction of the Persian Gulf,' " Part II, *Russian Review* (Stanford, Calif.), July 1970, pp. 248-53.

[15] *Pravda* (Moscow), May 18, 1964; Mohamed Hassanein Heikal adds flavor to the story by describing the private conversations Khrushchev had with Nasser, Iraq's President Aref, and Algeria's President Ben Bella during his visit. See *Les Documents du Caire*, Paris, Flammarion, 1971, pp. 114-18.

[16] George Schopflin, "Russia's Expendable Arab Communists," *New Middle East*, June 1972, pp. 20-21.

[17] *Soviet Advances in the Middle East*, pp. 2-3.

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too far to the Western side[18]), it was not until several years later, well after the new military regime took power in Egypt, that the Soviets discovered in the Arab nationalism a natural ally. In the United Nations, they began a consistent policy of support for the Arab side against Israel early in 1954; the following year, Nasser's search for arms offered them the grand opportunity to take up a great-power role in the Middle East.

From the time of this historic breakthrough to the present, the Soviet relationship with the Egyptian and other Arab governments of a similar type has been dominated by the efforts of both sides to put it to practical use in pursuing their own respective aims. These aims coincided in some respects; in others, they did not. Beneath the tactical benefits of cooperation and the clouds of official and unofficial rhetoric on the common struggle for national liberation and socialism against the "imperialists" and the "Zionist aggressors" lay fundamental differences.

Some were ideological. Without relying on the well-worn argument that Islam serves as a barrier to communism and to Soviet domination (actually a dubious proposition), one must take account of the gulf between the various brands of "Arab socialism" and the "scientific socialism" practiced in the Soviet Union. Arab leaders, even the most radical ones, have not tried to build the type of political system that exists in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and they probably could not succeed if they did. The Soviet Union has no intention of forcing them to do so. It is sufficient to praise them for having set out on the "non-capitalist path" in the direction of socialism. In Moscow's restricted list of eight or so Third World countries which have reached an advanced stage in this evolution, Arab states make up about half the total: Egypt, Algeria, and Syria are always on it, and now Iraq seems to qualify. But the fundamental differences remain and are not forgotten on either side.

The question of Arab unity tends to sharpen them. The Soviet government has never endorsed the concept of one "Arab nation," which even for Arabs has more emotional than real political content. Difficult as it is to deal with a patchwork of more than a dozen separate Arab states, it is safer and more rewarding than associating Soviet policy and prestige with a vague and unpredictable movement of which the leadership must be in Arab hands. Even the limited attempts to unite two or more like-minded Arab states have evoked Soviet distrust. Moscow accepted with ill grace the union of Egypt and Syria in 1958 and showed no enthusiasm for the proposed Egypt-Syria-Iraq union which was under negotiation in 1963. Although the Soviets gave lip service to greater unity among Arab states to wage the struggle against "imperialism" and publicly welcomed the formation of the federation of Libya, Egypt and Syria in 1971 (which the Sudan had refrained from joining because of problems with its own Communist Party), they had their reasons for suspecting this grouping of anti-Communist and potentially anti-Soviet, as well as anti-Israel, inspiration.

On more concrete subjects, the disparity in aims is but thinly camouflaged. The Soviet Union and the radical Arab regimes have worked together to reduce the positions and influence of the Western powers, but where the Soviets have wished to move into the resulting "vacuum," the Arab regimes have said, "There is no vacuum because we, sovereign Arab states, are there." The picture is likely to be a mixed one as long as Western power, in one form or another, remains in the region. Egypt, Syria, and others have some unfinished business with Israel and feel the need of the Soviet presence for security, for the recovery of lost territory, or for eventual victory. The Soviet Union, for its part, is still in a cold war against the United States in the Middle East. The Soviet leaders feel a continuing need for military power and bases and for local allies in order to carry on their effort.

Suppose that the Soviet Union succeeded in reducing American influence to zero. Would the Arab states face that prospect with equanimity? Their entire experience since independence shows that they do not wish to be left alone with only one outside power. Their conduct today, even as the conflict with Israel turns them toward Moscow, betrays their need to have some counterbalancing weight on the scales. Anwar el-Sadat's response to American diplomatic initiatives in 1970 and 1971 recalled Nasser's tactic of profiting from great-power rivalries. Algeria, in maintaining ties with France and increasing trade with the United States, has shown that it wants alternatives to the Soviet connection. Even the anti-Western regimes in Syria and Iraq do not want an exclusive relationship with the USSR, just as Turkey and Iran do not want such a relationship with the United States. Thus, the radical Arab states have an interest in the continuation of the Soviet-American cold war, just as the Soviet Union has an interest in the

[18] Dagan, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-60.

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continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Neither seems to wish to see the other's conflict with its principal antagonist end either in victory or in reconciliation.

Moscow and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The core of the Middle East crisis of recent years, of course, has been this very question of Moscow's involvement on the Arab side against Israel and the consequent danger of a Soviet-American clash. This involvement is not a simple matter of guaranteeing the existence of Egypt or of Syria; rather, it is an elaborate game in which the Soviets have exploited the Arab need of their support in order to establish positions in the region—positions from which they do not intend to be dislodged. They have no overpowering interest in the attainment of specific Arab objectives. For example, they are not for the destruction of Israel.[19] One may surmise that, despite their declarations, they are less than fiercely intent on Israel's withdrawal from every inch of territory beyond the old armistice lines. They are interested, above all, in playing on the conflict to their own advantage. Such a course, to be sure, involves dangers: the Egyptians may kick over the traces and renew the war, facing Moscow with an agonizing decision of whether to see the 1967 war repeated or to plunge in and risk a clash with the United States.

This is the context in which one must try to answer the familiar question: Does the Soviet Union really want an Arab-Israeli settlement? Its diplomatic notes and public statements say without equivocation that the goal is a political settlement based on UN Resolution 242. Soviet publications have been fairly specific in describing the terms of official proposals, which rest on the basic points of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and Arab acceptance of the sovereign existence of Israel. Among the other terms, which generally elaborate points of the UN resolution, are provisions for stages in the Israeli withdrawal and for four-power guarantees of the security of both sides under the settlement.[20]

The Soviet terms and those which the United States has had in mind for a comprehensive settlement have not been so far apart that negotiations could not conceivably iron out most of the differences. Yet the efforts to this end in bilateral Soviet-American talks in 1969 ended in failure and recrimination, and the subsequent four-power talks at the UN got nowhere. In retrospect, it looks as if the Soviets did not intend these undertakings to succeed —because Moscow was not prepared to go beyond what Nasser found acceptable, and because it knew that Israel would insist that each territorial settlement (whether with Egypt, Syria, or Jordan) be negotiated by the two states directly concerned. It also knew that the United States would not be willing to join the Soviet Union and others in pressing or imposing on Israel a settlement not freely negotiated. (Needless to say, some might likewise charge the United States with not really wanting a settlement because of its partiality to Israel.)

The USSR sees itself as occupying the high ground and feels no real pressure to force the Arab states to make some compromise which Israel might be brought to accept. It is better for the Soviet position in the Arab world for Moscow to play the friend and protector. It is better, too, so far as world opinion is concerned, for the Soviets to stick to the principle of Israeli withdrawal from conquered territory, for this principle is generally accepted not only in the Third World but by many governments allied to the United States. By its refusal to withdraw completely, Israel has put itself in the position of frustrating the Jarring (UN) mission, even after Egypt formally accepted the idea of a signed peace agreement with Israel.

The Soviets can calmly accept the absence of a settlement while proclaiming their desire for one. They have profited by the American-initiated ceasefire, and they can contemplate with satisfaction the failure of the diplomatic efforts of the United States, which really wants a settlement, to move Egypt and Israel in that direction—to the damage of its relations with both.

The continuing conflict has obvious risks for the Soviets. After all, their pro-Arab stance has not given their Egyptian and Syrian friends what the latter want—recovery of lost territories. Yet they have succeeded rather well in finding the right measure of commitment without overcommitment. In a new crisis, Moscow might have to swing to cooperation with the United States in order to control events and prevent the worst. But the situation seems too favorable for the USSR to embark now on such a course of preventive diplomacy.

[19] See, for instance, Premier Kosygin's speech before the United Nations General Assembly, June 19, 1967, in *The New York Times*, June 20, 1967.

[20] For example, Evgeny Primakov, "The Way to a Just and Lasting Peace," *Pravda*, Oct. 15, 1970 (official English translation in *New Middle East*, November 1970, pp. 46-47).

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As regards the Left, Moscow has shunned anything more than occasional verbal support of the more radical elements like the Palestinian guerrilla organizations or the firebrands in Syria who would drag the Soviet Union into war if they could. As a price it has had to accept the growth of Chinese influence among these elements and a barrage of Chinese propaganda linking the "Soviet social imperialists" with the old-style Western "imperialists" as enemies of Arab liberation.[21]

Oil and Soviet Policy

Recent developments concerning Middle East oil bear upon our general theme and have raised some old questions in new guise. Does the Soviet Union's entry into a series of deals with oil-producing states reflect its own energy problems, its desire to win points with Middle East nations, or a comprehensive strategy to assault the West where it is most vulnerable?

For years, Soviet publications have been filled with stories of the great oil monopolies, their exploitation and repression of the peoples of the Middle East, and their close ties with official Washington and London. From Musaddiq's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 to el-Bakr's takeover of the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1972, Soviet voices have applauded every local move to cut down the power and profits of Western companies. But the actions taken by the Soviet government itself to speed this process or to profit from it have been modest.

The first Soviet move was the arrangement with Iran in 1966 for the import of Iranian natural gas. This was followed by a series of deals with Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and especially Iraq, providing generally for Soviet technical help in exploration and operations in exchange for payment in oil.[22] They did not make much of a dent in the position of the big companies, although the pattern and prospects of Soviet cooperation may have contributed to the Iraqi decision to nationalize the IPC.

We should not overlook the valid economic reasons for limited imports of Middle East oil by the USSR. The Soviet internal demand curve for energy will go up sharply in the coming years, and domestic production may not keep up with it, except at high cost. Moreover, Moscow's East European allies are already importing oil from the Middle East. To such economic considerations must be added the obvious political benefits of relationships with local states clearly based on government-to-government agreements, technical aid, and commercial deliveries—in clear contrast to the traditional oil concessions.

The Soviet role is unquestionably expanding as the producing countries and the Western companies move from one crisis to another. But can it expand indefinitely? Scare stories to the effect that the USSR, either by itself or in concert with radical local forces, can control the oil resources of the Middle East are based neither on a sober assessment of the situation nor on the record of Soviet conduct. Moscow could do so only by seizing the oil (which can be ruled out) or by providing an alternative to the Western companies for transporting Middle East oil to, and selling it in, its natural markets in Europe and Japan, a job which is beyond Soviet capabilities and which the producing countries might well be able to do for themselves.[23]

In oil matters, the Soviets have taken, if anything, an even more circumspect approach than in other aspects of their policy in the Middle East. The watchword is still opportunism, a readiness to take advantage of developments while not seizing them by the forelock. While the West may be greatly vulnerable because of its dependence on Middle East oil, the oil-producing countries are equally vulnerable because of the dependence of their national economies on Western markets, and the Soviets may have learned a lesson from their earlier underestimation of the forces of local nationalism.

Back to Grand Strategy

Do these many strands of policy make a whole fabric? If they do, it is not one in which a single design is dominant. One can pick out certain themes of ideology and of action, but no exponent or observer, friendly or unfriendly, has been convincing in putting these together as a consistent grand strategy. Nevertheless, it falls into focus somewhat better with a wide-angle lens.

Since World War II, the Soviet Union has been

[21] See the *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) editorial, translated in *Peking Review*, June 9, 1972, p. 10.

[22] John A. Berry, "Oil and Soviet Policy in the Middle East," *The Middle East Journal*, Spring 1972, pp. 157-58.

[23] John C. Campbell and Helen Caruso, *The West and the Middle East*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1972; Berry, *loc. cit.*, pp. 149-60.

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more than a state with a theory of world revolution and an apparatus for subversion. It has been the center of an imperial system, trying to hold together a string of satellite and client states, expanding its power further outward, and competing with other such systems. As the old empires of the European powers declined, the American system became Moscow's natural and only serious rival. By the 1960's, another rival had appeared—China. The competition with the United States has been global, with its vital center in Europe. The competition with China has been largely in Asia, with side effects throughout the Third World and wherever leftists gather together under the banner of Moscow or of Mao. In both cases, the struggle has been coated with ideology and propaganda, but the realities of power remain easily visible.

Can the Middle East, then, be said to be a vital area for Moscow, which looks west and east before it looks south? Not as an end in itself, but perhaps so in its relevance to those main rivalries, for it offers opportunities for a Soviet sphere of influence useful in asserting a world role and in blocking both the Americans and the Chinese. The latter cannot now mount a real challenge in the Middle East in terms of power, but politically and ideologically they are already providing real competition in southern Arabia and elsewhere.

Such a "sphere" would not have to be one of total domination, with puppet Communist governments sitting in all the state capitals of the region. It is a matter of going as far as Soviet power, economic ties, and diplomacy can go in making the USSR the primary outside power, the arbiter of the relations of individual states with other outside powers and with each other. The aims are not easy to define because they are not absolute but operate on a sliding scale, moving up or down in relation to the changing possibilities.

The beginnings of what might be called a treaty system throw some light on overall Soviet strategy as it exists at this juncture. In 1969, Leonid Brezhnev put forward the idea of a collective security system for Asia in which local states would presumably join with the USSR for the greater security of all.[24] The response was hardly audible, and there has been little clarification of the broad plan from Moscow since that time. But the Soviet government seems to be providing the bricks and mortar for such a system, in the form of roughly similar treaties with individual states. The fact that three of them were prepared for Middle East states—concluded with Egypt (1971) and Iraq (1972) and still discussed at length with Syria—indicates that the idea has greater application there than in Asia generally. That the other is with India indicates the double purpose, the link between the anti-American and anti- Chinese aspects of Soviet policy.

The treaties with Egypt and with India arose from specific circumstances in Soviet relations with those two countries: with Egypt, when Sadat had arrested Ali Sabry and wished to reassure the Soviet leaders, who in turn wanted to nail down Egypt's continued collaboration; with India, when the latter needed a great power's support as war with Pakistan approached. Yet the fact that the Soviets on both occasions were ready with draft texts in hand shows these documents to be more than creations of the moment. The subsequent negotiations with other states confirm that conclusion. Moscow's purpose seems to be to capitalize on the strength of its position to gain a more formal basis for the continuation of that position.

The 15-year treaties with Egypt and Iraq do not constitute straightforward alliances with automatic obligations to take military action. The key clauses provide, in case of threat or acts of aggression, for consultation on coordinating policies to eliminate the danger.[25] In that respect, they resemble the US security agreements of 1959 with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. The comparison is instructive, for it reveals a Soviet intention not to be satisfied with the nonalignment of these countries but to align them on the Soviet side. Other clauses of the treaties, covering continuing military aid and other forms of collaboration, look to the consolidation of an alignment—or, if you like, dependence—which cannot easily be broken. Moscow no doubt realizes, of course, that the durability of such treaties depends on the durability of the parties' mutual interests.

In the exchanges surrounding Egypt's demand for the removal of Soviet military advisers, incidentally, neither side has called into question the Soviet-Egyptian treaty. Egypt's well-advertised reaffirmation of nonalignment did not go that far. The fact that the Soviet-Iraqi treaty entered into force at that very time, however, throws some light on Moscow's motivation in spreading its alliance system, seeking alter-

[24] *Pravda* and *Izvestia* (Moscow), June 8, 1969 (English text in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [Columbus, Ohio], July 2, 1969).

[25] Texts of treaties in *New Middle East*, July 1971, pp. 40-41, and June 1972, p. 42.

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natives, and not putting all its eggs in the Egyptian basket. The Syrians for their part have proven unexpectedly wary. Damascus' line seems to be that relations with the USSR are so firm and cooperative that there is no need to enshrine them in a formal treaty.

The Soviet leadership, as we have seen, has not been bothered by inconsistency in thought or in conduct when there was a concrete gain to be made. They have swallowed with no more than verbal protest the decimation of local Communist parties by "national bourgeois" or "pseudo-socialist" regimes which they have found it useful to cultivate. They have survived violent shifts in relations with individual leaders and governments. Yet they have surely learned from experience that even their own adaptability does not dispel the uncertainty of developments in the Middle East and the obstacles to their control over them.

Those in the West who aspire to a general agreement with Moscow to reduce tensions and dangers in the Middle East are not likely to get a positive response as long as the Soviet leaders are convinced that they are still moving forward in the region at acceptable cost. The needs of the domestic economy, which have their champions, have not curbed the policies adopted by the leadership as a whole. Neither do we see signs of controversy about the inconsistency of pursuing strategic arms limitation with the United States and détente in Europe while carrying on an arms race and a cold war in the Middle East. Setbacks there may cause them to reconsider the extent of their involvement and commitments. Even then, the outcome is likely to be a unilateral course of gradual retrenchment and stabilization, with choices kept open, rather than agreement on a common course of cooperation with the United States.

Peking's Revised Line

By W. A. C. Adie

Peking's strategy in the Middle East—or, from the Chinese vantage point, West Asia—interlocks with the strategies it pursues both in the Mediterranean area and Europe and in Africa and the Indian Ocean area.[1] A major factor common to all is "containment" and counterencirclement of the USSR. In 1970, for example, a Chinese Communist newpaper observed:

The Middle East is one of the regions where the contradictions of the present world concentrate. From a geographical standpoint it constitutes a bridge between Asia and Africa on the one hand and Europe on the other. This gives it an important world strategic position. In addition, it is one of the richest sources of oil in the world.

The paper went on to claim that the Soviet-US "struggle for spheres of influence" in the Middle East is part of the two powers' "collaboration" to divide and rule the world, and it predicted that the Palestinian guerrillas' slogan of "Down with US im-

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[1] For more detailed treatment of the linkage with Chinese strategies outside the Middle East, see the author's "China, Israel and the Arabs," *Conflict Studies* (London), No. 12, May 1971; "The China Breakthrough," *Quadrant* (Sydney), December 1971; " 'One World' Restored?," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), Vol. 12, No. 3, May 1972; "China Returns to Africa," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), June 1972; and *Chinese Strategic Thinking under Mao Tse-tung*, Canberra, Australian National University Press, forthcoming.

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perialism" would become "Down with US and Soviet imperialism." [2]

In line with the above aims, the People's Republic of China has, since the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1969, endeavored to multiply its diplomatic and commercial contacts with governments in the Middle East. In February 1971, for instance, the Chinese and Pakistanis opened up an all-weather highway linking China and West Pakistan, and Peking has also entered into official relations with Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, and Kuwait. Most indicative, it has moved closer to all the Asian members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the former Baghdad Pact, both originally instituted under Western sponsorship. It has thus acquired positions from which to counter the extension of Soviet influence in the direction of the Persian Gulf, while it has simultaneously laid down its own stepping stones from the Gulf toward the Mediterranean.

China has sought, too, to strengthen its ties with bodies above and below the nation-state level, such as the Organization of African Unity and various more or less revolutionary groups. In the latter regard, Peking has registered some significant gains among the guerrilla movements of the Arabian peninsula. Its covert links with them plus the overt ties that it has developed in the region of Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and the Yemens enhance its ability to blunt Soviet activities in the strategic Gulf of Aden.

These efforts have apparently caused considerable unease in Moscow. China's crypto-diplomatic relations with the Palestinian and Gulf guerrillas are a matter of particular concern both to the Soviets and to the Moscow-line Communists of the area, who advocate settlement of the Palestine question by peaceful negotiations. At the Third Congress of the Lebanese Communist party in Beirut in January 1972, Nicola Shawi, the Secretary-General, warned that "the danger of the Chinese subversive role has increased after China's entry into the United Nations." [3] Although Lebanon had recognized Peking in November 1971 and a Chinese delegation arrived in Beirut around the time of the Congress to prepare for the opening of an embassy, no Chinese or Albanians received invitations to the gathering, and its main theme was opposition to China.[4]

This unease, in turn, has prompted the Soviets to step up their own undertakings in the Middle East. Consequently, the net result of China's recent diplomatic successes has thus far been a marked increase of Soviet involvement in the area.

The present article will examine China's recent policies in the Middle East in depth. In doing so, it will attempt to place them in context by analyzing how Peking has viewed and approached the area over the years.

The Historical Components

At the outset one must bear in mind that, from the Chinese perspective, an East Asian presence around the rim of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean area is quite a natural thing; it is rather the absence of such a presence during the period of North European ascendency in the area that constitutes the anomaly. In ancient times, commercial exchanges took place by land and sea between China and the "West"—with the peoples of what is now the Islamic world, especially the Arabs, sometimes acting as intermediaries and sometimes obstructing efforts to establish direct contact. The 15th-century voyages of Ch'eng Ho to Arabia and Africa, for example, are justly celebrated.[5]

The precise objectives of the Ming government in sending its treasure fleets to the "West" are still debated by scholars, just as the motives for Peking's more recent activities in the region remain the subject of controversy.[6] Quite obviously, however, commercial considerations played a part. During the late Sung and early Yuan (Mongol) periods (960-roughly 1300), a combination of socio-economic and tech-

[2] *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), Sept. 24, 1970, p. 9.

[3] See his Report of the Central Committee to the Congress. The Lebanese party, incidentally, is the only legal Communist party in the Arab world (Beirut authorities lifted their ban on it in 1970), and its Third Congress was the first congress of any Arab Communist party to take place in public.

[4] According to a writer in the Beirut paper *L'Orient-Le Jour*, Jan. 7, 1972, one of the main purposes of the Congress was to "bar the way to any Chinese gains in the region."

[5] On the early contacts, see, for instance, Friedrich Hirth, *China and the Roman Orient; Researches into Their Ancient and Medieval Relations as Presented in Old Chinese Records*, Shanghai, Kelly and Walsh, 1885; Chau Ju-kua, *Chu-Fan-Chi* (Treatise on the Barbarians), ed. Friedrich Hirth and W. W. Rockhill, St. Petersburg, Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1911; J. J. L. Duyvendak, *China's Discovery of Africa*, London, Arthur Probsthain, 1949. T. Filesi gives an extensive bibliography in his *Le Relazioni della Cina con l'Africa nel Medio-Evo* (China and Africa in the Middle Ages), Milan, 1962.

[6] See, for example, Ali A. Mazrui, "The Yellow Man's Burden" Race and Revolution in Sino-African Relations," a paper delivered to the Australian Institute of International Affairs' Conference on China, Melbourne, June 1972. Mr. Mazrui is a professor at Makarere University, Kampala.

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nological developments in China had led to its emergence as a sea power with many modern features.[7] (Professor Owen Lattimore, indeed, has suggested that the only thing that kept 15th-century China from becoming a capitalist society with modern science and technology was the reestablishment of the landlord elements and their ideology in control after the western imperialists—the Mongols—had retired to the steppe in 1368 and North China had regained its independence.[8]) The Ming government participated in monopolistic commerce, especially in the expanding maritime trade, from which it at one point derived as much as 20 percent of its cash income. Even the Emperor saw this as a better way of raising revenue than by taxing the people, *i.e.*, by taking it from agriculture.[9]

An economic factor may likewise enter into Peking's current push into the area. Today, Mao Tse-tung's government confronts the same problem of raising revenue, basically from the agricultural sector. Recent studies of China's economic prospects suggest that the country should step up foreign trade in order to help solve its economic problems; and it appears that Peking may well have adopted such a policy, while also giving high priority to the mechanization of agriculture so as to tighten its reins on the peasant masses and their produce.[10]

But it seems fairly clear that both in earlier times and now there has been a political as well as a commercial dimension to China's activism toward the "West." First, the Chinese have sought to "use barbarians to pacify barbarians" by fashioning alliances which outflank or leapfrog their foes. Second, they have attempted to employ trade links and the prestige accruing from visits by foreign "tribute missions" to enhance the prestige and power of the court or of the ruling elite.

Among the at least ostensible goals of exercises such as the voyages of Ch'eng Ho were the rooting out of remnants of the Mongols and the prevention of any restoration of the power from the steppes.[11] The principles that lay behind them were brilliantly articulated several centuries later by a Chinese mandarin, Wei Yuan, at a time when China was being compelled to take account of the strength and aggressiveness of another group of threatening "barbarians," this time from the direction of the sea. In a work whose avowed purpose was "to show how to use barbarians to fight barbarians, how to make barbarians pacify one another, and how to employ the techniques of the barbarians in order to bring them under control," Wei Yuan maintained that "the western part of the Mediterranean Sea is inhabited by many barbarian tribes, who cherish only profits and power and indeed are treacherous as the owls." Russia, he thought, might be an ally in a land war—"if we make alliances with nearby countries in order to attack those afar"—while the United States, since it had "faithfully guarded" its "central plain" against the English, might help China in a sea war—"if we ally with those afar in order to attack those nearby." [12]

Similarly, enterprises like those in which the Chinese are currently engaged in the Middle East are designed to thwart the challenges of what Peking perceives as menacing outsiders—most especially the Soviets. Though Mao, from the very earliest days of his career, evinced a predilection for leading a crusade to "shake the world," [13] his experience with guerrilla warfare during the 1920's and 1930's disposed him to handle "foreigners"— *i.e.*, persons not yet assimilated into one's own group—in more or less traditional Chinese fashion. For example, the existence of Communist guerrilla bands as minority groups surrounded by enemies of overwhelming physical superiority (at least during the initial years) compelled these bands to adopt a tactic of trying to divide their enemies merely to survive. Consequently, Mao's approach to "foreign affairs" at the

[7] See, for instance, Jung-pang Lo, "The Emergence of China as a Sea Power during the Late Sung and Early Yuan Periods," *Far Eastern Quarterly* (Ann Arbor, Mich.), Vol. 14, No. 4, August 1955, pp. 489-503.

[8] O. Lattimore, *From China, Looking Outward*, Leeds, Leeds University Press, 1964, p. 14.

[9] Lo, *loc. cit.*, p. 499.

[10] Audrey Donnithorne, "Economic Planning and Central and Local Budgetary Relations in China," unpublished paper, Canberra, 1970, and "China's Grain: Output, Procurement, Transfers and Trade," Economic Research Center, The Chinese University, Hong Kong, 1970. See also U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1967.

[11] See Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, Vol. 4, Part 3, p. 488: "There was the search for the deposed emperor, but overshadowing it was the clear desire to impress upon foreign countries . . . the idea of China as the leading political and cultural power. There was also the encouragement of overseas trade."

[12] Wei Yuan, *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* (The Gazetteer of Maritime Countries), 1843.

[13] In his earliest published work, the 1917 essay on physical culture, he wrote admiringly: "As for Mahomet, he subjugated the world holding the Koran in his left hand and a sword in his right." On this essay, see Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1964, pp. 94-95. For a full translation and analysis by Schram, see *Mao Ze-dong, une étude de l'éducation physique*, Paris, Mouton et Cie, 1963.

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dawn of the People's Republic of China in 1949 greatly resembled that which Wei Yuan had described a century previously.

However, two new elements in China's situation —namely, Peking's commitment to Marxism-Leninism and the physical meeting of the Chinese and Russian "empires" in the middle of Central Asia as the result of the absorption of states belonging culturally to the Islamic world—caused the Chinese to apply Wei Yuan's principles to a much wider arena than he had contemplated. While Peking's dedication to Marxism-Leninism brought it into a close relationship with Moscow on the ideological or cultural level, that commitment also virtually ensured a struggle between the two for each other's soul in an ambiguous bargaining situation. The sharing of a long common boundary, moreover, tended to shift their method of carrying on such struggle away from confrontation in their economically and strategically vital Central Asian territories to moves of an outflanking nature—both geographically (rivalry in the Third World, particularly the Middle East) and ideologically (in the international Communist apparatus and among revolutionary movements).[14] By the early 1960's, indeed, Soviet and Chinese leaders alike seemed to see the Afro-Asian world in terms of their individual national experiences with Central Asian minorities, "as a sort of extension of 'the east' and 'the western regions' respectively, and to carry over into it the *jujitsu* combat between Russia and China which had gone on in Asia for centuries." [15]

[14] Thereafter, as the author has pointed out elsewhere, "the dispute between Moscow and Peking was not essentially about war and peace, or the timetable of revolution. It really reflected the different internal aims and policies—primarily economic—to which the two regimes, heirs to vast multinational land empires historically and geophysically destined to compete for control of Central Asia, had inevitably been seeking to orient the Communist movement in the interests of self-preservation. . . . given the sincerity of their conviction that they have a great mission to perform, Mao and Khrushchev can hardly be blamed for acting according to the logic of their situation; each of them found himself struggling to impose his policy in the face of an opposition which sought support not only from potential Bonapartes in their respective armies but also from the group in power in the other country and in the international Communist movement as a whole. Each naturally sees it as his first duty to insure the strength and security of his own country (identified, needless to say, with the protection of his regime and his own person to a considerable extent); it could hardly be otherwise; however, these aims involve serious 'contradictions,' and since they rest on an economic base, Marxists cannot really expect them to be resolved at periodical interparty synods." See his "Soviet and Chinese Foreign Policies in Asia," *Proceedings, Symposium on Economic and Social Problems of the Far East, Hong Kong, September 1961*, ed. Edward F. Szczepanik, Hong Kong University Press, 1962, pp. 301-2.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 294.

Traditional Chinese concepts alone, of course, do not fully explain the character of Peking's recent policy toward the Middle East. In large measure, this policy reflects a specifically Maoist approach to "foreign affairs."

The Maoist Contribution

According to Mao Tse-tung, the international realm constitutes an arena of conflict between competing elements, and his formula for nation-building stresses the importance of war, the "highest form of struggle." In his experience, war is the only cure for the absence of national strength and unity. As a Chinese publication expressed things a few years ago,

The war of resistance against Japan caused the Chinese people to experience . . . huge destruction and sacrifice. [But] it powerfully aroused them to wake up and unite, greatly promoting the progress of revolution and society. Was not the national malady of a "pot of sand" cured through the war of resistance against Japan? . . . Just as Chairman Mao said, revolutionary war is a kind of antitoxin . . . capable of transforming many things.[16]

Nonetheless, Mao does not visualize "revolutionary war" simply in terms of "armed struggle." In March 1949, for instance, he told his cadres that once they had laid down their guns and become the government, they must learn "how to wage diplomatic struggles against the imperialists," and he exhorted them to learn to carry out such struggles in both overt and covert fashion.[17] From the Maoist perspective, then, the proper conduct of "foreign affairs" involves a mixture of "armed struggle" and "diplomatic struggle." [18]

As countless Chinese articles and statements have pointed out since the publication of the fourth vol-

[16] *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* (China Youth Daily—Peking), Aug. 31, 1965. See also the present author's "Some Chinese Attitudes," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1966.

[17] Significantly, these instructions were publicized at the end of 1968 when what later came to be called "Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line" was inaugurated. See New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), Nov. 24, 1968.

[18] According to a recent Chinese discussion of Mao's 1940 essay "On Policy," "we must adopt a revolutionary dual policy. While persisting in armed struggle as the main form of struggle, we must also engage in various forms of struggle with the enemy on many fronts . . . alliance and struggle—the relationship between the two is one of dialectical unity." See "Unite the People, Defeat the Enemy," *Peking Review*, No. 35, Aug. 27, 1971, pp. 12-13.

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ume of Mao's *Selected Works* in 1960, this notion represents an application to international relations of Mao's thinking on military matters—which in turn derives chiefly from traditional ideas found in the ancient military treatise *Art of War* by Sun Tzu,[19] classical histories such as the *Tso Chuan,* and old novels like *Water Margin* and *Romance of the Three Kingdoms.* Mao's military thought lays great emphasis on the use of "united-front work" in dealing with one's opponents. Such a technique involves striking up an alliance with a portion of one's foes against an alleged common (main) enemy—"Let you and him fight." Another crucial aspect of it is the assimilation into one's own forces not only of captured enemy personnel, but also of "friendly armies." In order to penetrate and bring over such "allies" as well as the civilian population on which they depend, one adopts the principle of "casting the net wide to arouse the masses"—that is to say, one employs agents and Trojan Horse tactics such as those portrayed in the famous revolutionary Peking opera, "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategem." Once an agent's model behavior has gained the commander's trust, other agents infiltrate the lower levels until the original leaders lose control and either submit or become isolated. When expedient, one can then "draw the net in" to deliver the *coup de grâce* by military means.[20]

A classic example of the Maoist "united-front" technique in action was the 1936 Sian incident in China and its sequel. The Chinese Communist Party's military forces (under Mao) and political forces (under Liu Shao-ch'i) coordinated their efforts to force Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his policy of giving priority to fighting the Communists instead of to resisting Japan, and to "unite with" the Communists in order to retain his position as national leader. Mao sent troops across the Yellow River to attack the Japanese and provoke a Sino-Japanese war, a move which failed. Secret agents organized demonstrations against Chiang's policy to his rear with the aim of winning over troops and commanders of the Manchurian and Northwest armies to the idea of kidnaping Chiang and forcing him to fight Japan instead of the Communists; these efforts succeeded. Thus, power to manipulate "public opinion" was turned to military advantage. Not only did the Communists remove Chiang's military pressure from themselves, but in the long run—as the party had foreseen in 1927—Japan drove Chiang from his power base in the cities, enabling Mao to raise "people's war" and subsequently take over the country as the overextended Japanese withdrew from it.[21]

So much for the general concept. Why have the Chinese deemed it relevant to the Middle East specifically, and how has it concretely affected Chinese policy in the area? Let us go into these questions individually.

In Chinese eyes, the area of the former Ottoman Empire must display many of the features that Mao discerned in his analysis of old China,[22] though in different geographical arrangements. The region is administratively fragmented and under militarist and feudal regimes linked to various foreign powers. It has ethnic minorities and weakly-administered border regions suitable for guerrilla warfare. On the western approaches, there is, in the form of Israel, a focus for "nationalist" opposition to foreign aggression analogous to Manchukuo (the former Japanese puppet-state in Manchuria) and Formosa. Chinese propaganda depicts Israel as a "dagger" pointed at the heart of the Arab world by "imperialism." [23] On the Persian Gulf side and eastern approaches to the area, the "social imperialists" of the USSR and the "new and old imperialists" of the West are engaged in a struggle for strategic minerals and positions. This struggle, as the Chinese perceive it, has gone on for many years. In the 1920's, Moscow signed treaties with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan mainly to forestall a suspected British plan to organize these countries in an anti-Bolshevik alliance. V. M. Molotov was thinking along the same lines when in 1939 he sought the agreement of the Nazis that "the area

[19] For a full translation, see Sun Tzu, *Art of War,* trans. Samuel B. Griffith II, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963.

[20] The technique is excellently described in Lyman P. van Slyke, *Enemies and Friends,* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968.

[21] For more thorough analysis, see this author's " 'One World' Restored?," *loc. cit.,* and *Chinese Strategic Thinking under Mao Tse-tung.* Tang Tsou and Morton Halperin offer a plausible reconstruction of Mao's strategy at the itme of the Sian incident in "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wis.), Vol. 59, March 1965, p. 92. On the Chinese Communist Party's suggestion of such a strategy in 1927, see Robert C. North and Xenia J. Eudin, *M. N. Roy's Mission to China: The Communist-Kuomintang Split of 1927,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963, Document No. 35, pp. 361-65.

[22] For example, in "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?", "On the Protracted Warfare," and other writings. See his *Selected Works,* New York, International Publishers, 1954-60.

[23] See, for instance, the NCNA commentary, Jan. 6, 1967. According to the report of John Cooley, Mao in 1966 told the Secretary-General of the Palestine Liberation Organization: "Israel and Formosa are bases of imperialism in Asia. You are the gate of the great continent, and we are the rear. They created Israel for you and Formosa for us. . . ." See *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Aug. 1, 1966.

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south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf should be recognized as the main area of Soviet aspirations." [24] Soviet pressure on Turkey and Iran after World War II forced these nations to seek American support and thus initiated the sequence of events that led to the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, the expansion of NATO to Turkey, and the creation of the Baghdad Pact and CENTO. The formation of the Baghdad Pact, in turn, enabled the Russians to outflank Turkey and Iran and to establish themselves in the Arab world, which was looking for a source of support on the Palestine issue to counterbalance the powerful influence of the Zionists in Europe and the United States. In short, the Middle Eastern landscape presents excellent conditions—from the Chinese perspective—for the application of a line mixing "diplomatic struggle" with "armed struggle."

With respect to the effect of this "walk-on-two-legs" concept on actual Chinese policy toward the Middle East, one must bear in mind that this concept has underlain Peking's approach to the area since the People's Republic of China first began to engage in activities there. What renders the concept especially important at the present juncture is the Chinese decision to stress the "right-foot," or diplomatic, element for the time being. Inherently, it ought to be underscored, the application of the concept requires a determination of the proper balance between "armed struggle" and "diplomatic struggle," and Peking has varied in its choice of emphasis over the years.

In the early period of Chinese contact with the Middle East—which commenced roughly with the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian States in April 1955—China gave primary attention to the formation of a "united front from above" with governments in the area. The fundamental aim was to win the confidence of the "national-bourgeois" leaders with whom the Chinese were seeking to "unite." To some extent, however, Peking also pursued this tack as a means of establishing connections with discontented sub-elites more amenable to the idea of "armed struggle" than the current leaders were.

During the initial half of the 1960's, a shift occurred in the Chinese line—largely as a result of increasingly open Sino-Soviet rivalry, which produced global competition for both ideological and political support. The Chinese in the new phase paid greater heed to supra-state forces and causes such as those of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the People's Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG).

While the transition to an accent on "armed struggle" was under way in the early 1960's, there may have been, some evidence suggests, two distinct versions of the revised Chinese tack within the Peking leadership. Though the Chinese claimed to be defending "true Marxism-Leninism" in their ideological challenge to the Soviets, at least Liu Shao-ch'i and other leaders connected with the Chinese Communist Party apparatus tended to treat this challenge as a *political* maneuver. Its purpose was evidently to force the Kremlin to listen to the Chinese on policy matters—and thus enable them to function as Greeks in Moscow's Roman Empire—or, if that failed, to bring about a transfer of the capital of the world Communist movement from Moscow to Peking. For Marshal Lin Piao and others who became known as "ultraleftists" during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966–69, however, it was expedient to take the line that violent and especially armed struggle represented the only valid course for genuine revolutionaries. In part, this was the ideological expression of conflict between rival bureaucracies, but Lin and his cohorts seemingly endeavored to implement their view within the limits of their capabilities. For example, personnel and organizations falling under the military "net" (*e.g.*, those concerned with recruitment, supply and training of guerrillas, and with other forms of "special political action" or "dirty tricks" in foreign parts) did not, it seems, coordinate their activities with the civilian bodies concerned with the same country, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, etc.—all under the control of Liu and like-minded individuals.

The new phase finally reached full fruition in the mid-1960's with the ascendance of the military and Lin Piao in Chinese politics. Not only did the People's Liberation Army virtually take over civilian party functions in internal affairs, but it obtained a dominant voice in the conduct of China's relations with the outside world. The ultimate outcome was an ultraleftist "diplomacy" reminiscent of events in China during the Boxer Rebellion at the beginning of the 20th century.

With the demise of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, the Chinese line toward the Middle East un-

[24] *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1948, p. 259.

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derwent another alteration; the "right-foot" element, as indicated previously, came to the fore once again. Over subsequent years, Peking has opened or reopened conventional diplomatic and trade relations with countries where its ties with local dissident forces or its potential as a counterweight to the USSR's growing involvement in the area have made it a "force to be reckoned with." Moreover, Lin and the ultraleftists of the Cultural Revolution period have recently been accused of having "castrated" the thought of Mao in the late 1960's.[25]

Having delineated the concepts that have shaped recent Chinese policy toward the Middle East, let us now look more directly at the substantive details of that policy. Current Chinese activities, as already indicated, did not emerge out of a vacuum. Rather, they represent a new stage in ventures that date back more than 15 years. To appreciate the elements of continuity and change, therefore, one must pay some heed to earlier times.

The Initial Years

As noted above, the Chinese at the outset directed their efforts largely to the establishment of ties with Middle Eastern governments. Their first breakthrough came thanks to Chou En-lai's personal approach to Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser at Bandung in 1955. In conveying support to Nasser for the Arab stand against Zionism, Chou apparently encouraged Nasser, who was smarting from a major Israeli military action against Palestinians in the Gaza strip the previous February, to turn to the Soviets for arms and promised him Chinese assistance in obtaining them—a move which later in the year led to Egypt's indirect acquisition of Soviet arms through Czechoslovakia. Chou also held out the prospect of a Chinese market for Egyptian cotton and of other trade opportunities. Not long after the conclusion of the Bandung Conference, Egypt set up trade offices in China, and in February 1956 Peking dispatched a cultural mission and opera troupe to Egypt. Egyptian recognition of China ensued on May 16, 1956.

During the next two years, several other countries followed Egypt's lead. Syria received a Chinese cultural mission and concluded a cultural pact in 1956, and by the end of the year, Damascus and Peking had exchanged diplomatic missions at the ambassadorial level. After similar Chinese cultivation, the strategic and medieval state of Yemen recognized Peking in August 1956. The overthrow of the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq on July 14, 1958, resulted in another success for the Chinese. Within 10 days of the military coup, General Abdel Karim Kassem, the new ruler, recognized the People's Republic of China; and Peking subsequently sent a large mission to Iraq and signed trade agreements with the fledgling government.

Although diplomacy and state-to-state relations preoccupied the Chinese during these years, they did not totally neglect opportunities for greater militancy. One reason for Peking's original desire to establish a mission in Cairo was to promote the armed struggle in Algeria, which had begun shortly after the close of the Indochina war in 1954, and which the Chinese evidently anticipated would eventuate in a Communist takeover of the nationalist cause. Because of the special interests of the French Communist Party and of Moscow in maintaining a position in metropolitan France, however, the Algerian war did not develop as China would have wished.

Notwithstanding this disappointment, Peking also saw the Arab-Israeli confrontation as a focus of "contradictions" that the Chinese could use to foster armed conflict. As just mentioned, it was partly due to Israel's operation in Gaza in February 1955 that President Nasser proved receptive to Chou's overtures at Bandung and later accepted arms from the Soviet bloc. In interviews with Nasser and his colleagues from 1959 onward, the present writer gained the impression that they had had few illusions about Soviet or Chinese aims in the region but had felt obliged to take risks in their relations with those countries because of an overriding fear of Israeli "expansionism." Cairo's decisions to recognize Peking and take aid from the Soviet bloc, in turn, not only confirmed American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' distrust of Nasser but also set in mo-

[25] On Nov. 11, 1971, the Anhwei Provincial Radio broadcast an article, written by the deputy political commissar of a regiment of the People's Liberation Army stationed in Anhwei, which charged Lin with "castrating, tampering with, and distorting Marxism, Leninism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung"—a clear reference to Lin's edition of *Quotations from Chairman Mao* (the little red book that became the Bible of the Cultural Revolution). The idea that Lin modified Mao's thinking, of course, is not at all novel. For example, an article on "View Nuclear Weapons with a Correct World Outlook" in *Kwangming Jih-pao* (Kwangming Daily), Aug. 27, 1965, had contended that Lin's emphasis on the human factor in warfare constituted a "creative development of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thinking on the roles of man and weapons and the dialectical relations between the two." See *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (Hong Kong), No. 3539, Sept. 17, 1965, p. 3. But the observation now carries a critical rather than a laudatory import.

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tion the mechanism of self-fulfilling prophecy regarding Israel by nourishing Israeli fears of a Communist-backed Arab encirclement and an eventual attempt to "drive the Jews into the sea." The ultimate outcome was the Suez crisis of late 1956, which witnessed a coordinated military assault on Egypt by the Israelis, the British, and the French.

Seeking to exploit the "contradictions" to its own advantage, Peking rendered vociferous backing to Cairo during the 1956 crisis. Moreover, in response to the enunciation on January 5, 1957, of the Eisenhower Doctrine—whereby the United States served notice that it would intervene militarily in the Middle East to counter any Communist aggression—Peking joined Moscow on January 18 in pledging support to all countries in the area against aggression or interference by the Western powers.[26]

The year 1958 marked the zenith of the Chinese position in the Middle East during this early period. After that, Peking's fortunes declined quite significantly. Two interrelated factors lay behind this development. First, China's switch to a harder line in dealing with the so-called "national-bouregeois" regimes of the Middle East and Africa put it into conflict with Soviet policy in the area. Already in 1956, the Suez crisis had produced a notable difference in the tone of the responses of the two Communist giants, with China considerably more intransigent than the USSR; the ensuing years brought growing evidence of a divergence in outlooks.

For example, shortly after signing the joint declaration with Peking in January 1957, the Soviet Union reassured the West that it did not wish to establish any position or obtain any privileges in the countries of the Near and Middle East, and it put forward draft proposals stipulating that the United States, Britain, and France should join with it in guaranteeing peaceful settlement of disputes in the region, abolition of military alignments, withdrawal of foreign forces, and a ban on supply of arms to Middle Eastern nations.[27] There was also a sharp contrast in the approaches of the two Communist powers to the 1958 crisis stemming from the outbreak of rioting and then of civil war in Lebanon in May and June, the coup that overthrew King Faisal's government in July, and the ensuing landing of US marines near Beirut and of British paratroopers in Jordan (in both cases at the request of the Arab governments concerned). To judge from its press reaction and subsequent polemics with Moscow, Peking perceived the crisis as an opportunity to turn an anti-imperialist war into a revolutionary war and to pit the USSR against the United States, in much the same way as the Chinese Communists had thrust the Nationalists into battle against the Japanese. On July 29, *Jen-min Jih-pao* hailed the Soviet-Bulgarian military exercises which Moscow had announced would take place in the Transcaucasus and Black Sea area, and it not only expressed hope that "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union" would repulse "Anglo-American aggression," but even went so far as to talk about a "volunteer army" to join in the expected "anti-imperialist" war. Instead of heeding Chinese promptings, however, Khrushchev sent letters to the United States, Britain, France, and India reiterating the reassuring message of his note of February 1957 and inviting the four powers to a summit meeting to settle existing differences.[28]

In essence, Peking preached that a sharpening of international class struggle provided the foundation for a united front with the countries of the Middle East battling against "imperialism," while Moscow advocated "peaceful coexistence and economic competition" with "imperialism" as a basis for constructing a socialist commonwealth ultimately embracing the nations of the Middle East. To put things another way, Mao sought to employ his old tactic (subsequently expounded at length in Lin Piao's famous article of September 1965 on "people's war" [29]) of allying with a lesser enemy to get him to fight the "main enemy"; and Khrushchev, in line with the "Leninist nationalities policy" for bringing the Soviet East, Outer Mongolia, and other satellites into the Communist fold, wanted to lead the nations of the Middle East toward "scientific socialism" by promoting state capitalism.

Second, though Arab leaders initially strove to pursue a policy of neutralism while capitalizing opportunistically on Chinese militancy, Peking's entanglement in the skeins of Arab politics after it opened relations with Baghdad in the summer of 1958 precipitated a setback for Chinese operations in the two major centers of Arab radicalism—Iraq and the United Arab Republic (formed in early 1958 by the

[26] Text in *The New York Times*, Jan. 19, 1957.

[27] Note of Feb. 11, 1957. See *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1957. On the Sino-Soviet divergences of 1957, see the author's "The Middle East: Sino-Soviet Discords," *Polycentrism, The New Factor in International Communism*, ed. Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, New York, Praeger, 1962, pp. 226 ff.

[28] *Pravda* (Moscow), July 20, 1958.

[29] *Long Live the Victory of People's War*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965.

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Union of Egypt and Syria). Specifically, Peking encouraged the Communists in Iraq to promote armed struggles which could have blossomed into an "anti-imperialist war."

After the Iraqi coup of July 1958, there was a good deal of jockeying for influence in the country among various political elements, including the Communists. In March 1959, the activities of local Communists and "peace partisans" under Chinese sway prematurely triggered in Mosul a non-Communist attempt to overthrow Kassem and his increasingly powerful Communist allies.[30] In the wake of the coup's failure, the Communists ruthlessly suppressed their "bourgeois-nationalist," Nasserite, and Ba'ath Socialist rivals.

By April, the Communists were practically running the country: their "People's Resistance Force" was reported to be stronger than the army.[31] Moreover, they expressed a preference for the Chinese, as opposed to the Soviet, line on the national bourgeoisie, peaceful coexistence, etc., in a variety of ways, such as the foundation of an Iraq-Albania Friendship Society and advocacy of the opening of diplomatic relations with Albania at the ambassadorial level. Having demonstrated their power in the streets, the Communists successfully pressed Kassem in July to add two pro-Communist ministers to his cabinet. They then returned to the street to improve their position further, launching another terrorist action, this time at Kirkuk.[32] But their gambit wound up alarming Kassem, and he thereupon spoke out strongly against the party and purged Communists from the army and bureaucracy. At a self-criticism session of their Central Committee in August, the Communists officially admitted "leftist political errors." Significantly, Moscow publicized the document, but Peking, whom the Soviets later (1960) charged with responsibility for the deviations, ignored it.[33]

In the meantime, Nasser, seeing what was happening in Iraq, had declared a *jihad* (holy war) against communism in the UAR. Peking reacted with mounting vehemence. In March 1959, the Chinese press hinted that Nasser would be better off abetting armed struggle in Algeria, Oman and other countries if he did not want to end up as Chiang Kai-shek had, and it denounced his slogan "neither East nor West" as a "step toward going over to the enemy."[34] The ensuing October, Peking provided Khalid Bakdash, the Syrian Communist leader, with a pulpit for an attack on Nasser at the celebrations in honor of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.[35] Six months later, the Chinese made an unsuccessful attempt to displace the Egyptian Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and to transfer the body's headquarters from Cairo to Conakry, Guinea. By the summer of 1960, then, Peking's relations with the UAR had become highly strained; furthermore, Nasser was displaying growing interest in helping President Tito of Yugoslavia build up a bloc of non-aligned countries—an enterprise which Peking had earlier denounced as "trafficking in poison."[36]

Toward Extreme Militancy

Thus adventurism had ruined what had at the outset looked to be a promising field for "united front" work in Iraq, and it had rendered the UAR leaders more and more suspicious of China's intentions toward them, Nevertheless, Peking, interpreting the spirit of Bandung as a *Banteng* spirit of struggle by the "have-not" countries against the "have" countries, still expected to reap dividends from a balanced dosage of united-front work "from above" (with governments) and "from below" (with supranational and subnational revolutionary groups); indeed, Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, and the Chinese civilian bureaucracies sought to mobilize Third World governments for such a struggle against the United States and, increasingly, against the USSR. At the end of 1963 and in early 1964, Chou and Ch'en Yi toured Asia and Africa (plus Albania) to fashion a militant interstate united front through specific bilateral arrangements and through the creation of an overall organization at a "Second Bandung Conference" of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries (later scheduled for Algiers in 1965).

However, the ousters (in most cases through a preemptive coup by the armed forces and police, who

[30] See this writer's "The Middle East: Sino-Soviet Discords," *loc. cit.*, pp. 228 ff.

[31] *Swiss Review of World Affairs* (Zurich), March 1961, pp. 29-30, cited in M. S. Agwani, *Communism in the Arab East*, New Delhi, Asia Publishing House, 1969. *Cf.* Uriel Dann, *Iraq under Qassem, A Political History, 1958-1963*, New York, Praeger, 1969, pp. 118 ff.

[32] For details, see the present author's "The Middle East: Sino-Soviet Discords," *loc. cit.*, pp. 229-30.

[33] Phebe Ann Marr discusses some of these events in "The Iraqi Revolution: A Cast Study of Army Rule," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Vol. XIV, No. 3, Fall 1970.

[34] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 20, 1959, and *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag—Peking), March 18, 1959.

[35] Indeed, Radio Peking even broadcast the attack in its Arab-language programs to the Middle East.

[36] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Feb. 22, 1959.

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felt threatened by the rising power of Chinese-supported institutions like the militia and the youth organization [37]) of President Ben Bella of Algeria, President Sukarno of Indonesia, President Nkrumah of Ghana, and other individuals on whom the Chinese had placed their hopes raised doubts about the viability of such a strategic mix for creating a "third force" of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. With the demise of these leaders' relatively friendly regimes, Peking began to lay greater stress on direct Chinese support for armed insurrectionists and the development of transnational linkages than on state relations "from above" or "bourgeois" diplomacy. This emphasis hit its peak during the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967–68.

It was against such a background that Peking, toward the end of 1965 (*i.e.*, after the collapse of the Algiers conference in the aftermath of Ben Bella's overthrow), moved to forge close ties with the radical Ba'ath regime in Syria and with the Palestinian resistance movement.[38] The Chinese established links not only with the Syrian government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which the Arab governments had helped to set up, but also with the clandestine activist group Al-Fatah, which commenced operations in January 1965 but did not emerge into the limelight until after the June 1967 war.

From the Chinese standpoint, these associations quickly bore some worthwhile fruit. The activities of the PLO and Syria against Israel in 1966 helped to polarize the Arab world and to turn Nasser away from his "new pragmatic course." [39] For instance, after the Israelis staged a retaliatory military operation against Syria in July, the PLO and Radio Cairo called for the "liberation" of Amman and Riyadh.[40] Meanwhile, another coup in Syria had brought the "left" Ba'athists to power. Though strongly supported by Moscow, the new rulers opted to strengthen their bonds with the Chinese as a means of insuring against undue Soviet exploitation or the withdrawal of Soviet backing, and they likewise adopted the kind of intransigent posture that Peking favored. As David Morison has rightly pointed out, without "a heightening of Syrian anti-Israeli pas-

Li Hsien-nien, Deputy Premier of the People's Republic of China, greets Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

—From *China Pictorial* (Peking), October 1971, p. 60.

sions and the sympathetic reaction it received from Moscow," the train of events that led to the war of 1967 would not have gotten started.[41] But Syria's belligerence was not something that Moscow inspired; it stemmed from the decision of the then dominant Ba'athist faction to "play the Chinese card."

When the June 1967 war began, the Chinese greeted it with apparent relish. Chou En-lai sent messages to the presidents of Egypt and Syria (both independent entities again since 1961) and to Ahmad Shukairi, head of the PLO, saying that the Arabs would (*i.e.*, should) fight on, "like the heroic Vietnamese," until victory.[42] The announcement of the cease-fire, therefore, left Peking decidedly unhappy. *Jen-min Jih-pao* denounced Moscow for its policy of "treachery and survival" and recommended that "although a cease-fire has been announced, the Arab people . . . are [should be] determined to fight the aggressors to the end." [43]

While June 1967 thus represented another missed opportunity to turn an "anti-imperialist" war into a "revolutionary" war, it opened up new doors for the expansion of Chinese influence. To much of Arab public opinion, not only Moscow but all of Arab officialdom appeared to be "Chiang Kai-sheks" una-

[37] See the author's "China Returns to Africa," *loc. cit.*

[38] For details, see this writer's "China, Israel and the Arabs," *loc. cit.*

[39] See the author's "Some Chinese Attitudes," *loc. cit.*, p. 251.

[40] Speaking over Radio Cairo on Nov. 29, 1966, Ahmed Sa'id declared: "Hussein's throne is the target. It should fall so that Israel may fall."

[41] "Russia, Israel and the Arabs," *Mizan* (London), May-June 1967, p. 100. See also A. Francos in *Jeune Afrique* (Tunis), No. 336, June 18, 1967. This article argues that Syria pushed Nasser into making the moves that precipitated Israel's attack.

[42] See *Peking Review*, No. 24, June 9, 1967, pp. 8-10.

[43] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 11, 1969.

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ble or unwilling to fight the enemy effectively, and the old PLO no longer possessed credibility. In contrast, activist groups like Al-Fatah or Dr. George Habbash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine seemed to incarnate the national spirit of resistance. Moreover, the outlook of significant segments of the Palestinian activists tended to make them receptive to Chinese wooing.

To be sure, the Chinese must have been aware that the Palestinian resistance movement scarcely constituted a tight-knit, coherent whole, for there were numerous "organizations" with widely varying views. For example, while some of these groups consisted of dedicated revolutionaries, others had come into being simply as a means of extorting funds from countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. In addition, many of them had from the outset been penetrated by Syrian, Egyptian, and Iraqi intelligence agencies. More important from the Chinese standpoint, a number contained *Ansar* (partisans) with ties to and support from the USSR.

Nevertheless, the panoply of groups included some that were ideologically inclined to be amenable to Chinese counsel. Perhaps the most obvious was the ultramilitant and avowedly Marxist-Leninist PFLP, but the somewhat more moderate Al-Fatah had to be counted among them too. Though the word "fatah" (conquest) alludes to a verse in the holy Koran,[44] the organization itself espouses a line at least substantially Marxist-Leninist in content. Its publications often reproduce or paraphrase the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, and it proclaims that "blazing our armed revolution inside the occupied territory [*i.e.,* Israel] is a healing medicine for all our people's diseases." [45]

Thus, a Sino-Soviet contest over the Palestinian issue became superimposed on the longstanding "struggle between two lines" (*i.e.,* between radical and conservative states and between revolutionaries and nonrevolutionaries among the countless groups, coalitions, and personal followings below the state level) in Arab politics. Moscow had staked its bets in the latter battle on the existing governments in the radical countries, especially Egypt; and its Egyptian sympathizers had originally hoped to build up a Communist "bloc within" in the nation's only legal party, the Arab Socialist Union—much as the Chinese Communists had tried to infiltrate the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) in China during the early 1920's. Peking, on the other hand, saw all the present governments in the Middle East as comparable to the militarist splinter regimes that had emerged in China after the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911. Just as Mao's supra-provincial, armed Communist party had captured the nationalist sentiment of the masses by leading the "hilltop and underground" resistance against Japan and had then crushed the splinter regimes in China to reunify the Empire, now the stateless Arab guerrilla movement and its "special force" (among students and others) throughout and beyond the Arab world would sweep away kings and colonels alike under the banner of "liberation" from Israel and its "allies."

Though the Cultural Revolution paralyzed Peking's conventional diplomatic activity, Chinese liaison with Palestinian guerrilla forces continued without interruption—perhaps because it came under the control of a military "net" (*hsi-tung*) in the bureaucracy. It may be true that Syria and the Palestinian commandos accepted military and other aid from China partly as a means of extorting more support from the Soviets, but the Chinese did not come off without anything to show for their investments. Indeed, Syria and the commandos committed themselves to a partly as a means of extorting more support from the cal solution to the conflict (as the Soviets advocated). Damascus endorsed this policy after the visit of a Syrian military delegation to China in May 1969, and the commandos followed suit in a joint declaration with the Chinese on July 4 of the same year. While pro-Moscow guerrilla elements did not propose to liquidate Israel, the majority of the guerrillas probably subscribed to the views of the PFLP, which officially anticipated the appearance of an Arab state of Palestine in 20–30 years' time.

At the same time that it was developing closer links with the Palestinian guerrillas, Peking also cultivated ties with guerrillas operating at the opposite end of the Arabian penisula—the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), which proposes to unite Oman, the emirates of Trucial Oman (now the United Arab Emirates), Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait in a single state. PFLOAG's origins date back to 1964 and an insurrection in the Dhofar region of Oman. This insurrection was theoretically directed against British domination, and the Dhofar Liberation Front (as PFLOAG was known at that juncture) was affiliated with the Arab National-

[44] Surah LXI, "As-Saff" (the Ranks), vv. 13-14.

[45] See Y. Harkavi, *Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy,* Adelphi Paper No. 53, London, Institute of Strategic Studies, December 1968.

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ist Movement, then a pro-Nasser, Pan-Arabist organization. However, at the Dhofar Liberation Front's Second Congress in Himrin in September 1968, the group's initial leaders were ousted by self-styled Marxist-Leninists, the present name was adopted to reflect an expansion of the body's geographical concerns, and it was decided to establish a headquarters in Aden (the capital of the People's Republic of South Yemen, since renamed the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen). Subsequently, PFLOAG and Chinese representatives reached an agreement whereby 30 PFLOAG members would receive training in China. These individuals completed their training and returned to the Middle East in 1969 to take charge of 15 different guerrilla bands.

Chinese courtship of both the Palestinian and Gulf guerrillas has continued unabated over the ensuing years. In fact, Peking has, if anything, intensified its activities with regard to both groups, particularly the latter. For example, not only has PFLOAG enjoyed considerable propaganda support from China, but it has also received a substantial flow of Chinese arms and uniforms since the opening of a Chinese military mission in Aden in July 1969 after left-wing elements of the National Liberation Front had seized power there the previous month.

However, the emphasis in Chinese policy toward the Middle East has shifted back to diplomacy and state-to-state relations as a result of the end of the Cultural Revolution and the military clashes along the Sino-Soviet borders in the spring of 1969. The termination of the Cultural Revolution generally encouraged a return to a less sectarian international approach, and with the danger of a Soviet "preemptive strike" against China's growing nuclear/rocket capability, it became imperative from Peking's standpoint to "distract" Moscow from the confrontation along their mutual borders.

Guerrillas of the Dhofar region, in revolt against the Sultanate of Oman, train with Chinese weapons.

—Keystone Photo.

Renewed Stress on Diplomacy

Hence, the Chinese during the last few years have been devoting a lot of effort to strengthening their positions with existing Middle Eastern governments. Those in the important strategic area encompassing Aden, the Red Sea gateway to the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa, and the approaches to the Persian Gulf have been particular targets of Chinese attention. In Yemen (now the Yemen Arab Republic), Peking already enjoyed a base of goodwill upon which to build, for Chinese aid to Yemen had been extensive and effective since the two countries entered into diplomatic relations in 1956. Recently China has endeavored to capitalize on this through stepped-up political contacts. Yemen's neighbor, the troubled Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, had established official ties with China in November 1967 and had received a loan of $12 million in 1968. In 1970, the Chinese promised the DPRY another $43.2 million in aid. Since then, Peking has also increased its trade and its political interaction with Aden.[46] After the abortive Communist coup against President Nimeri of the Sudan in July 1971 produced a strain in Soviet-Sudanese relations, China moved to improve its standing with Khartoum by extending military aid.

In the eastern sectors of this same area, Peking forged diplomatic links with Kuwait, already a major market for its goods, in March 1971. The Ba'athist government in Iraq has been the object of both mounting political activity and attempts to promote trade. For example, the Chinese entertained an official Iraqi delegation in Peking at the turn of this year. Though Iran continues to repress local "Maoist" groups severely, China succeeded in opening diplomatic relations with Teheran in August 1971 and has requested overflight and refueling

[46] See *The Times* (London), Jan. 2, 1971; *The New York Times*, Jan. 7, and Feb. 10, 1971; John Cooley in *Christian Science Monitor*, May 19, 1971.

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rights for its projected commercial air operation to Europe. In part, it ought to be noted, the new Sino-Iranian ties may reflect Teheran's worries about Peking's growing links with the Persian Gulf guerrillas. The Shah's government aspires to preeminence in the Gulf; consequently, China's support of the Oman guerrillas arouses concern in Teheran. Moreover, recent evidence of contacts between the guerrillas and the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran have no doubt heightened this concern.[47] Against this background, the Shah may have "considered the possibility that normal Peking-Teheran relations might help ease Chinese backing to the guerrillas".[48] As President Nasser used to say, "the squeaky wheel gets the grease."

Though the governments of the Mediterranean countries appear to have fallen somewhat lower on the Chinese scale of priorities than those in areas nearer to the Indian Ocean, Peking has by no means neglected them. For example, a "trade offensive" vis-a-vis Lebanon finally enabled the Chinese to establish a diplomatic foothold in Beirut, hub of commerce and intrigue in the Arab world, in November 1971. Following the restoration of Sino-Algerian official ties in the fall of 1971, China managed to restore sufficient amicability to its relations with Egypt—which had sunk to an all-time low in 1968 when the Egyptians blamed "Maoist" Palestinians and Chinese money for an outbreak of student riots in Egypt[49]—to receive a visiting delegation from the Cairo government in March 1972. In August 1971, China opened up official links with Turkey (despite Ankara's ruthless suppression of local "Maoists"), and Peking has asked for overflight and refueling rights for the commercial air operation to Europe mentioned earlier.

As many of the foregoing data attest, recent Chinese enterprises in the Middle East have yielded a number of distinctly positive fruits from the Chinese vantage point. Yet, on balance, the Chinese position in the area has weakened, for increasing Soviet activity in the Middle East has more than offset Chinese gains. In large part, this heightened Soviet acitivity represents a direct response to the challenge posed by Chinese ventures, but broader strategic considerations arising from the prospect of a diminishing US military presence in Asia have probably played a role too.

With respect to the latter, one must bear in mind that because of the Sino-Soviet military flareup in 1969, Moscow now feels compelled to deploy its troops in three main areas—Europe, the Soviet Union proper, and the Far East. At present, it can get by with, say, 30 divisions in each area, but a significant alteration in Chinese deployments could drastically change the situation. Today, China would logically have her roughly 120 divisions split into three concentrations: one would cover the South (mainly because of Vietnam); another, the borders with the USSR, especially in the north where the line passes fairly close to Peking, the national capital; and the third, the East coast opposite Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. However, the increasing possibility of a US military withdrawal from the areas to the south and the west, with an attendant decrease in the threat that China would perceive from these directions, could cause Peking to redeploy a major portion of its military forces to the north and west against the Soviets. Therefore, Moscow seems to have decided that it needed some means of preventing such a redeployment. Expanding its own military muscle to the south of China could be one solution to the problem, though the cost-effective answer might be to arm India and Bangla Desh.[50] The implementation of such a program entails not only access to port facilities in the Middle East but also an overflight corridor from the Mediterranean through Egypt, the Sudan, and the Yemens, or through Syria and Iraq, to the Indian Ocean.

Only with respect to the guerrilla movements of the Middle East does the USSR's influence and involvement fall shy of China's, and even here the Soviets have evinced a desire to improve their position. This has been most evident concerning the Gulf guerrillas. In September 1969, PFLOAG indicated publicly that it welcomed arms from anyone, not just the Chinese. Shortly afterwards, a delegation of the organization visited Moscow, and some Russians likewise appeared in Dhofar (illegally) to distribute Lenin badges and the insignia of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Furthermore, the Soviets seem to have had an indirect hand, through

[47] For example, the two issued a joint communique in January 1971.

[48] John Cooley, *loc. cit.* See also Ralph Joseph, *Canberra Times*, May 13, 1971.

[49] According to *Jeune Afrique*, April 6, 1969, Mahmoud Riad summoned Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua and reproved him for supporting the riotous students with funds and printing facilities.

[50] Even before the Sino-Soviet military clashes of 1969, Chester Bowles saw the uses of Indian manpower "if there was ever an honest-to-goodness land war with China." *International Herald-Tribune* (Paris), Jan. 15, 1968, quoted in *CASAN Bulletin* Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 1972, p. 108.

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the Iraqis, in bringing about the foundation of a "National Democratic Front" for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf, announced in June 1970.[51] In December 1971, NDFLOAG concluded a cooperation agreement with PFLOAG.

Certainly, Moscow's influence and activities in relation to established governments vastly exceed those of Peking. In May 1971, the USSR concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Egypt. While the significance of this development may have been somewhat reduced by President Sadat's prior purge of the Arab Socialist Union's leading pro-Moscow elements, headed by Ali Sabry, and his subsequent expulsion of Soviet military advisers in July 1972, the treaty remains in force, and the Egyptian government continues to be dependent on Soviet military aid. During the last few years, the USSR has boosted economic and military assistance to the Ba'ath regime in Iraq; in April 1972, the two countries signed a treaty similar to the Soviet-Egyptian treaty.[52] The consummation of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty was accompanied by hints that Iraqi Communists must join in a National Front under the direction of the Ba'ath Socialist Party—a condition which later came to pass. About the same time, a Soviet naval contingent visited Iraq, and Premier Kosygin arrived to open the Soviet-aided Rumaylah oil field as part of a Soviet campaign to encourage the Iraqis to use petroleum as a political weapon.[53] Though Syria's Ba'athists have been ideologically at odds with those of Iraq, Moscow has pragmatically stepped up its military and economic aid (especially for the oil industry) to Damascus. For instance, since Israeli planes raided Syria in 1969 in retaliation for Syrian-instigated commando raids, Soviet SAM missiles have ringed Damascus. Then, in March 1972, the Syrian Communist Party formed a National Front with the Ba'athists under the latter's leadership, thus paving the way for the possible signing in the near future of a Syrian-Soviet treaty comparable to the Soviet-Egyptian and Soviet-Iraqi treaties. Previously, the Syrian Communists had wavered in policy because one faction insisted on "total liberation" of Palestine and an end to anti-Chinese policies in the world Communist movement, and another faction favored a more moderate and pro-Soviet line.[54]

Elsewhere, Soviet achievements have been less spectacular but nonetheless noteworthy. In 1972, Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, visited Turkey, and Marshal Andrei Grechko, Soviet Minister of Defense, journeyed to Somalia. Lebanon sought to obtain arms from Moscow. Despite substantial Chinese aid to the Yemen Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, the USSR continues to be the chief source of military aid for the two nations. And the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971 and the ensuing Indo-Pakistani war decreased Pakistan's utility to China as a "stepping stone" to the Middle East.

The Outlook

Having explored the various aspects of current Chinese policy in the Middle East, let us briefly attempt to peer ahead into the future. As this writer observed last year, "it would be wishful thinking to expect Peking's leaders to abandon their dual strategy of indirect defense—even though it may increase the threat of 'imperialist' encirclement and collusion it was meant to avoid."[55] Indeed, China has not forsaken the subnational and supranational revolutionaries despite its accent on state-to-state diplomacy in its recent approach to the Middle East.

To be sure, the Chinese have been relatively circumspect in their statements on the Middle East in the United Nations since they joined the body in November 1971. In his maiden speech to the General Assembly on November 15, 1971, Chiao Kuan-hua toned down the unusual Chinese reference to "armed struggle" and spoke only of "struggle"; he also failed to denounce the four-power talks (involv-

[51] It should be pointed out, however, that the Hong Kong Communist paper *Ta Kung Pao* on July 23, 1970, hailed the body's first military operation (in Northern Oman) with a banner headline, "Guerrilla War Breaks Out in Oman." See also "Peking Gives Aid to Gulf Guerrillas," *Age* (Melbourne), Aug. 8, 1970; and *The Guardian Weekly* (London), Jan. 8, 1972.

[52] *Le Monde* (Paris), April 11, 1972, commented that the new treaty was aimed at preventing Chinese penetration of the Persian Gulf after British withdrawal from there.

[53] On March 13, 1972, in preparation for the Eighth Arab Oil Congress to take place in Algiers in May 1972, Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress urged producer states to employ oil as a weapon "in the struggle against imperialism." On June 2, both the Iraqi and Syrian governments nationalized all Western oil interests in their countries. This development plus Soviet leverage on Syria and Iraq gives Moscow a potential for affecting the oil supplies not only of Japan and Western Europe, but also of China. According to some oil experts, China will need imports from the Persian/Arabian Gulf for the next few years even should the rumors of large oil deposits in the continental shelf area around the Tiaoyu or Senkaku islands in the Pacific prove out and should oil from this source become available to Peking. See, for example, *Etelaat* (Teheran), Aug. 3, 1970.

[54] *Africasia* (Paris), March 6, 1972.

[55] In the University of Sydney's *Current Affairs Bulletin*, Nov. 1, 1971.

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ing the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France) aimed at finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli question.[56] More generally, the Chinese have conveyed the impression that if a settlement were reached, China would not oppose it. But while there has been some evidence that China has attempted to disengage from direct, overt support of certain African guerrilla movements,[57] many utterances by Chinese leaders and the Chinese press persist in stressing armed struggle for the Palestinians—even if these utterances imply that the Palestinians must rely basically on their own efforts to triumph.

Insofar as the means of action available to a given bureaucracy or leader can sometimes modify policies, we may reasonably expect that the admitted purge of Lin Piao and most of the top military command in September 1971 will mean that Chairman Mao's "revolutionary diplomatic line" will stress trade, diplomacy, and cultural exchanges in the months immediately ahead. Nevertheless, the time could come when the Chinese leadership might decide to "shift to the other foot" in its policy and emphasize armed struggle. Whether that time will ever arrive will likely depend on the capacity of Middle East leaders and their backers to exercise control over their domains and cope with their nation's domestic problems.

For the long term, the aims of China's game of counterencirclement in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean area as a whole probably will remain the same as they were under the Ming emperors: to outflank the steppe power (now the USSR and its ally, the Mongolian People's Republic); to impress upon foreign countries China's political and ideological preeminence; and to engage in some trade (marginal for China, yet potentially of great importance to small countries heavily dependent on a restricted range of exports and markets). The outcome of the game may in the last analysis be determined not on the Middle Eastern part of the world chessboard, but in Africa. Once the Tanzania-Zambia railway is built, the main obstacle to the use of Zambia as an effective base for guerrilla attacks against South Africa and neighboring territories—Zambia's dependence on Portuguese-controlled railways for its export of copper and other things—will be gone. What will happen then? Conceivably, the Middle East pattern could repeat itself. That is, a "Jordanization" of African states could occur under the pressure of guerrillas on the one hand and reprisals by their victims on the other, and the Organization of African Unity could go the way of the PLO, falling increasingly under the influence of militants backed by Peking. Such an evolution would, in turn, leave the "original officers" of the organization with a choice of either swimming for a time with the tide of "people's war" or sticking, high but dry, with their moderate policies until replaced—probably after a shorter time—by people who, in the Maoist book, count as genuine national leaders.[58] Whether a less cataclysmic scenario will prevail, only time will tell.

[56] NCNA, Dec. 8, 1971.

[57] See "Arab People's Just Struggle Will Triumph," *Peking Review*, No. 32, June 9, 1972, p. 10. A spokesman of the Eritrean Liberation Front, Omar Jaber, said in Beirut on Nov. 2, 1971, that China, "which had previously supported us as a part of the international revolution," no longer did so because of her policy of widening her international relations.

[58] According to the *Kung-tso T'ung-hsun* (Work Bulletin) of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in 1961, "if there were one or two among the independent countries which would effect a real nationalist revolution, . . . a revolutionary wave would roll up the African continent." (See the present writer's "China and Africa Today," *Race* [London], Vol. 4, No. 4, April 1964, p. 6.) While this publication may have reflected the outlook of Lin Piao and a section of the Chinese military leadership no longer around on the political scene, rather than the thoughts of Premier Chou En-Lai and what now passes for "Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line," the difference between the two points of view is not in terms of basic approach so much as in the operational methods to achieve the goals suggested by Maoist analysis of the "contradictions" to be found in the world situation and the opportunities inherent in these. For example, the *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial on African Liberaton Day for 1972 declared *that "all countries, whether or not they have attained independence, will sooner or later win full and complete independence and liberation."* See *Peking Review*, June 2, 1972, p. 5. Emphasis added.

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Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Constitutional Reform

By Jerome M. Gilison

The story of constitutional reform in the Soviet Union is essentially the story of a reform that failed. Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 proposal to rewrite the "Stalin" Constitution of 1936 was one of his many attempts at policy innovation, but like so many others it was caught up in the web of conflict surrounding his leadership and remained unfulfilled when he was ousted in 1964. Two years later, the Brezhnev leadership revived the project but then abruptly buried it in a silence that continues unbroken to the present. Thus, in a system that contains many paradoxes, the central paradox remains that the "supreme law" of the Soviet state—the 1936 Constitution—has been declared by the nation's own leaders, including Brezhnev, to be obsolete and virtually irrelevant to contemporary Soviet society. Despite this, the present leadership has left the old document intact and shows no apparent intention of replacing it.

The history of the reform project, from its initiation until its apparent abandonment, will be reviewed later, with some speculative assessment of the motives that prompted Khrushchev to bring it to life, and Brezhnev to bury it. The story would be incomplete, however, without a brief discussion of the peculiarly ambiguous role that the Constitution plays in the Soviet political system.

The survival of an admitted anachronism as the capstone of the entire Soviet legal system seems to impose no great disabilities on the functioning of the Soviet state. This, in itself, is a clear indication of the peripheral role which the Constitution plays in the actual practice of Soviet politics. Yet even that role has never been easy to define. The Soviet Constitution establishes a set of state institutions whose functions are not insignificant, but it defines a set of relationships among them (and between them and individual citizens) that are essentially reversed in practice. Whereas the constitutional text is a model of "power to the people," the practice of Soviet politics unmistakably reveals a downward flow of power from the smaller institutions at the apex to ever larger bodies below.

Perhaps one reason for this discrepancy lies in the fact that the Soviet Constitution, in spite of its formal similarity to Western constitutions, was never intended to serve the same purposes. Western constitutions generally presuppose a certain amount of conflict between competing groups and individuals in society. They therefore establish and legitimize sets of institutions and normative relationships that serve to moderate and channel such conflict and thus prevent it from giving rise to violence or alienation. Inherent in this form of constitutionalism is the assumption that conflict is endemic to society and, if kept within proper limits, may be a positive force for social betterment.

It is precisely this assumption that is alien to Soviet ideology. Here the assumption is that conflict is inherent only in capitalist societies which exist in a condition of perpetual class warfare, while Soviet society, on the other hand, is characterized by perpetual harmony between the two "fraternal" classes of peasants and workers (with the intelligentsia added as a "stratum"). Soviet theory denies the possibility of fundamental conflict because these two classes are seen as having the same interest, the same goals, and the same world-view (Marxism-Leninism). During Stalin's time, to be sure, intensified social conflict was ideologically accepted as a dialectical antithesis to future unity, but it was seen as conflict between the "people"—*i.e.*, the masses of workers and peasants led by the Communist Party

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—and the "un-people"—the vicious, desperate, and degenerate remnants of the old capitalist order, the renegades, and the agents of foreign imperialist powers. The Constitution, in fact, was not intended to apply to the latter, who were simply marked for ruthless suppression. Within the ranks of the "people," an inherent unity of purpose was supposed to preclude conflict.

The Soviet Constitution thus embodies a fundamental contradiction. Its form, which is based on Western constitutions that assume social conflict, is at odds with its intended function, which is to give continuous expression to an assumed social unity. This disparity between constitutional form and function gives rise to numerous anomalies.

One such anomaly is the Constitution's provision for an elaborate mechanism to elect representative assemblies of the people (*i.e.*, the soviets). An extraordinarily large number of Soviet citizens (over two million) actually become elected representatives at one level or another in the network of soviets. Great care is taken to assure that they are "drawn from the people" and reflect the best characteristics of a supposed cross-section of the population. Yet it is quite clear that the whole concept of popular representation has utility only if one assumes some sort of continual conflict in society. A society in which everyone is in conscious agreement—or even a society in which everyone's inherent interests coincide—does not require a large and expensive representative mechanism to make decisions. For if these premises are correct, and if "scientific Marxism-Leninism" reveals the *one* right way to do things in every instance, then society needs only an administrative structure to implement policies that will, automatically, embody the people's unanimous wisdom. It was this sort of logic that led Engels to speak of the "withering away of the state" and its replacement by "the administration of things." [1] Another constitutional feature which is anomalous for the same reasons is the provision setting up an explicit procedure for conciliating differences between the two houses of the Supreme Soviet—a procedure that is not likely to be tested in practice before the millennium. Yet, in spite of these oddities, the Stalin Constitution has undergone very few substantive changes since its adoption in 1936. The rather large number of amendments that have been incorporated in the text over the years have practically all been related to changes in the administrative structure of the Soviet state as prescribed in Articles 22–27, 70, 77, and 78.[2]

In addition to the fundamental disparity between form and purpose, the present Constitution is increasingly subject with each passing year to the same kind of Marxian obsolescence that afflicted its 1924 predecessor and justified the replacement of that document by the present one. The 1936 Constitution was written to conform to the Soviet "victory" in building socialism and was considered appropriate to that historical stage of development. But in the intervening years the Soviet Union has supposedly entered the stage of the "full-scale" (*razviornutoe,* literally "unfolding") construction of communism, and the Stalin Constitution has consequently become an outmoded document in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory.

The Genesis of Reform

The story of Khrushchev's move to revise or rewrite the 1936 Constitution is intimately connected with the vicissitudes of Kremlin politics in the post-Stalin period. The late First Secretary's whole approach to the question of constitutional reform clearly derived from his destalinization drive, which was one of the key elements in his struggle with his foes in the party Presidium (since renamed the Politburo). The issue of constitutional revision was therefore charged with special significance for the members of the Kremlin's inner circle, with the proponents of destalinization more favorably disposed toward revision than conservative elements.

Khrushchev's initial thrust in the direction of constitutional reform came at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. In his major open speech to the Congress, *i.e.*, the Central Committee report (delivered ten days before his "secret speech" denouncing Stalin), the First Secretary placed unusual emphasis on the theme of "strengthening socialist justice," the apparent rationale for which was the need to develop norms of leadership interaction during the post-Stalin succession struggle. Thus, Khrushchev declared:

Experience shows that enemies of the Soviet state try to use for their own foul subversive activity the

[1] Frederick Engels, *Anti-Duehring, Moscow,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959, pp. 385-87.

[2] For a short enumeration of changes, other than purely administrative reorganizations, see Harold J. Berman and John B. Quigley, Jr., *Basic Laws on the Structure of the Soviet State,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 1-2.

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slightest weakening of socialist law observance. That is how the Beria gang, which was exposed by the party, acted: it tried to remove the agencies of state security from the control of the party and the Soviet regime, to place them above the party and the government, and to create in these agencies an atmosphere of lawlessness and arbitrariness. . . . Our party, state, and trade union organizations must vigilantly stand guard over Soviet law observance, unmask and bring into the open anyone who violates socialist law and order and the rights of Soviet citizens, and sternly call a halt to the slightest manifestations of lawlessness and arbitrariness.[3]

The final policy resolution passed by the 20th Congress included approval of "measures to strengthen Soviet justice and ensure that the rights of citizens guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution are strictly observed," [4] but no mention was made at this time of the need to revise the text. There is little question that Khrushchev's motives for emphasizing "socialist legality" were connected with his intensifying struggle with the "anti-party group" of Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin *et al.* Among other things, destalinization was a major weapon in Khrushchev's arsenal directed against this group, and one of its major themes was denunciation of the dead dictator for his disregard of legal norms. It can be surmised that Khrushchev, having come close to destruction first at the hands of Stalin and then of Beria, and now facing a continuing struggle with his rivals for the leadership, was personally interested in establishing new ground rules whereby the struggle would be moderated and the stakes reduced.

Khrushchev did not openly advocate revision of the Constitution until the 21st Party Congress in 1959. Then, in the context of calling for more socialist democracy, he remarked:

In today's conditions, with our country entering a new and very important period of its development, the need has arisen for introducing certain amendments and additions to the Constitution of the USSR. More than 20 years have passed since its adoption, years crowded with events of world-historic significance. Socialism has emerged from the framework of one country and turned into a mighty world system. Important changes have taken place in the political and economic life of the Soviet Union. The building of Communist society has become an immediate practical task of the party and the people. All these tremendous changes in domestic life and the international situation should be reflected and legislatively affirmed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, the basic law of our state.[5]

By this time, the anti-party group had been routed and sufficiently reviled, the anti-Stalin campaign had been somewhat muted (possibly because it was a growing point of friction with the Chinese), and Khrushchev was in much firmer control of the party and state than he had been earlier—or was to be later. Nevertheless, he evidently still felt in 1959—apparently more strongly than the other members of the leadership—that the Constitution contained elements of Stalinism that must be expunged as part of the anti-Stalin campaign. No other speaker at the 21st Congress mentioned the need to revise the Constitution, but the Congress resolutions on Khrushchev's CC report included the following:

Certain amendments and additions should be introduced in the Constitution of the USSR. Since the Constitution was adopted, important changes have occurred in the political and economic life of the Soviet Union, and the international situation has also changed. All these changes should be reflected and registered by legislation in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.[6]

Since this period represented the zenith of Khrushchev's personal power in the Kremlin hierarchy, it can scarcely be doubted that he was directly responsible for inspiring this resolution in the face of the apparent coolness of the other hierarchs. Yet Khrushchev was unwilling (or unable) at this point to call for a totally new constitution and instead suggested "amendments and additions" would be appropriate.

No such substantive amendments or additions appeared in the years following Khrushchev's proposal. There did not seem to be much enthusiasm for the idea at the outset, and Khrushchev, the prime mover, turned his attention shortly thereafter to drafting a new Party Program, perhaps deciding that it would be a better vehicle for his policies.

From 1959 until the adoption of the new Party

[3] "Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 20th Party Congress," *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 15, 1956 (trans. in *Current Soviet Policies—II*, New York, Frederick Praeger, 1957, p. 54).

[4] *Current Soviet Policies—II*, p. 193.

[5] "On Control Figures for Development of the USSR National Economy in 1959-65," *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1959 (trans. in *Current Soviet Policies—III*, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1960, p. 71).

[6] *Pravda, Feb. 7, 1959 (in Current Soviet Policies—III*, p. 215).

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Program in 1961, Khrushchev did not publicly pursue the idea of rewriting the Constitution. The new Program, however, tended to bring up more forcefully than ever the question of constitutional obsolescence. The proclamation that the "current generation" of Soviet workers would actually enter the hallowed land of Communist society where the state would be in the final stages of withering away and Communist self-management would replace government made the Stalin Constitution seem, more than ever, an ideological relic of the past. Whereas the Constitution defined the USSR as "a socialist state of workers and peasants" and referred to the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the new Program redefined the state as a "state of the whole people" and declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat had given way to a new stage of the full-scale construction of communism.

It was only natural that Khrushchev, having staked a claim to ideological innovation with his destalinization speech at the 20th Congress and then with the new Party Program, would wish to rewrite a constitution that for most people was still connected with Stalin's name.[7] Scuttling Stalin's Constitution would serve to lower still further the prestige of the former *vozhd* and would thereby deal a frontal blow to the conservative, neo-Stalinist elements in the party. Furthermore, Khrushchev probably also had in mind that a new constitution, written while his personal power was declining but not openly challenged, would be credited to him as Stalin's successor and thus would greatly enhance his own authority and prestige. A Lenin Constitution, a Stalin Constitution, and now a Khrushchev Constitution—such a sequence would not merely put Nikita Sergeevich in very select company but carry the clear implication of equivalence. The legitimacy of his leadership would thereby be greatly strengthened, and his attempt to rise to a level of personal authority where he could no longer be effectively attacked by his rivals would gain added momentum. Finally, any new constitution would have to embody Khrushchev's ideas and could thus be a means of safeguarding the main lines of his policies against future attacks.

When the 22nd CPSU Congress met in October 1961, the main developments were the discussion and approval of the new Party Program and Party Rules and Khrushchev's renewed and now open attack on Stalin and Stalinism. In the midst of all this, scant attention was paid to the question of revising the 1936 Constitution, but Khrushchev did slip into his opening Central Committee report a rather puzzling reference to it. He remarked:

Great changes have occurred in the life of our country during the quarter-century that has passed since the adoption of the present USSR Constitution. The Soviet Union has entered a new stage of its development, and socialist democracy has been raised to a higher level. The new Constitution of the USSR, which we are beginning to draft, *must express the new characteristics in the life of Soviet society during the period of the full-scale construction of communism.*[8]

Up to that moment there had been no public announcement that a completely new constitution was even contemplated, let alone actually being drafted. Furthermore, Khrushchev's cryptic remark gave no indication of what agency or group was at work on the draft, or from where the drafters had received authority to undertake such an important task. In the past, constitutional revision had been undertaken only by publicly-constituted and duly authorized committees and had been accompanied by at least some public discussion of the issues involved. Given the fact that nothing further was said about the "new Constitution" until the Supreme Soviet session the following spring—when Khrushchev announced that "all conditions [now] exist for *undertaking* to work out the draft of the Soviet Constitution[9]—it seems likely that no work was actually being done on it at the time of the 22nd Congress. Most likely Khrushchev was simply testing the water and putting pressure on the more recalcitrant of his colleagues by implying that the draft of a new constitution would be forthcoming in the near future.

At the Supreme Soviet session in April 1962, as noted above, Khrushchev brought up the matter again, indicating that the decks were now cleared for action on drafting the new Constitution. He supported his proposal with the characteristic "Marxist-

[7] Ironically enough, it was Khrushchev himself who, alone among Stalin's leading cohorts, underscored this association on the occasion of the dictator's 70th birthday in 1949. Writing in *Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1949, he declared that "the victory of socialism found its expression in the new Constitution, which the people of the USSR rightly call the Stalin Constitution." (Trans. in *Current Soviet Policies*—II, pp. 4-5.)

[8] *XXII sezd kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskovo soiuza: stenograficheskii otchet* (22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Stenographic Record), Moscow, Gosizdat, 1962, Vol. 1, p. 119. (Emphasis added.)

[9] *Pravda* and *Izvestia* (Moscow), April 25, 1962 [trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter CDSP), Vol. XIV, No. 17, p. 15]. Emphasis added.

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Leninist" argument that a new stage of historical development required a new constitution which would mirror contemporary economic and social relations. As Khrushchev put it,

The constitution of a socialist state must change with the transition of society from one historical stage to another. . . . The chief provisions of the [Stalin] Constitution are now obsolete, do not reflect the changes that have occurred in the life of society in a quarter of a century, and do not conform to its present state.[10]

Khrushchev went on to argue that the transformations that had occurred since 1936 were too profound to "be taken fully into account by making individual changes" in the Constitution, and that any such attempt at piecemeal revision would merely amount to adding "new wings on an old building."

From Revision to Rewrite

This, in itself, marked a considerable change from Khrushchev's previous proposals for limited constitutional revisions, and the reasons for it were discernible in his account of the "basic tasks" of the future constitution. On the domestic scene, he indicated, the new constitution would "raise socialist democracy to a still higher level" and create "still stronger guarantees of the democratic rights and freedoms of the working people and guarantees of the strict observance of socialist legality"—phrases which can be interpreted as an indication that Khrushchev was seeking constitutional sanction for his policies of moderate and measured liberalization, including restrictions on the use of the secret police and other Stalinist forms of coercion. In the international sphere, the new constitution would include "formulations of the basic principles of the relations between [the Soviet] state and other states," and among these formulations would be the principle of "peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems" [11]—again a clear indication that Khrushchev envisaged using the projected constitution as a vehicle for establishing his policies as relatively permanent guidelines for the Soviet state.

In sum, it seems probable that Khrushchev saw the new constitution as a means of winning a substantive victory over his foreign and domestic enemies on a whole range of important policy questions. The issue of constitutional reform was, therefore, intimately connected with the increasingly intense leadership conflict from 1962 until Khrushchev's forced resignation in October 1964. That no draft constitution appeared during this interval can be seen retrospectively as one indication of the growing opposition to Khrushchev within the leadership.

In April 1962, however, Khrushchev was still firmly in the saddle. His proposal to draw up a new constitution was duly approved by the Supreme Soviet, and on the following day a Constitutional Commission was established, with Khrushchev as Chairman. The other 96 members of the Commission had a motley assortment of backgrounds and included the entire membership of the party Presidium and Central Committee Secretariat, plus a moderate sprinkling of model workers, lower-level administrators, and a few legal experts. From its composition it seems fairly certain that the Commission was never intended to sit together *en masse* to hammer out a new constitution, and even more certain that it would have been quite incapable of doing so despite the best of intentions.

Meanwhile there were prompt evidences of dissension within the leadership over the constitutional issue, in the form of differing interpretations placed on Khrushchev's proposal by *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. *Izvestia,* then edited by Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, faithfully echoed Khrushchev:

The fundamental task of the future constitution . . . consists in delineating the new stage in the development of Soviet society and the state, raising socialist democracy to a yet higher level, creating even stronger guarantees of democratic rights and freedoms for the working people and of the strict observance of socialist legality, and preparing the conditions for the transition to Communist social self-management. Working out the draft of the new constitution is a firm step on the path of the development and strengthening of our socialist democracy, democracy that is genuinely for the people and knows no bounds, democracy for all.[12]

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] The question of peaceful coexistence had, of course, been much debated in the polemics that arose out of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In this dispute Khrushchev was the advocate of redefining peaceful coexistence as a relatively fixed relationship between the Soviet Union and the West, while the Chinese, and presumably some Kremlin and East European conservatives, insisted on the old Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence as a temporary tactical maneuver during periods when capitalism achieves relative stability.

[12] April 28, 1962.

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Pravda, on the other hand, refrained from echoing Khrushchev's specific references to "democratic rights and freedoms" and stronger guarantees of "socialist legality" and instead issued a clear warning that the new draft must not depart from established Leninist tradition:

The new constitution must be a constitution of the all-people's socialist state, a constitution of the builders of communism. Fundamentally, work on it must be based on the great ideological legacy of V.I. Lenin—the creator of the first Soviet Constitution.[13]

Pravda's evident lack of enthusiasm for Khrushchev's emphasis on liberalization was curious in view of the fact that the paper was then edited by P. A. Satiukov, a staunch Khrushchev supporter who was later demoted to the editorial board of *Partiinaia zhizn* shortly after the First Secretary's fall. One can only surmise that Satiukov was outmaneuvered by the other, more conservative members of the *Pravda* editorial board.

There was no further publicity regarding the redrafting of the Constitution until June, when a brief announcement of the first meeting of the Constitutional Commission appeared. The announcement merely said that Khrushchev had "briefly set forth the basic tasks of the Commission in preparing the draft of a new USSR Constitution," and that the Commission had then organized itself into nine subcommissions to deal with such matters as "general political and theoretical questions" and "questions of social and state organization."[14] In contrast to the practice followed during the drafting of the 1936 Constitution, the size, composition, and chairmen of the subcommissions were not revealed; but it is likely that Khrushchev assumed the chairmanship of the Editorial Subcommission, just as Stalin had done in the earlier instance. The lack of publicity in 1962 almost certainly reflected friction within the leadership over the project.

In its obligatory editorial celebrating Constitution Day (December 5) in 1962, *Izvestia* noted that the Constitutional Commission "as is well known, has already begun its work," and a few weeks later, in an address commemorating the 40th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, then a Khrushchev supporter, stated that "the vast changes that have taken place in the life of Soviet society . . . will receive their legislative confirmation in the new USSR Constitution."[15] In the months that followed, however, there were no reports of any meetings of the Commission, and it is doubtful any took place.

In July 1963, an article commemorating the first Soviet Constitution (of 1918) mentioned that "today preparations are under way for the working out of a new USSR Constitution" which would be based on Khrushchev's proposals.[16] Still, there was no word of actual progress. An entire year passed with no published announcement of any activity by the Commission. Finally, on July 17, 1964, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* published identical accounts of a Commission meeting at which Khrushchev had spoken twice, once to report "on the recent work of the Commission," and once to make "some preliminary remarks concerning the principles on which the draft of the new Constitution of the Soviet Union should be based."[17] However, the published account of his "preliminary remarks" was so conspicuously vague that it seems to have been purposely designed to obscure whatever concrete proposals Khrushchev had put forward.

The July 17 *Pravda* and *Izvestia* account did reveal for the first time—albeit indirectly—the chairmen of seven of the nine subcommissions.[18] Five of the seven were full Politburo members: G. I. Voronov (Subcommission on Social and State Structure); L. I. Brezhnev (State Administration, Activity of the Soviets and Public Organizations); A. N. Kosygin (Economic Questions and Management of the National Economy); N. M. Shvernik (Questions of People's Control and Socialist Law and Order); and A. I. Mikoyan (Nationalities Policy and the National-State System[19]). The other two were B. N. Ponomarev, a Central Committee Secretary and specialist on international affairs (Foreign Policy and International Relations); and V. P. Yeliutin, Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education and member of the CPSU Central Committee (Science and Culture, Public Education, and Public Health). Understandably, there was no report from the Editorial Subcom-

[13] April 27, 1962.

[14] *Izvestia*, June 17, 1962 (*CDSP*, Vol. XIV, No. 24, p. 22).

[15] *Ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1962 (*CDSP*, Vol. XIV, No. 52, p. 42).

[16] *Pravda*, July 10, 1963 (*CDSP*, Vol. XV, No. 28, p. 37).

[17] Trans. in *CDSP*, Vol. XVI, No. 29, p. 23.

[18] Actually the account listed the names of those who had made progress reports for seven of the subcommissions. Although they were not explicitly listed as the chairmen of these subcommissions, it is highly unlikely that the progress reports would have been entrusted to any persons other than the respective chairmen.

[19] The designation of a non-Russian—in this case Mikoyan—to head the subcommission on nationalities policy was in keeping with established Soviet practice.

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mission, whose work would normally begin only after publication of a draft text; nor, apparently, was there any from the Subcommission on General Political and Theoretical Questions. Both these subcommissions were presumably chaired by Khrushchev.

Between July and the ouster of Khrushchev in October, nothing further was heard from the Constitutional Commission. The constitutional issue apparently did not figure as a major item on the bill of particulars against Khrushchev, though his initiative may very well have been considered an example of "harebrained scheming" or of "subjectivism" in his style of leadership.

From Khrushchev to Brezhnev

Khrushchev's removal naturally required a reshuffling of personnel at the upper reaches of the hierarchy, including the chairmanship of the Constitutional Commission. This change was effected at the next session of the Supreme Soviet in December 1964, which approved a proposal by Nikolai Podgorny that Khrushchev be relieved of his duties as Chairman in favor of Brezhnev. However, no other changes in the composition of the Commission were announced at this time, and it was evident that the new leadership intended to approach the question of constitutional revision with characteristic caution.

However, the image of liberalization which Khrushchev had evoked in his campaign for a new constitution did not die with his political demise. In February 1965, A. I. Lepeshkin, a member of the editorial board of the legal journal *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* who had earlier written in favor of democratizing the constitution, carried his argument further in the same journal,[20] calling on his "juridical science" colleagues to overcome the lag in their field caused by "the ideology and practice of the Stalin personality cult and the harmful concepts of Vyshinsky" and to work out "scientifically-based principles for apportioning jurisdiction between the USSR and the Union republics that could be used by the Constitutional Commission." The implication of this was that a new, less centralized form of "federal" structure might be required for the period of full-scale Communist construction which the Soviet Union was entering.

Another major highlight of the article was a strong plea for democratization of the political structure to be delineated in the new constitution. According to Lepeshkin, this should be accomplished mainly by expanding the network of soviets, increasing their authority, and safeguarding against the exercise of heavy-handed party guidance which often amounted to "substitution for or even supersedure of these bodies." [21] The author's most revolutionary proposal, however, concerned revision of the electoral system:

We should think about a certain improvement in present election practices that would enable voters to exercise their will better and more fully in the election of deputies to the soviets. . . . Numerous articles and proposals from readers of our magazine have raised the question of the advisability of allowing on the ballot not one but several candidates *nominated by the voters for election to a single vacant position of soviet deputy in a given election district.*[22]

None of these suggestions received any attention during the following months. Most probably, the new leadership rested on too tenuous a balance of forces to permit any major innovations in the constitutional structure. If the Lepeshkin article had been intended to keep the constitutional question alive, it clearly failed.

Rebirth of Reform?

Nothing further was heard on the issue until June 1966 when Brezhnev himself unexpectedly referred to the prospective new constitution in his "campaign" speech for a seat in the Supreme Soviet. The General Secretary declared:

The experience we have accumulated during the years of Soviet rule opens broad opportunities for the further improvement of socialist democracy. All the best things that the practice of state construction in our country has offered should be crystallized in the new USSR Constitution, which will crown the magnificent, half-century path of our country.[23]

Thus Brezhnev seemed to put himself on record as expecting the new Constitution to be completed by

[20] No. 2, 1965, pp. 5-14 (*CDSP*, Vol. XVII, No. 14, p. 3).

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

[23] *Pravda*, June 11, 1966 (CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 23, p. 16).

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the 50th anniversary of Bolshevik rule in November 1967, just 17 months away, and he also seemed to be embracing the Khrushchev line that the new Constitution should pave the way for a "further improvement of socialist democracy." The latter position especially appeared somewhat out of character for Brezhnev, who has generally been regarded as taking a conservative stand on the issue of political liberalization.[24] In the Supreme Soviet election campaign of June 1966, however, he was the only Soviet leader to mention the matter of constitutional reform, while Suslov in fact spoke approvingly of "the rights and freedoms of Soviet man as afforded by the [existing] Constitution." [25] Particularly puzzling was the silence of Podgorny, who as head of state might normally have been expected to be more directly concerned with constitutional reform than Brezhnev, and who generally appeared to be more liberally oriented than the General Secretary.

If, indeed, work had been under way on the new Constitution in June, as Brezhnev intimated in his election speech, then it was even more inexplicable that Premier Kosygin, in his formal government report to the Supreme Soviet in August, omitted any reference to the matter. One can probably conclude from this omission that Brezhnev, like Khrushchev before him, had merely intended his remarks to serve as a trial balloon. This hypothesis is also supported by the fact that the Constitutional Commission could hardly have been meeting either as a group or in subcommissions to continue its work, since it was still formally the same body that had been established in 1962 (except for Khrushchev's replacement by Brezhnev) and could no longer function owing to the deaths of several members and the demotion of quite a few others in the interim. Despite this, *Pradva*'s Constitution Day editorial (December 5, 1966) reiterated Brezhnev's timetable for a new constitution by the 50th anniversary of the Revolution and claimed that the document was "now" being worked out.

At the next session of the Supreme Soviet two weeks later, the membership of a reorganized Constitutional Commission was announced; the appointment of 33 new members once again brought the total membership to 97. The official announcement stated that the new members were elected "in place of members of this Commission who either have died or are not deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the present time." [26] This seemed to establish a new criterion for membership, since eight members of the original 1962 Commission had not been members of the Supreme Soviet when they were appointed. Apart from the fact that the composition of the reorganized Commission mirrored the changed fortunes of 26 living members of the 1962 body who had suffered political demotion under the post-Khrushchev leadership,[27] the only noteworthy change was a reduction in the number of members representing the legal profession to only two: A. F. Gorkin, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court; and R. A. Rudenko, USSR Procurator-General.

Announcement of the Commission's new make-up seemed to signify that a major effort would be made to fulfill Brezhnev's promise of a new constitution to "crown" the celebration of 50 years of Soviet rule. Even though only seven months remained before the anniversary, it could reasonably be expected that this interval would allow enough time for publication of a draft and the customary period of "public discussion" prior to formal enactment.

Reform in Limbo

These reasonable expectations were doomed to disappointment, however, for the December 1966 announcement brought the public record of the project to an abrupt and still unexplained end. From that time to the present, there has not been a single public reference to the question of constitutional revision, and in recent years the Stalin Constitution has been brought back into favor with ever firmer praise.

Signs of this policy reversal accumulated rapidly. In January 1967, the published text of the Central Committee resolution on the 50th anniversary contained not a word about a new constitution.[28] Even more ominous, none of the top party leaders—not even Brezhnev—mentioned constitutional revision in their March campaign speeches for the local soviet elections. In July the enactment of a new statute on the USSR ministerial structure, explicitly based on the existing 1936 Constitution, clearly indicated that it was not soon to be swept aside. Thus when Brezhnev avoided the issue in his 50th-anni-

[24] See, *e.g.*, "Brezhnev at Odds with Podgorny—Development of 'Socialist Democracy' *vs.* Secret Police Repression," Radio Liberty report, June 22, 1970.

[25] *Pravda*, June 8, 1966 (*CDSP*, Vol. XVIII, No. 24, p. 17).

[26] *Ibid.* and *Izvestia*, Dec. 20, 1966 (CDSP, Vol. XVIII, No. 51, p. 7).

[27] See Christian Duevel, "Constitutional Commission Reorganized," Radio Liberty report, Jan. 18, 1967.

[28] *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, Jan. 4, 1967 (*CDSP*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 pp. 11-14).

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versary keynote speech in November,[29] it was already quite plain that his earlier prediction of a new constitution was meant to be forgotten. (As an aid to forgetting the matter, Brezhnev's June 1966 statement was subsequently expunged from a two-volume compilation of his utterances.[30]) Finally, the abandonment of the revision project was clearly signaled by an *Izvestia* editorial on Constitution Day 1967:

On December 5th, the peoples of the Soviet Union observe Constitution Day, the day of our country's Fundamental Law, the document that reflects and consolidates the political gains of the working people and the democratic norms that have been established in the Soviet state. . . .[31]

In the absence of any hard evidence, the reasons that impelled the Brezhnev leadership to turn away from the revision project can only be a matter of conjecture. Initially, Brezhnev's motives for sponsoring the project were probably similar to those of Khrushchev earlier, since the same benefits in personal prestige would accrue to the new General Secretary. No less than his predecessor, Brezhnev needed some dramatic personal initiative to enlarge his authority within a still fluid Politburo leadership. But the very fact that a new constitution would benefit Brezhnev most of all probably aroused the suspicions of those Politburo members who preferred to keep him "first among equals" within the group. In this as in other cases, anything that strengthened Brezhnev's position could only serve to weaken the relative position of his Politburo colleagues.

There are also grounds for suspecting that Brezhnev himself had a change of heart. Let us suppose that sometime (most likely early) in 1967, the Constitutional Commission, or some leading part of it, met to begin drafting a new text. At some point in those discussions, Brezhnev's anomalous position would certainly have become apparent. From all we know about him, it seems clear that Brezhnev was not interested in liberalizing Soviet society. But any substantial revision of the Constitution would have to create at least the impression of "strengthening socialist democracy" and thus would foster the expectation of a liberal trend in the regime's policy. Brezhnev and his colleagues were well aware that Soviet dissident writers, and their intellectual supporters, had been appealing to the already existing "constitutional guarantees" of free speech and assembly. A new constitution for a society within reach of communism would have to strengthen socialist democracy in principle and would thus strengthen in fact the position of the dissident forces in Soviet society. And this Brezhnev did not want to do. Constitutional revision fitted the context of Khrushchev's relatively liberal policies, but it could only run counter to the conservative course that the Brezhnev leadership had chosen. The price of revision was apparently too high, even in return for the benefits that might eventually accrue to Brezhnev's personal account.

This concern was probably coupled in Brezhnev's mind with the fear that his conservative base of support within the leadership would be weakened if he pursued constitutional reform, thus upsetting the delicate balance of forces on which his power rested. It seems likely that, in the end, the combination of these factors caused Brezhnev to turn away from the idea early in 1967 and to avoid any further public references to it. It was hardly surprising that shortly after Brezhnev ignored the constitutional issue in his 50th-anniversary speech, a conservative party organ denied any need to replace the Stalin Constitution.[32]

Czechoslovakia and After

Thus, the pattern of retreat from liberal constitutional reform was already set as 1968 began. In the following months, developments in Czechoslovakia toward a more open and pluralistic socialism hardened the Brezhnev leadership's determination to avoid the consequences of liberalization at home. Obviously feeling the pressure of Czech events, the Soviet press dropped all mention of the constitutional rights of citizenship and increasingly emphasized the opposite theme of the citizen's obligations and responsibilities. *Pravda* drove the point home in an article of July 10, 1968, commemorating the adoption of the first (1918) Soviet Constitution:

There is not and there cannot be "pure democracy and freedom"; it is impossible to live in society and to be free from society. . . . Consequently, an indispensable part of the development of socialist democracy is the inculcation of political activeness, high idealism, and conscious self-discipline.

[29] *Ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1967 (*CDSP*, Vol. XIX, No. 44, pp. 3-20).

[30] L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom: rechi i stati* (The Leninist Course: Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, Vol. I, p. 434.

[31] Trans. in *CDSP*, Vol. XIX, No. 49, p. 10.

[32] See "*Agitator* Sees No Need for New Constitution," Radio Liberty report, Nov. 29, 1967.

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The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia a month later not only dealt a fatal blow to political liberalization in Czechoslovakia (and elsewhere in East Europe); it also drove home the last nail in the coffin of constitutional reform—and liberalization of any kind—in the USSR for years to come. The Brezhnev leadership was driven by worldwide condemnation (including criticisms from some foreign Communist parties) to find theoretical justifications for its intervention. Among the many formulas concocted for this purpose was the argument that a socialist society must maintain its monolithic ideological unity and vigilance in order to thwart subversive efforts by "imperialist" powers. If Czechoslovakia was to be indicted for its failure in this regard, then the Soviet Union had to be displayed as a contrasting model.

All of this was reflected in published references to the Stalin Constitution, implying that it remained the firm, legitimizing foundation of Soviet "socialist democracy" and a bulwark against the corrupting influences of "bourgeois ideals." Thus, on Constitution Day 1968, *Pravda* declared:

Socialist democracy, having received its legislative expression in the Soviet Constitution, includes both political and social rights. . . . The interests of socialism demand an active, aggressive struggle against the schemes of imperialist ideologists, who in recent times have attempted with particular zeal to discredit [our] *new social order and to proclaim the superiority of the bourgeois style of life.*[33]

Although the agitated tone has disappeared from more recent Soviet pronouncements, the essential message has remained that the present leadership does not intend to alter the Constitution, particularly in the direction of broadening and giving more substance to the individual rights of citizens. This is the obvious implication of *Pravda's* statement on Constitution Day 1969. "The Soviet people," it declared, "know that [the Constitution] not only proclaims but also guarantees in practice the widest political freedom and social rights for the working people." [34]

The failure of constitutional reform in the Soviet Union provides strong evidence of the cautious, conservative style of the post-Khrushchev leadership. With the memory of Czechoslovakia still lingering, with Khrushchev's "adventurist" failures not entirely forgotten, and with the persistent problem of maintaining its internal balance of power, the present Politburo has tried to solve problems individually and incrementally, shunning fundamental political changes such as constitutional reform. Brezhnev's address marking the Lenin centennial celebrations in April 1970 was a model of this approach. At one point he declared:

We shall never agree to the "development of democracy" that is being strongly recommended to us by bourgeois ideologists and their right-wing opportunist assistants, who are zealously trying to recast socialism in their own bourgeois mold. We have our own, truly democratic traditions, which have stood the test of time. We shall cherish and preserve these traditions; *we shall develop and improve them.*[35]

The Soviet Union, having passed its 50th birthday, has indeed developed its own traditions. While hardly "democratic" by Western standards, they do amount to a working arrangement between the regime and its citizens—an understanding that places approximate limits on both the citizens' permissible behavior and the regime's coercive power, and an understanding that includes the meaning of terms, like "socialist democracy," that are enshrined in such documents as the 1936 Constitution. Now, more than ever, there is no advantage for the Politburo in writing a new constitution. The present Constitution is already "the most democratic in the world"—on paper—and thus meets all the propaganda requirements of the regime. A new constitution, quite apart from all the difficulties the leadership would have in drafting it, could only create additional unsettling problems. How could it be "more democratic" without actually *being* more democratic?

Thus, despite the Marxian obsolescence of the present Constitution, and despite the assurances of two successive Politburo chieftains that it would be discarded, it seems more solidly entrenched than ever. There is not the slightest hint of any desire to replace it. The 1970 Supreme Soviet did not even bother to revise the membership of the 1966 Constitutional Commission, which by now includes quite a few unpersons. The message from Moscow seems to be: Constitutional reform is dead, long live the Constitution!

[33] *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1968.
[34] *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1969.
[35] *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, April 22, 1970 (*CDSP*, Vol. XXII, No. 16, p. 11). Emphasis added.

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Books

The Plight of the Minorities

By Roman Szporluk

EDWARD ALLWORTH, Ed.: *Soviet Nationality Problems.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.
MICHAEL BROWNE, Ed.:*Ferment in the Ukraine: Documents by V. Chornovil, I. Kandyba, L. Lukyanenko, V. Moroz and Others.* New York, Praeger, 1971.
ROBERT CONQUEST: *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities.* New York, Macmillian, 1970.
PAUL LENDVAI: *Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe.* Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1971.

RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLES of different language, culture, race or religion living within a single political system are usually a complicated and thorny matter, as various problems in a number of countries—including the United States, Canada, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Great Britain—emphatically attest. The Soviet Union, however, claims that it is an exception to the rule, comprising one big happy family in which ethnic and national "contradictions" have melted away in the common concern to build socialism. Notwithstanding the official stance, which is rooted in the imperatives of ideology and internal politics, there has been a continuous flow of evidence of minority problems throughout Soviet history. And small wonder, for the Soviet Union embraces some 80 nationalities, no less than 20 of which number one million or more members. In this conglomerate, the Russians now constitute a bare majority of 53 percent, and demographic trends of the last decade have indicated that their relative numerical strength—along with that of Slavs in general—is declining. At the same time, the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR have become increasingly vocal in asserting and expressing their ethnic concerns. Such developments have generated growing interest in Soviet nationality policy in recent years; specialists in various fields related to Communist studies are asking themselves—and each other—how serious the nationality problem in the USSR really is and what new approaches might be devised to make its study more systematic and objective.

A MAJOR PRODUCT of such interest is *Soviet Nationality Problems,* a collection of essays by several noted authorities on the Soviet Union which emerged from a special research seminar sponsored by Columbia University. The volume's editor is Professor Edward Allworth, who also contributes a methodological introductory essay and a chapter on problems of bibliography. He explains that the project was planned as an attempt to bring together specialists not only from the traditional disciplines such as history and law, but also from fields which in the past have been less influential in Soviet nationality studies—*e.g,* demography, anthropology, and sociology. In Professor Allworth's view, both scholars and policy-makers in the US have long failed—and are still failing—to pay sufficient attention to the Soviet nationality question. In the past, he remarks, "our Russian specialists, in whatever disciplines, were . . . often impatient, as they are today, with this new concern for non-Russians in the USSR. The government of the United States remained virtually blind to the existence of race or nationality anywhere." His view is echoed in an essay contributed by Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who holds that American scholars "generally have minimized the significance of the nationality problems of the Soviet Union," while "in the American government planning process" discussion of the subject has been "almost non-existent."

This lack of interest becomes a little more understandable when one learns that historically the Russians themselves have paid scant attention to nationality and

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minority issues. Professor Marc Raeff points out in his contribution that before the 1917 Revolution "Russian society remained unaware of the state's having become a multinational empire" and that Russian historiography virtually ignored the subject. Even the great historian, V. O. Kliuchevsky "hardly acknowledged the fact that Russia comprised a multinational imperial polity." Thus, the Russians apparently surpassed the English, who had built their empire, it used to be said, in a fit of absentmindedness—for the Russians failed even to notice that they possessed an empire after they had acquired it.

Which groups of the non-Russian population tend to take a nationalist stand and how strong are they in comparison with those favoring assimilation? Professor Brzezinski advances a "tentative generalization" that the "intellectuals, the humanists, the pseudo-intellectuals (school teachers, run-of-the-mill journalists and the like)" tend to be nationalistic, while the assimilationists include "the engineers, technicians, scientists, . . . the modernizing elite." The latter, argues Brzezinski, maintain closer relationships with the Russians than the humanists. If the Soviet Union continues to grow economically, there will be "more . . . assimilation and perhaps more intensive . . . Russification."

If Brzezinski is right, then a gradual assimilation of the non-Russian nationalities will occur as a side effect of their modernization. This is a hypothesis that warrants further exploration and testing. At the same time, the possibility should not be excluded that the non-Russian elites will develop their own formula for modernization as an alternative to the Moscow program, with its heavy emphasis on the eventual fusion of all Soviet peoples into a single homogenized nation. The obstacles to such fusion have been suggested, at any rate, in the case of one major national minority—the Tatars. Several recent Soviet studies have found that among the non-Russian members of the "scientific-technical" intelligentsia in the Tatar Republic, there exists a tendency to perceive "interpersonal conflicts" (involving work conditions, promotions, salaries, etc.) as nationality conflicts. Some Tatars are also said to evaluate their relative success or failure at the higher educational level in nationality terms. Thus, besides the traditional xenophobia of the unschooled minority member—attributable to backwardness, cultural and religious distinctiveness, and isolation—there apparently exists a "modernizers' nationalism" among the educated and professional sectors of the Tatar population. (Professor Zev Katz drew attention to this phenomenon in his important article on Soviet sociology in the May-June 1971 issue of this journal.)

Such findings obviously cannot be generalized, however. The non-Russian Soviet nationalities differ enormously in size, location, degree of modernization, and attitudes. In an attempt to work out a method of evaluating the potential of individual peoples for self-perpetuation, Professor Vaclav Lamser identifies various indicators, including—besides those just mentioned—the proportion of the national population variously employed in agriculture, manufacturing and industry, material services, human services such as education and health, and information and communication. Among other factors influencing the survival potential he cites the level of urbanization and the relative strength of "cultural institutions and personalities" (such as theaters, film production, and the cadres of writers, artists and composers). Some numerically small peoples—notably in Siberia—are totally cut off from contacts with other non-Russians. On the other hand, certain peoples inhabit peripheral regions of the USSR and are thus less isolated and more open to external—*e.g.*, East European—influences. Only a combination of all such data can sug-

Reviewers in this Issue

ROMAN SZPORLUK—Associate Professor of History at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor): editor of *Russia in World History: Selected Essays by M. N. Pokrovskii,* 1970.

RICHARD M. MILLS—Associate Professor of Political Science at Fordham University; past contributor to these pages and to other studies on Soviet affairs.

HELEN DESFOSSES COHN—Associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.); author of *Soviet Policy Toward Black Africa: Focus on National Integration,* 1972.

WERNER E. KLATT—O.B.E., former economic adviser at the British Foreign Office and currently a Fellow of St. Antony's College (Oxford); editor of and contributor to *The Chinese Model,* 1965; currently engaged in a study of agricultural development in Asia.

ZVI Y. GITELMAN—Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor); author of the forthcoming *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917-30.*

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gest the likely effect of social mobility and migration on the nationalities. Large nationalities, like the Ukrainians, are capable of "evolving diversified institutions" and providing wide opportunities for social mobility, Lamser says, and they should therefore be able to maintain their "key positions" whether the central regime's nationality policy veers toward mildness or toughness. The medium and small nationalities will face the choice—to the extent there is any option—of developing their own modern framework or merging into a larger entity.

This larger entity does not necessarily have to be Russian. Professor Alexandre Bennigsen poses the question of whether national consciousness among the Soviet Muslims, for example, is limited to the separate Uzbek, Chechen, or Karakalpak nations, or whether they consider themselves as belonging to "Turkistan, or the Turkic race, or even to Islam in general." The issue is a serious one because, as he points out, the demographic trends in the Soviet Union show an exceptionally high growth of Turkic and Iranian groups. Soon after it came to power, the Soviet government underscored its opposition to pan-Muslim tendencies by proscribing the use of a common Turkic language and establishing a number of separate republics among the Turkic peoples. In Bennigsen's words, these republics "have become realities," and their existence as governmental units is "necessary for the non-Russian bureaucratic and political cadres." However, since World War II there has emerged a large non-Russian intelligentsia filled "with a strong desire to rediscover the national past," which is "a common Muslim past." Bennigsen is not sure whether several larger regional groups or a "Turkistanian" or "pan-Turkic" group will emerge. At any rate, he does not foresee the Turkic peoples becoming Russian or merging with the Russians and others in a "pan-Soviet" nation.

The demographic problems of Central Asia (and the USSR at large) are examined by Professor Robert A. Lewis, who analyzes the process of Russian "mixing" with the Soviet nationalities in terms of how it affects and/or is affected by "Russification, urbanization, and labor-force characteristics." Central Asia has, of course, been one of the principal areas of Russian in-migration. According to 1959 census results, the Kirgiz, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens comprise only a small proportion of the urban population there, while the Russians constitute the most numerous group, thus making the cities linguistically and culturally Russian. There is little rural-urban migration, and the rural population, growing rapidly in Central Asia, is accumulating on the land. Professor Lewis anticipates that by the 1980's economic pressures will force the rural population to move—and if Russians continue to monopolize the jobs in the cities, many rural migrants will have to go to "labor-deficit areas elsewhere in the USSR, such as Siberia or the Urals." With non-Russians and Russians competing for jobs and scarce resources, economic tension should grow; at the same time, as the nationalities develop economically and educationally, they should be in a position to make more demands upon the Soviet government. Under these circumstances, Professor Lewis predicts that Soviet nationality problems will almost certainly intensify and collectively become a dominant force shaping the future Soviet society.

Whether these major demographic, social and economic difficulties are perceived as an issue involving relations between *nations* will largely depend on the attitude of the elites. According to Professor Paula G. Rubel, even a numerically small nationality may be capable of developing its own "modern framework" while maintaining its separate cultural identity. As an example, she points out that at the turn of the 20th century members of the Kalmyk elite who had a Russian education developed a cultural "amalgam" which over time came to serve as "a vehicle for the maintenance of Kalmyk identity." She believes that the local elites may play a "pivotal role in determining the future course of nationality events"—and in this context, she argues that "a shift of allegiance by the indigenous elite . . . from a local frame of reference to a union-wide one" could be produced by giving it "a stake in political control and decision-making" while preserving its local leadership role.

This kind of authority, however, the central party leaders have consistently refused to grant. As Professor John Hazard comments in his essay, "Statutory Recognition of Nationality Differences," there has been constant—but not very successful—pressure from the republics for formal expansion of their role in policy-making. In terms of statutory prospects, it is doubtful that the tentatively proposed new Soviet constitution—if and when it should materialize—will enlarge the powers delegated to the republics.

Even if the Soviet leaders were to decide to risk a "constitutional debate" over the future form of

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government (which is unlikely), they would certainly rule out federalization along the lines adopted in Yugoslavia and insist on what Professor Rubel calls a union-wide "frame of reference." Such a solution might be enforced but would hardly be happily embraced by the non-Russian nationalities. The idea of a union of socialist republics made sense to them as long as it was assumed that the USSR would be gradually expanded to incorporate other nations entering socialism. Since the postwar establishment of the "people's democracies" as separate entities, however, it has been harder for the Moscow center to explain why socialism should mean to the non-Russian peoples of the USSR the denial of national statehood and the prospect of eventual dissolution in an all-Soviet, but Russian-speaking, "nationality." To jump ahead to some relevant remarks by Robert Conquest in *The Nation Killers* (more on which shortly), instead of a world state or a federation of socialist states, we now see in the Communist world "two great empires" whose frontiers, established in the presocialist, imperialist past, separate the Turkic and Mongol peoples. Yet "if there can be a Communist Russia and a Communist China," Conquest adds, "one might ask why there could not be a Communist Turkestan."

WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT for a book entitled *Ferment in Turkestan* or *Dissent in Uzbekistan* to find out if Conquest's question has occurred to anyone in Soviet Central Asia. *Ferment in the Ukraine*—a collection of documents edited with outstanding care and accuracy by Michael Browne—shows what happened when a similar question occurred to some citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. There was nothing technically illegal or un-Soviet in asking this question, at least according to the provisions of the Soviet Constitution, which guarantees to the union republics the right to secede from the USSR. However, the political authorities and the KGB took a different position. At a secret trial in 1961 in Lvov, seven Ukrainians of peasant or working-class origin, all Soviet-educated (they included members of the CPSU), were convicted and sentenced to long prison terms on charges of having organized a conspiracy for the overthrow of the Soviet government and a secession of the Ukraine from the Soviet Union. The defendants denied the charges, though they admitted that in view of the Soviet regime's failure to respect the Ukraine's political and cultural rights, they had considered the formation of a *legal* organization to advocate the Ukraine's secession from the Union and its establishment as an independent socialist state like Poland or Hungary. In another trial of "separatists," also held in secret in 1961, 20 men were tried and two death sentences carried out.

Besides providing documentation relating to these early cases, the Browne volume devotes major attention to a wave of arrests and trials of Ukrainian intellectuals that occurred in 1965–66. In the latter crackdown the accused were charged with the "dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda" and "agitation" rather than with "separatism." Their "crime" was that they had issued protests against KGB and judicial violations of Soviet criminal law and procedure, such as the holding of secret trials, the application of pressure to get incriminating confessions, and other violations of human rights. While the dissenters had not directly raised the issue of national independence, they had also criticized Soviet cultural, economic and social policies (*e.g.*, organized migrations to and from the Ukraine) which they felt were designed to weaken and dilute the distinct Ukrainian culture and nationality. The volume offers as much evidence as it can on the fate of these dissenters. It also includes writings that originated in Soviet prison camps, most notably the remarkable "Report from the Beria Reserve" by the young Ukrainian historian Valentyn Moroz.* Finally, it includes documents that reflect continuing public concern over official repression—for example, a letter of protest against KGB methods signed by 139 Ukrainian writers, scientists, workers, engineers, etc., addressed directly to Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny in Moscow.

The aforementioned book by Robert Conquest—a revised edition of a work first published in 1961 under the title, *The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*—contains previously unknown information on the notorious mass transfers of Soviet minorities in the years 1941-44. The need for an updated version is illustrated, *inter alia*, by the fact that at the time Conquest first wrote on this subject, the world did not even know about the deportation of one minority—the Meskhetians, a small national group which until 1943 lived near the Turkish border. Conquest reports that the Meskhetians, along with the Cri-

* An abridged text of Moroz' work was published in *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1968, pp. 84-90.—Eds.

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mean Tatars and Volga Germans, still have not been allowed to return to their old lands. He describes recent stirrings among some of these peoples for the restoration of their rights—though apparently the Germans have refrained so far from demanding the resurrection of the Volga Republic (could they be harboring latent hopes of a "return" to Germany?).

Unlike the Allworth volume which is quiet and restrained in tone ("forced migrations are not unknown in the USSR"), Conquest and Browne write with obvious emotion about deeds of violence and arbitrariness: the forced deportations of entire ethnic groups, in which thousands of children perished; the continued prohibition of some peoples from living where they want; the disregard by the KGB of Soviet law in its efforts to stifle nationality protest. These phenomena not only raise the question of the place which law occupies in the USSR but invite comment on the general character of the Soviet system. Conquest regards the Soviet treatment of nationalities as symptomatic of "the entire range of Soviet political, social and cultural actions"; the constitutional rights of the nationalities are disregarded simply because "the interests and desires of the Politburo in Moscow must have precedence over theirs." He adds the further comment that the year 1968 showed the situation of the Czechoslovaks to be essentially identical with that of the Tatars. A similar point is made in the Allworth volume by Vaclav Lamser, when he states that the Soviet nationality question was "extended" from the USSR to the Warsaw Pact countries in 1968.

THE LATTER PROPOSITION also underlies the main argument of Paul Lendvai's *Anti-Semitism without Jews*. Lendvai asserts that the anti-Semitism of the Soviet "bureaucratic dictatorship" is rooted "in the peculiarly Russian traditions of prejudice and chauvinism." It was the Soviet party and secret police, he says, which introduced the East European Communist parties to the practice of using the "Jewish question" in internal power struggles. He sees a direct link between the Stalinist pogrom of the Soviet Jews in the late 1940's and early 1950's and the anti-Semitic aspects of the East European purges and trials of those years. The main focus of his study, however, is the period 1967–69. In analyzing the course of events in different countries, Lendvai does not deny that popular anti-Semitism exists in East Europe; he merely argues that it was not this sentiment but rather a matter of deliberate policy decisions in the various party hierarchies that resulted in the persecution of the Jews in Poland and, conversely, the absence of a "Jewish question" in Hungary and Romania.

In Lendvai's view, just as the anti-Semitism of Tsarist Russia has influenced Soviet policies, so "integral" nationalism in Poland has survived and influenced the Communist Party there. Interestingly, he refers to a report—issued shortly after the Czechoslovak-Soviet talks at Cierna—that when Kosygin saw Frantisek Kriegel among the Czechoslovak delegates, he reacted with the remark, "What is this Jew from Galicia doing here?" For the student of East European history, these words recall a precedent: in a 1925 account, the prominent Polish statesman and nationalist, Roman Dmowski—describing his work in London during World War I—similarly referred disparagingly to a junior employee of the British Foreign Office (the future Sir Lewis Namier) as "the little Jew from Galicia." It seems more than curious that the leading theorist of modern Polish nationalism and the head of the Soviet government 43 years later singled out the same epithet to belittle opponents.

While Lendvai does not mention this particular incident, he refers to Dmowski a number of times in discussing the link between East European nationalism and contemporary communism. The rightist Dmowski, Lendvai suggests, found spiritual heirs among some of the leading Communists in Poland. As confirmation of this assertion, Lendvai points to an article published in 1968 which was written by a high-ranking party ideologist, Andrzej Werblan. In the article, Werblan analyzed the roots of the 1967-68 Jewish "crisis" in Poland and argued that because the prewar Polish Communist party, working underground, had too many Jews in its ranks and too few ethnic Poles, it had been insensitive to Polish national feelings and interests. One wonders if Werblan was intimating that the prewar Communists should have had a Jewish *numerus clausus* in their admission policy. By implication, at any rate, the article seemed to suggest that the nationalists who demanded Jewish (and other "alien") quotas in college admissions, professions, etc.—a standard item in their propaganda before 1939—had in a way been right.

It is absolutely clear, in any event, that the Jewish participants in the student demonstrations of 1968, in which hundreds of non-Jews were involved, were singled out for special treatment by the Communist authorities. What is

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more, their parents were promptly and publicly exposed as the "real" instigators of the trouble, summarily dismissed from their jobs, expelled from the party, etc.; and all this happened before any legal proceedings, investigations, or trials could take place.

There is a general significance in this episode, therefore, that warrants mentioning it together with Soviet nationality problems. The Polish case showed how lofty constitutional declarations on the equality of all citizens could be thrown overboard, and how certain citizens of the state could be declared to be particularly prone to disloyalty and lack of patriotism just because of their " background." Concomitantly, such clear provisions of law as the principle that only the courts can find a man guilty were waived in Poland—though on a smaller scale than in the USSR—with respect to an arbitrarily selected group of people. Together, the Soviet and Polish cases raise the question whether anybody's rights can be secure under authoritarian systems.

To sum up, the works of Browne, Conquest and Lendvai usefully complement the essays assembled by Allworth; for they remind us that the processes of change, modernization, social mobility, migration, and the rise of elites do not take place in a sociological vacuum—that when we talk about Tatars or Ukrainians, or Jews or Meskhetians, we are talking about human beings who have been subjected to violent, brutal and often irrational policies in the name of the search for a socialist Utopia.

Lysenkoism: The Un-Science

By Richard M. Mills

DAVID JORAVSKY: *The Lysenko Affair*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.

IN RECENT YEARS there has been a sharp increase in studies on the fascinating and complex relationship of science, philosophy, ideology, and politics in the Soviet Union. Siegfried Mueller-Markus, Zhores Medvedev, Loren Graham, and others have analyzed a number of interesting problems of this nature.[1] In a related effort, David Joravsky has exhaustively, judiciously, stimulatingly and sometimes angrily investigated the events, issues, institutions, processes and personalities associated with the fate of Trofim D. Lysenko. Lysenko, it will be remembered, championed the concept of agrobiology—a problem-solving approach in agriculture and biology which was based on the idea that practical intuition ought to replace the more traditional and exacting methods of research and verification.

The major point of Joravsky's study is that, given the right circumstances, normally harmless cranks can come to dominate important sectors of a society.[2] It was toward the late 1920's that Lysenko and others—notably, the plant-breeder Michurin—began to air claims that they had solved a number of agricultural problems by using practical intuition alone, consciously avoiding the scientific testing of their results. From the outset, it should have been apparent that their aversion to science was tied to the fact that these men either had no training in scientific methodology or were incapable of conducting a disciplined discussion on the level of theory.

Yet Lysenko nonetheless achieved a position of dominance. How? Joravsky notes that cranks characteristically operate on the basis of the willful self-assurance that their efforts will produce quick positive results in the practical realm. This self-assurance precludes any tolerance of princi-

[1] See, *e.g.*: S. Mueller-Markus, *Einstein und die Sowjet-Philosophie: Krisis einer Lehre* (Einstein and Soviet Philosophy: Crisis of a Doctrine), Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1960-66, 2 vols. Z. Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko*, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1969; *The Medvedev Papers*, London, Macmillan, 1971. L. Graham, *Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union*, New York, Knopf, 1971. George Fischer, Ed., *Science and Ideology in Soviet Society*, Chicago, Aldine, 1967.

[2] A crank is defined in Webster's *Dictionary* as "a person with a fanciful, impractical or crackbrained obsession or project."

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pled criticism by qualified experts. Of course, to survive and thrive, the crank needs the support of the powers that be. Lysenko's refusal to allow testing of either his methods or their propagandistically proclaimed practical results coincided almost perfectly with the methods and attitudes of Stalin and the agricultural bureaucracy during the period of collectivization and for some years thereafter.

When the political leadership chose to gamble on people like Lysenko, it was not influenced primarily by ideology, as has sometimes been thought in the West, nor was it in the least interested in reasoned debate among biologists in the realm of theory. The Stalinist bureaucracy allied itself with the likes of Lysenko in the hope of producing quick and dramatic results through an exercise of the will. In so doing the leadership defied the more cautious approach recommended by the real scientists, who were aware of the dangers inherent in Lysenko's methods and of the dubiousness of his conclusions.

The gamble was undertaken on the basis of Stalin's famous dictum about the relationship of theory to practice, which Joravsky applies to the Lysenko case as follows: "Practical success in agriculture is the ultimate criterion of truth in biological science." In actual fact, however, Lysenko produced little of any practical value and, indeed, much that was harmful; yet he managed to get away with it for a surprisingly long time.[3] If one asks why, the answer must inevitably be another question: How did Stalin and the agricultural bureaucracy themselves get away with similar practices for so long?

Ultimately, the answer to both questions probably relates to the momentum of the enthusiasm generated and/or consciously evoked in the course of any radical program of modernization. Joravsky suggests: "The modernization of a backward country seems to require some irrational enthusiasm and force, which are very difficult to measure out in usefully moderate doses." These phenomena can be blinders to rationality and even common sense.

BUT THERE IS another reason explaining Lysenko's protracted influence. Although shared enthusiasm and willfulness may have motivated the regime's initial endorsement of Lysenko, the alliance was also marked by a caution that was very characteristic of Stalin. He held back from total support of agrobiology, thereby postponing for many years the full-blown application of Lysenkoism and the full impact of its disastrous practical results. Aware of Stalin's hesitancy, the Central Committee's ideological establishment devoted its efforts to an attempt to arrange a compromise between agrobiology and science, the effect of which was to prevent an early Lysenko victory. At the same time, the support Lysenko received from the party and state agricultural bureaucracy ensured him a continuing position of influence. The combination of Stalin's partial support and the split between the ideological and agricultural establishments perpetuated this situation for some two decades, until the period 1948–52, when Stalin finally switched to an all-out endorsement of Lysenko's methods and thereby precipitated the full realization of their failure. Thereafter Lysenko's star began to wane, to the accompaniment of an interesting turnabout in bureaucratic support: now the agricultural establishment became critical, and the ideologues came to his defense.

In other words, concomitant with all the braggadocio and ideological posturing regarding agriculture that attracted so much attention abroad, the political leadership *and* the ideological and agricultural bureaucracies were all—at one time or another and to some degree—beset by a nagging doubt that the scientists might, after all, be correct in their contention that there were no easy answers. That reserve grew out of the respect for science and specialists that was part of the Bolshevik heritage, but it became submerged in another part of the same heritage, the wave of obligatory optimism in the face of enormous tasks, in this case the task of achieving rapid progress in agriculture.

The tension between the elements of politically-motivated optimism and more pragmatically-grounded reserve left the locus of "scientific truth" in question. Here is another theme of the book. Who could lay claim to the real truth: the autonomous scientific communities patiently toiling away at study, research, criticism, experimentation and validation in terms of their own demanding criteria, or the political leadership

[3] To cite the major negative consequences of Lysenko's activity: for decades the development of Soviet biology and agricultural science was arrested because no meaningful research could be done using his methods; for at least a generation, miseducated "specialists" controlled biological education; and during the same period, colossal efforts were misdirected into discussing and applying ideas on a fairly wide scale that had not been tested adequately beforehand—such as soaking seed grain before sowing, and when that did not produce the promised results, freezing the grain. There was a succession of similarly unsuccessful experiments.

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striving to transform the society at large?

Under Stalin there was a deliberate refusal to distinguish between political and technical authority. Soviet agriculture was belatedly extricated from this totalitarian blind alley by the crudely utilitarian outlook of the post-Stalin leaders and agricultural bureaucrats. Their position was that truth in agriculture is determined by the number of poods produced. This was actually a return to Stalin's criterion of practice as related to theory, but now it was being applied against a background of considerable negative experience with Lysenkoism over several decades. It was a case of the regime's learning the hard way—by trial and error, slowly, and on a stupendous scale—that for very practical reasons the two types of authority had to be separated and professional autonomy granted to the biologists.

One of Joravsky's most sensitive portrayals is of the biologists and other scholars who opposed Lysenko. Each fought in his own way and set his own limits on the duration and intensity of the struggle in terms of the way he read the signals emanating from the political decision-makers—a gripping study in esoteric political communication. On a more mundane level of communication, Lysenko's opponents were hampered by his wily use of the press to keep himself (and agrobiology) in the limelight. Through feeding wide-eyed reporters tales of tomorrow's breathtaking achievements, he not only made good copy but also succeeded for a long time in dampening the efforts of his opponents, who never could produce a public relations counterweight to the cumulative effect of hortatory *Pravda* articles on Lysenko.

Some opponents were repressed, others compromised or were converted, and some survived more or less intact by means of a variety of strategems and dodges. Joravsky successfully conveys the richness, variety and resiliency that the Soviet scholarly community managed to retain despite the maelstrom through which it was forced to pass.

For those who remained after the passing of Lysenkoism the task of overcoming the negative consequences of this cult was not easy. Lysenkoism was firmly in control in secondary education in biology and had influenced university studies, with the result that, as Joravsky puts it, ignorance perpetuated itself.

Yet despite the far-reaching influence of Lysenko's ideas, the decision made in 1964 to have done with Lysenkoism once and for all hardly caused a ripple. With no fanfare, no denunciations, a reversal of major significance was received with paradoxical equanimity. Joravsky's explanation is that this made it possible for the regime to eschew an explicit official recognition that political control over biology had resulted in costly failure.

The conclusion seems to be that in the Soviet Union changes are made as necessity eventually dictates, but in sensitive areas change is deliberately kept incremental. Lysenko's rise, just as his decline, was characterized by gradual change. He was able to ride the crest of the enthusiasm for modernization, but his rise was anything but meteoric, characterized as it was by the infighting between the agrobiologists and the scientists and by the interplay between Stalin and the bureaucracies. Once discredited, he fell, too, like the old soldier—simply by fading away.

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Shifting Soviet Assessments of Africa

By Helen Desfosses Cohn

ROBERT LEGVOLD: *Soviet Policy in West Africa.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.
V. G. SOLODOVNIKOV: *Afrika vybiraet put* (Africa Chooses a Path). Moscow, Nauka, 1970.
V. G. SOLODOVNIKOV, A. B. LETNEV, P. I. MANCHA, Eds.: *Politicheskie partii Afriki* (Political Parties of Africa). Moscow, Nauka, 1970.

ROBERT LEGVOLD'S work, *Soviet Policy in West Africa,* represents the first detailed study of Soviet involvement in Africa to consider both the theoretical and pragmatic aspects of the policy continuum. In proceeding chronologically to review Soviet contacts with colonial Africa, and then to emphasize the crucial period 1960–68, Legvold reveals his basic methodological concern: to juxtapose Soviet assessment and response in order fully to elucidate the process of policy formation. The task is difficult and involved. But the author's premise is that every aspect of Soviet behavior must be investigated; in his words, the task cannot "be skirted by arguing that the content of policy is essentially the exchange of parliamentary delegations, the work of an embassy first secretary, or the conclusion of a new agreement on economic cooperation—forgetting a *Pravda* article on the single-party system in Guinea, a radio broadcast to Africa on the Ivory Coast's collaboration with imperialism, or a special remark made by Khrushchev on African socialism." (p. 145)

The arduousness of Legvold's undertaking is underscored by two considerations: 1) the frequent vacillations in Soviet African policy, and 2) the voluminous nature of Soviet writings and commentary on Africa. Regarding zigzags in Moscow's policy, consider the Soviet reaction to pro-capitalist regimes—*e.g.*, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. In 1960–62, when the Soviet Union was confident that the progressive, "non-capitalist" tide would prevail in West Africa, the Francophilism of certain former French colonies was vigorously attacked. The hostility of Soviet commentary was tempered only by the premise that imperialist "collaborators" such as Léopold Senghor and Félix Houphouet-Boigny (respectively presidents of Senegal and the Ivory Coast) would soon succumb to the overwhelming attraction of the socialist path.

However, by mid-1962, even vanguard states such as Guinea seemed to be lost to the attractions of Western aid and/or to the efforts of Communist China to limit Moscow's participation in the Afro-Asian movement. In light of this perfidious behavior, the triumph of socialism no longer seemed so inevitable—nor did the steady course of bourgeois African regimes seem so reprehensible. For if the progressive states could not be trusted to provide proof of the pull of Marxism-Leninism and to serve as constant allies in Moscow's search for a presence in sub-Saharan Africa, then expanded contacts with a variety of states were necessary to ensure the satisfaction, at least, of the latter goal. Toward this end, the Soviet Union concluded a number of diplomatic, cultural and economic agreements with Senegal in June 1962.

Legvold notes that by 1963 Khrushchev's fear of being outflanked by the revolutionary rhetoric of the Chinese was a determining influence on Soviet policy. One week after Chou En-lai's visit to Africa, Khrushchev lent his ideological imprimatur to the unorthodox and sometimes bizarre efforts to achieve socialism being undertaken by Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Modibo Keita in Mali. This type of loose endorsement contributed, of course, to Khrushchev's eventual ouster. At the same time, he also showed increasing toleration of states on the "capitalist" path—a policy that was expanded by his successors.

Soviet analysts did indulge in a form of neo-Khrushchevian smugness in early 1966 when it seemed that military coups were confined to pro-Western, capitalist states (*e.g.*, Dahomey, the Central

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African Republic, Niger, Upper Volta, Congo-Brazzaville, etc.). However, less than six weeks after Soviet commentators concluded that these coups reflected a systemic weakness of capitalist states, and a "swing to the left" in Africa, Nkrumah was ousted by the Ghanaian Army. In 1968, Mali's Keita was overthrown. These setbacks to Africa's revolutionary potential intensified a tendency on the part of the Soviet leaders to lose interest in events on that continent. Their growing indifference, originally inspired by their desire to concentrate on domestic needs and to restrict their overseas efforts to potentially more rewarding areas of the world, had the interesting effect of bringing about a relative upgrading of the more moderate African states in Moscow's policy. In Legvold's words, Moscow began "emphasizing less the nature of the regime than the intrinsic importance of the country." (p. 302) The capitalist African states, with their impressive rates of economic growth (*Afrika* . . ., p. 147), thus assumed greater significance in Moscow's eyes.

THE PRAGMATISM and objectivity which this switch indicates is also noticeable in the corpus of Soviet writings on Africa. Legvold is certainly correct in stating that Soviet scholars and officials are likely to be more frank in private conversations than in publications. Nevertheless, even a cursory survey of the literature reveals significant differences in tone, methodology and emphasis between earlier Soviet works and those under consideration here. Whereas Ivan Potekhin, the first Director of the USSR Africa Institute, was quite obviously impelled to provide some substantiating framework for the concerns of officialdom, the writings of his successor, V.G. Solodovnikov, reveal a comparatively greater concern with consistency and scholarship. Admittedly, this is in large part a result of the present regime's downgrading of Africa on the Soviet scale of foreign policy priorities. However, the shift also reflects a concern on the part of Soviet Africanists to enhance their stature in international circles and to join the ever-increasing number of scholars involved in outlining viable political and economic programs for countries in the Third World.

These concerns have produced a more noticeable emphasis in Soviet scholarship on evaluating local conditions in order to assess the workability of ideological precepts. Analysis of African social strata has provided somber evidence—from the Communist viewpoint—of real barriers to "non-capitalist" development. Although the local bourgeoisie is still economically and politically weak, and African countries do have a very active leftist intelligentsia, corruption and bureaucratism are rife. Nor is there much chance of a working union of the peasantry and the proletariat. To quote Solodovnikov, the peasantry is still "politically unaware" and subject to the machinations of "secular and spiritual feudals," while the working class is numerically insignificant (comprising only one to one-and-one-half percent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa) and "fundamentally composed of migrant workers." The possibilities for organization and political consciousness among such groups are extremely limited. (*Afrika* . . ., p. 85; *Politicheskie*, p. 8)

The nature of the class structure in Africa poses a dilemma for Soviet analysts. On the one hand, they claim that it would be the height of "leftist extremism" to count on creating a vanguard elitist party by decree, ignoring African realities. On the other hand, Solodovnikov reminds his readers that a mass party, eminently suited to the first stage of the national liberation movement, "cannot serve as a guarantee of the real flowering of democracy and the transition to a higher level of social development." (*Politicheskie* . . . p. 63) In the Soviet view, transformations in the political superstructure — ensuring both an elitist leadership and mass appeal—are essential for the establishment of a socialist system.

Because Sékou Touré's Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) is the sole revolutionary-democratic party in sub-Saharan Africa to have survived the first decade of independence, it is assumed by Soviet analysts to have resolved the mass party *vs.* vanguard party problem. Whereas Nkrumah did not heed the advice of those progressives *(i.e.,* Soviets) who warned him to restructure his Convention People's Party (CPP), and Mali's Union Soudanaise (US) changed suddenly from a party granting membership to one-third of the population to one whose functionaries were independent of the people, the PDG relied on party schools to instill a revolutionary-democratic outlook in the cadres of the streamlined political structure. This move has the approval of Soviet analysts who have long assumed that the triumph of socialism in Africa wil be conditional upon the quality of political leadership (Legvold, p. 179).

Nevertheless, although the

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hope is still held out that revolutionary-democratic African leaders will be able to triumph over various socio-economic obstacles, it is recognized that the severity and variety of these barriers may bring down even the most promising non-capitalist leaders. Solodovnikov continues, of course, to prescribe "the introduction of deep social transformations which can create the necessary conditions for rapid economic growth," (*Afrika . . .*, p. 76) However, after reading his catalogue of the difficulties facing the African states, one cannot escape the conclusion that this sort of glib statement is simply a concession to ideology. For not only does he acknowledge time and time again that social revolution is an exceedingly complex task, but he also admits that the economic sphere is proving surprisingly resistant to change:

It is necessary to note that among the leaders of the new sovereign countries there was a definite underestimation of the difficulty of liquidating economic backwardness. It seemed to them that one had only to banish the colonies and the tempo of economic development and the standard of living would immediately rise. It must be said that many of us thought that. (Afrika . . ., *p. 69)*

Instead, his survey of the African economic scene after a decade of independence reveals low rates of agricultural productivity, high investment in the service sector, and continued dependence on capitalist markets and foreign aid to finance even minimal development efforts. The survey further reveals that the gap between rich and poor states is constantly increasing.

AFTER DELINEATING the many obstacles to economic progress, what solutions does Solodovnikov propose? He offers up three possible answers for the African states: increasing domestic productivity, reducing capitalist influence, and obtaining more assistance from the developed nations. Yet, as he analyzes these possibilities, his underlying pessimism is quickly discernible. With respect to the prospects for improved domestic output, he proceeds from the familiar commentary about excessive population growth to note that Africa's raw material resources are its only potential advantage. The communal system of agricultural production, long touted by Soviet advisers as a force facilitating the attainment of socialism, is now berated:

At one time the African commune was idealized. . . . The conclusion was drawn that it could facilitate Africa's transition to socialism. However, the tribal commune, which includes 80–90 percent of the rural inhabitants, is a barrier to the differentiation of the peasantry, to the formation of class and national consciousness, holds it prisoner to religious-communal dogmas, and in the final analysis interferes with the development of production forces and with social progress. (Africa . . ., *p. 84; cf. Legvold, p. 281)*

Leaders of African revolutionary-democratic parties are warned against "communal mysticism," the "romantic, neo-Narodnik idealization of the commune" which captivated them in the past. (*Politicheskie . . .*, pp. 82–83) Thus, the commune, which in more halcyon days won Soviet approval as a potential positive force which progressive leaders could actualize, is now listed as one of Africa's more damaging peculiarities.

Solodovnikov is also more cautious in his analysis of capitalist influence. Although admitting that "regardless of slogans, capitalism is developing quite fast in an extensive group of African countries" (*Politicheskie . . .*, p. 5), he seems to distinguish between capitalism as a political-economic system and capitalist states as a source of developmental funds and expertise. The collaboration of segments of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie with foreign capital interests might be reprehensible, but hasty nationalization should be abjured. What African regimes should strive for is to turn foreign capital to their own interests.

This stance may stem from the noticeable reluctance of the Soviet government to allocate substantial funds to Africa as a relatively unimportant area of foreign influence. As a result, Soviet analysts may be attempting to deflect aid requests away from Moscow by alternating between prescriptions for greater African self-reliance and charges of imperialist blame for Africa's plight.

Thus, Solodovnikov is impelled to gloss over his own warning about the inescapable exploitation that results from expanding relations with imperialist countries in order to counteract mounting demands from the Third World that all developed states—capitalist or socialist—allocate one percent of their GNP to underdeveloped nations. After implying that this request is unfair to poorer states such as the Soviet Union, he rails against the replacement of the imperialist criterion with that of the level of development as an index of responsibility. He concludes that the Soviet Union cannot and will not take responsibility for the

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consequences of past imperialism and present capitalist exploitation of the Third World. (*Afrika*, p. 98)

Of course, this denial of responsibility does not mean that the USSR will not strive to further an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation between Africa and the socialist commonwealth. In fact, Solodovnikov acknowledges that such cooperation, "originally limited by considerations of politics and ideology, is now growing steadily in the area of economics." He states that the USSR not only directs eight percent of its trade with Africa to countries of socialist orientation(!) but continues to provide a ready market for African raw materials in exchange for machines and equipment. Unfortunate though it is that African exports should consist of products so dependent on an unstable world market, the Soviet Union can at least promise (a) to offer machinery rather than consumer goods in exchange, (b) to press for an international agreement regulating prices for raw materials, and (c) to help develop Africa's industrial potential if considerations of economic rationality so dictate. However, Solodovnikov makes it very clear that the USSR cannot be expected unduly to limit its own pace of development to aid the African countries.

Thus, in spite of Solodovnikov's frequent references to increasing imperialist influence, Chinese left-extremist agitation, and the attempts by certain African nations to promote what they call a "third path" of development—*i.e.*, a path that is neither capitalist nor socialist—it is apparent that the potential risks of reduced Soviet involvement in Africa are not deemed sufficiently compelling to warrant a change in policy. Socialism will inevitably triumph in sub-Saharan Africa, but that is a matter for the future. The downgrading of Africa's importance in the total Soviet scheme, the initial processes of which Robert Legvold so ably traced, is still the primary characteristic of the USSR's Africa policy in 1972.

The Agricultural Base of China's Political Economy

By Werner E. Klatt

KANG CHAO: *Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949-65.* Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.
JUNG-CHAO LIU: *China's Fertilizer Economy.* Chicago, Aldine, 1970.

AFTER THE BRIEF reconstruction period (1949–1951) following Mao Tse-tung's seizure of power in China, the People's Republic adopted an economic policy strongly emphasizing industrial development. It is therefore not surprising that during the first decade or so of Communist rule in China, Western analysts concentrated on the urban and industrial aspects of the Chinese scene. To be sure, the standard works published in this period considered the contribution of the farming industry to the country's total output, but it was only in the 1960's —when the Chinese leaders themselves rediscovered the importance of farm production— that Western scholars turned their attention to this aspect of China's political economy. The volumes under review, by Kang Chao and Jung-Chao Liu, respectively, are worthy examples of this trend.

The state of the rural economy is indeed important in today's China, for the People's Republic remains a predominantly agrarian community despite the great efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to industrialize the country. The CCP inherited a land in which four-fifths of the population lived in villages and well over three-quarters of the working people were engaged in farming operations of one kind or another. Two decades later, these proportions have changed very little. Only a fraction of the net increase in population over this period has been able to find a livelihood outside the rural areas, although the share of farming in the PRC's overall economic performance has

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declined. Hence one must view China as a country whose politics are determined as much by the success or failure of rural production brigades, collectives and communes, as by the efforts of workers and managers of the public industrial sector.

Despite this, much of the available literature on agriculture and agricultural policy in the PRC has been of limited usefulness. An early account of the CCP's agrarian policy, written by Chao Kuo-chun following a temporary visit to his home country, showed signs of uncertain judgment—possibly reflecting the strain of divided loyalties.[1] Nor have Western scholars such as Owen L. Dawson, Peter Schran, and Dwight H. Perkins[2] found it any easier to assess the meaning and impact of Chinese Communist policies in this area. Dawson, who had served as US agricultural attache in pre-Maoist China, found it difficult to decide whether to attribute the favorable performance of Chinese cultivators in the 1950's to improved morale or to the cold front of indifference shown toward this sector by CCP policy. Professor Schran, taking an ambivalent view of the accuracy of official Chinese data, concluded—somewhat inconclusively—that the consequences of the CCP's farm policies during the first postreconstruction decade (1950–59) were more adverse than the Communists had been willing to admit but less severe than most Western observers had believed. Professor Perkins, rightly dissatisfied with contemporary analyses of Chinese agriculture, chose to place his own study within the context of 600 years of agricultural development in China—an almost impossible undertaking. His sweeping conclusion that grain supplies in China have successfully kept up with a tenfold increase in population over a span of six centuries, thanks to increased inputs of land, labor and capital, may provide a broad standard by which to judge the efficacy or shortcomings of Chinese Communist farm policies, but the author tells us little about the formulation and substance of these policies, or their implementation.

Against this background, Professor Kang Chao's history of the first 15 years of Communist agricultural policy in China represents a valuable contribution. Although the thorny road from land reform to the amalgamation of cultivators' homesteads into large and even gigantic farming institutions has been charted before, the author analyzes some of the less-publicized materials concerning internal policy controversies over agriculture—disputes which at times split the CCP right down the middle. We discern from this account that Mao consistently held the more radical views. By well-tried tactics, such as the packing of a vital Central Committee meeting in October 1955 with sympathetic regional party secretaries, he managed to prevail over more cautious voices. Surely no "liberal agrarian reformer," Mao has always been a revolutionary to the core, and most of the time his views have had disastrous effects on China's rural sector.

As a case in point, Kang Chao notes the "eight-point charter" on agricultural development which bears Mao's imprimatur.[3] This document set impossibly high targets for agricultural production over a 12-year period from 1956 to 1967, the targets being based on a simplistic correlation of certain inputs with outputs which ignored critical interdependencies obvious to any agricultural specialist. Although the resulting lack of progress in farm production was blamed by domestic and foreign apologists alike on adverse weather, Chou En-lai himself ultimately was to admit some of the human follies which caused the CCP to abandon long-term agricultural planning in the early 1960's.

Lately, Chinese agriculture has performed somewhat better, although hardly as well as Kang Chao suggests. The author overestimates the favorable impact of fertilizer on crop yields in the early years of its application (more on this below). In dealing with the important question of consumption, Kang Chao overstates grain consumption by equating it to total supply (p. 250). In fact, human consumption is equivalent to total supply minus nonfood use. Since the latter is not constant over time, a distinction should always be made between supply and consumption. The fact that in most cases the author presents his statistical material in Chinese units lessens the utility of the book for Western scholars, as well as for the world's grain traders, who are likely to display a growing interest in the Chinese market as it becomes more accessible.

PROFESSOR JUNG-CHAO LIU'S slim volume on *China's Fertilizer*

[1] *Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-59,* London, Asia Publishing House, 1960.

[2] Dawson, *Communist China's Agriculture,* New York, Praeger, 1970; Schran, *The Development of Chinese Agriculture: 1950-59,* Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1969; and Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China: 1368-1968,* Chicago, Aldine, 1969.

[3] "Draft Program on Agricultural Development," *Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-k'an* (Peking), No. 22, Nov. 25, 1957.

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Economy is certainly more than a footnote to Kang Chao's broad study. Since most commentators on China's agriculture place due, even undue, emphasis on the role of fertilizer as the most recent and most effective input to Chinese farm production, publication of this highly competent study redounds to the credit of the Committee on the Economy of China under the American Social Science Research Council. Professor Liu left no stone unturned in his effort to present a fair and coherent picture of one of the more complex sectors of the Chinese economy. It is worth noting here that his data on fertilizer output and consumption for most of the 1955–65 decade are lower than those given by Kang Chao. Not surprisingly, Liu's estimates are also lower than Chinese claims for those years for which official data have been published.

Several words of caution seem in order concerning both authors' assessments of the relationship between fertilizer inputs and grain output. First, one must know whether China's limited supply of commercial fertilizer (in 1965 about 13 pounds per acre, or roughly one-fourth of that available per acre in the United States) was used on grain or commercial crops. In fact, before the 1958 Great Leap Forward, roughly half of China's fertilizer was used to raise cotton and other commercial crops. After the bad years of 1959–61, official policy stressed application of fertilizer to grain crops. However, since the financial return from the use of fertilizer in cotton production was at times twice as great as in paddy-rice growing, farming practice may well have been at variance with official intent. Any observant visitor to a commune knows how easily a load of fertilizer can find its way to a field other than that for which it was earmarked.

Even assuming that the assigned fertilizer made its way to the grain fields, one has reason to doubt that its impact was as great as suggested by Chao and Liu. They accept figures of 3.5 or 4 units of incremental grain output for every incremental unit of fertilizer (the latter measured in terms of ammonium sulphate). Judging from the poor quality of some Chinese nitrogen products, the phosphate deficiency of irrigated lands, and the lack of phosphates in the fertilizer mix of China today, one must consider such yields improbably high. Significantly, the statistical samples on which the authors based their calculations were very small.

Even if one takes a somewhat more cautious view of the impact of fertilizers, however, it would appear that China was able to harvest approximately 200 million tons of grain (including potatoes, measured in grain equivalents) during 1970. Allowing for an additional input of some four or five million tons of imported grain and assuming a population not in excess of 750 million, one arrives at an estimated 213 kilograms of grain per head of population—equal to 1,650 calories a day from cereals alone. With an estimated input of 500 more calories from other sources, this diet provides quite well for the life and work of the population of the age-composition and body-weight existing today in the PRC. It is therefore not surprising that, like Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery before him, President Nixon found few lean Chinese on the streets of Peking.

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Czechoslovakia: 1968 in Perspective

By Zvi Y. Gitelman

GALIA GOLAN:
The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962-1968. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.
BARBARA WOLFE JANCAR:
Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power: A Study of Political Power in a Communist System. New York, F. A. Praeger, 1971.

THE LITERATURE ON THE events in Czechoslovakia in 1968-69 has evolved in what may be a natural order—from the immediate and the dramatic to the historical and analytic. First came the journalistic reports of the invasion triggered by the "Prague Spring"; next came descriptions of the "Spring" itself and some "inside" views of various of its aspects; now there are beginning to appear more analytic studies examining the developments in 1968 in terms of the evolution of the system in the preceding decade. By this time the events are familiar to us; the merit of the books reviewed here is that they place 1968 in broader contexts which, in one case, allow us to understand better the nature of the Czechoslovak reform movement, and, in the other, place the Czechoslovak events in the setting of systemic problems common among European Communist states. Galia Golan traces the evolution of what she calls the "reform movement" in Czechoslovakia from 1965 through the Soviet invasion, while Barbara Jancar argues that the crisis in Czechoslovakia was the outcome of an inherent contradiction in the goals and functions of Communist systems.

Miss Golan, an American who emigrated to Israel in 1966 and now teaches at the Hebrew University, convincingly demonstrates that the events of 1968 were not phenomena *ex nihilo,* but were the products of a reform movement which had begun in the early 1960's, had coexisted uncomfortably from 1963 to 1967 with the conservative elite headed by Antonin Novotny, and had been forced into an openly oppositionist stance by the breakdown of "the uneasy compromise that Novotny had made with the liberals in 1963." To the reformist elements, "it became increasingly clear that further progress would only come if Novotny and his major supporters were removed." Miss Golan accepts the arguments of Zdenek Mlynar and other Czechoslovak liberals that the reforms in various spheres—including the economy, the arts, and education—of necessity began to overlap, with "reforms in one area demanding reforms in another in order to be fully effective." She provides us with a rather detailed picture of various reformist ideas in economics, politics, and social and cultural life which had been bruited about since the early 1960's. At times, this becomes a catalog of heterodox or merely fresh notions published in a wide variety of sources, and one gets the impression that the author felt obliged to report every such manifestation, without really weighing its intrinsic worth or its political consequences. Thus the picture that emerges is somewhat overdrawn, and a reader who is not too familiar with the recent history of Czechoslovakia might get the idea that the country was a boiling cauldron of heretical ideas for almost a decade before 1968 and that Novotny and his supporters simply served as passive foils for the reformers—which was hardly the case.

Nevertheless, the wealth of detail presented by Miss Golan does succeed in underscoring the basic problems confronting the regime and the attempts made to solve them: We see that the "reform movement" was not a unified movement at all, but became such only in 1967 when the various disaffected elements—Slovaks, students, social scientists, party leaders, among others—realized that their interests were coalescing and that change could be brought about only by the coordination of the discontented elements. It becomes clear also that the "Prague Spring" was not sim-

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ply the explosion of smoldering disaffections, but a further extension of some significant reforms which had already taken place—if not with the enthusiastic support, then at least with the official approval, of the Novotny regime. We are reminded that the economic reforms were planned and approved before Novotny fell from power, and that by the fall of 1966 the party had appointed a committee of social scientists and other scholars to prepare studies on "the development of the political system in socialist society"—that is, in effect, to prepare a new political model for Czechoslovakia. A good two years earlier, in 1964, the National Assembly had already begun not only to meet more frequently but also to debate and reject proposed bills. And all the while there had been a steady flow of reformist notions. As early as 1963 Ondrej Kopcok had expressed some of the basic ideas of the political reforms later adopted in 1968; in 1965 the Slovak theoretician, Julius Strinka, had called for an *institutionalized* and legitimized opposition; and in the same year Mlynar had published an article in no less a forum than the *World Marxist Review* on the need to recognize the existence and legitimize the activities of interest groups in socialist societies.[1]

In Miss Golan's view, a constant tug of war went on between the reformers and the conservatives in the 1960's; eventually, the reformers won out because more and more groups joined their side and began to pull together in a coordinated effort. "Thus Novotny was replaced not as a result of a 'power struggle' or of outside forces but rather as a victim of a movement forced on him four years earlier by many of the same people responsible for his demise [sic] in December 1967." The "Prague Spring" began as a "revolution from above," with the masses largely indifferent to what they saw at first as merely a change of personnel; but by March 1968, the population realized that fundamental changes were in the making, and it began to play a major role in shaping and directing those changes. The reform movement adopted what both Golan and Jancar consider to be a typically Czech political style, concentrating on legal, institutional changes which hopefully would give the reforms stability and permanence, rather than contenting itself with dramatic gestures and *ad hoc* changes.

Miss Golan concludes that the Soviet invasion came, not because the Soviets feared the defection of Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp, but because they considered Prague's internal reforms an unacceptable, dangerous deviation from the Soviet model, a precedent that could well be attractive to reformist elements not only in Eastern Europe but in the USSR itself. "There is every reason to believe that the Czechoslovak reform movement believed it could realize its program within the context of communism and alliance with the Soviets. It was Moscow, not Prague, which said —perhaps proved—the contrary." The author is now convinced that no genuine move away from the Soviet model will be possible in Eastern Europe unless the Soviets themselves change their system of rule.

WHILE MISS GOLAN concentrates on a descriptive history of reformist ideas, Miss Jancar takes a more analytic approach, dealing topically with those elements she feels were most crucial in explaining the evolution of reform in Czechoslovakia. Her thesis is that Communist systems are no longer totalitarian, since they do not exercise total control or make wide use of terror. Communist systems are characterized by an absolute monopoly of power, which implies exclusive, rather than total, control, "by virtue of which no other groups or individuals can compete with the ruling group." What happened in the 1960's in Czechoslovakia was the "progressive erosion of the absolute monopoly." While the latter history is persuasively demonstrated, it seems to the reviewer that the author's distinction between exclusive and total control may be more apparent than real. If control is not total, it cannot be exclusive, unless one assumes that there are areas of social and political life that are "controlled" by no one at all; in any event the terms require more precise definition.

Miss Jancar identifies eight areas over which the ruling group exercises control, and argues that a monopoly of the national economy serves two functions: (1) economic development, and (2) "isolation, security and control." The purpose of the second function is "to make sure that no one rises to a position of executive or official importance who will not support the ruling group, and that no possibility of an opposition forming an independent economic base arises."

These two basic functions increasingly clash with each other, since economically sound proposals—such as the reforms pro-

[1] Zdenek Mlynar, "Theory and Practice of Building Socialistm," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), No. 12, December 1965, pp. 75-81.

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posed in Czechoslovakia—will be rejected for as long as possible by the ruling group because they threaten to weaken its monopoly control of the economy. "The [regime's] problem is always to retain control while still increasing production." In the Czechoslovak case, however, the requirements of production became so acute by the mid-1960's that the leadership was forced to yield on the second function and to relax its exclusive control. Miss Jancar demonstrates the diffusion of initiative to elements beyond the ruling group, showing how the monopolies of the elite were eroded in law, the economy, ideology and culture, the mass media, and the political system. Particularly noteworthy is her treatment of the role of Czech political culture and of Slovak nationalism in bringing about the erosion of the regime's absolute monopoly of power. She also offers an incisive analysis of the divisions within the reformist camp, as well as of the limitations of the 1968 "Action Program" of the Czechoslovak ruling party.

It is difficult, however, to agree with some of the author's hypotheses concerning Czechoslovakia's role in the socialist camp and in the international arena in general. She suggests that the major aim of the Novotny regime was to "desatellize," that is, "to win an independent position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union," and in order to do this, "it had no other course than to mobilize popular support by liberalization." Yet because of the democratic political culture, she argues, liberalization took its own course and the absolute monopoly of power crumbled. It is hard to accept this contention in view of the fact that in many ways Novotny was one of the most slavish imitators of Soviet policy (except on the issue of destalinization) and that precisely for this reason his regime drew severe criticism at the Czechoslovak Writers' Congress in June 1967, an important prologue to his downfall. Moreover, the extent of liberalization that took place under Novotny occurred despite his wishes, not because of them. Furthermore, even the Dubcek leadership did not attempt to dissociate Czechoslovakia from the USSR or from the Warsaw Pact—and in fact was more conservative in this respect than the Hungarians and Poles in 1956 or the Romanians in the 1960's.

Again, Miss Jancar seems to argue that desatellization took precedence over democratization when she states: "There is no doubt that what alarmed the five Warsaw Pact countries . . . was that internal developments in the CSSR would encourage the shifting of Czechoslovak foreign policy, and that this shift would further promote the erosion of absolute monopoly . . . which would inevitably undermine the entire community." Yet from Soviet, Polish and East German commentaries on Czechoslovakia, it would seem that to the Communist regimes the really troublesome aspects of the Czechoslovak reforms lay in evolving internal changes which could spread to other countries *directly* and *immediately,* and that all the verbiage about the German threat simply served as a smokescreen to rally the Soviet and East European populations against the Czechoslovak reformers by raising the one issue most likely to frighten those who had suffered so much at the hands of the Nazis. Certainly, the changes in internal policy in 1968 were far more radical, and therefore more threatening, than the hesitant attempts of the Dubcek regime at some reorientation in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy.

Miss Jancar concludes that the absolute monopoly system will not be fundamentally changed from within even under the pressure of economic failure; any change will have to be in the nature of a "complete overthrow of the system, a revolution." Presumably, she applies this conclusion to all "absolute monopoly" systems, including the Soviet. Curiously enough, this brings us back to the lugubrious assumption of the totalitarian syndrome that such systems cannot change in an evolutionary manner but can only be overthrown, either from within or without. Yet the changes in the Soviet system since 1953, with all their contradictions and inconsistencies, seem to belie that assumption and show that important change can coexist with basic continuity. If the interlocking relationship between the USSR and Eastern Europe remains what it is today, then one can at the least entertain Miss Golan's assumption that changes in the USSR will open the door to changes in Eastern Europe. If that relationship changes, then a far wider range of possibilities may surface, and the Czechoslovak precedent of 1968 may become highly relevant —but both authors seem to assume that this will not be the case for the foreseeable future.

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Correspondence

TO THE EDITORS: Mr. Vladimir Petrov—in his reply (*Problems of Communism*, May-June, 1972) to myself on the subject of the treatment of pro-Cominform Yugoslavs in 1948—again avoided the point.

Would he suggest that Yugoslavia would be better off today if those who endorsed the Cominform's condemnation and expulsion of Tito and his party had not been "put out of circulation" (to use Mr. Petrov's own curious euphemism, or synonym, for his previous charge of "extermination")? He might care to put it to a poll of the Yugoslav people.

I could not, of course, share Dedijer's kind of association with Tito. One did not need to in this particular aspect of the 1948 story—the facts were on hand, well publicized, for one to see, hear and verify—but I did know Tito pretty well through those years of Cominform pressure and spoke with him on the subject at length many times.

Nor did I dispute Dedijer's figures of those placed under detention. He says "several thousand" and, again, "ten thousand." There is no difference there with the figure generally known at the time and which I quoted—"some thousands." But to equate Adriatic island detention with incarceration in Stalin's Siberian camps is rubbish (if only for geographical reasons), as Dedijer himself at that time would have bluntly—and rightly—replied if anyone had suggested it to him. I have said already that of course the detainees were not "feather-bedded." But few Yugoslavs indeed (apart from the ruling group and its activists with access to "privileged" party stores) fared much better or had a minimally decent living standard at that time.

The rehabilitation of men like Zujovic—one of the two most prominent of Tito's opponents in 1948—is *not "irrelevant,"* even if they subsequently were still excluded from politics. It is possible that some relative "innocents" were wrongly indicted. Given the acute tension of the Yugoslav situation and its amalgam of ideological bitterness and the traditional passion of South Slav politics, it would seem logical that some mistakes might have been made (though, throughout my long on-the-spot study of the crisis and its aftermath, I heard of no recorded, validated case of someone getting up and claiming to have been unjustly accused). The fact remains that—except for the affray in which Jovanovic was killed as he tried to go over the border to Cominformist Romania, and, later, the controversial "suicide" of Zujovic's partner Hebrang in jail—no one perished by violence. There were no executions or physical liquidations. The Stalinist activists were simply placed where they could do no harm in a situation of infinite peril to the vast majority of their countrymen—Dedijer included—who wished to be independent.

Internment is not unknown in other countries—democratic ones included—at such moments of dire national emergency. Whether the Yugoslav Cominformists should have been allowed to return to politics must be judged by local criteria and conditions, not by the sophisticated practices of older political systems which one expects to be more politically mature and, therefore, to feel more secure. They lost out politically, be it remembered—like Dedijer and Djilas later—within the limits and sanctions of a system they themselves helped create.

Finally, everyone knows that Yugoslavia's present "uniquely relaxed" style of government did not always apply. But its period of severe Stalinist orthodoxy, as adopted throughout Eastern Europe following the war, was brief indeed. It was not very long after 1948 that the first trends towards the later liberalization and far-reaching reform began to appear; it is all on the record. Dedijer—like Djilas—supported the regime both before and after 1948 without reserve. That by 1954 they began to find themselves out of sympathy with it is *not* relevant to its record and behavior during the five years of Stalin's unceasing efforts to destroy it. Nor is there occasion for undue or "idealistic" sympathy with those who would have blocked Yugoslavia's path to its present independence—and its broadly tolerable way of living for the vast majority—had they been given latitude enough to do so, especially when the country obviously may be put to new tests in the not too distant future.

ERIC BOURNE

MR. PETROV REPLIES: Eric Bourne insists on arguing his case with me rather than with Vladimir Dedijer, author of *The Battle Stalin Lost*. In my first comment, wishing to be gracious, I conceded that Tito's purge of the "Cominformists" was probably necessary. This concession did not satisfy Mr. Bourne, who is intent on proving that Tito has always been a great humanist who dealt with his enemies in the gentlest manner the circumstances permitted. Such a contention is silly.

One can mention such postwar exploits of the partisans as the mass slaughter of some 100,000 Croats who had surrendered to the British and were handed over to Tito's representatives near Bleiberg, of UDBA's hunting down of the Cetniks and other political opponents of the new regime—whose fate troubles neither Dedijer's nor Bourne's conscience. Bourne's point that 10,000 "Cominformists" were incarcerated on an Adriatic island (which by now may have been converted into a tourist paradise) rather than in a Siberian camp cannot prove Tito's humanism, if only because there were no Siberian camps at Tito's disposal; and I won't believe Bourne's contention that the prisoners enjoyed a living standard equal to or higher than that of most Yugoslavs on his say-so.

The question of whether the round-up of the "Cominformists" was an "inevitable mistake" which took place "within the limits and sanctions of a system they themselves had helped create" is irrelevant unless someone—like Mr. Bourne—simply wants to award Tito a high grade for his performance. For myself, I couldn't care less about the issue. Tito's outstanding place in history and his invaluable contribution to the evolution of communism in no way depend on the manner of his handling of his real or perceived enemies at the time of crisis. The latter is strictly a matter between him and his Creator.

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